Sensitivity to Emotion Specified in Facial Expressions and the Impact of Aging and Alzheimer's Disease by McLellan, Tracey Lee
SENSITIVITY TO EMOTION SPECIFIED IN FACIAL EXPRESSIONS
 AND THE IMPACT OF 
AGING AND ALZHEIMER’S DISEASE
___________________________________
A thesis 
submitted in fulfilment 
of the requirements for the Degree 
of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
at the 
University of Canterbury 
by 
Tracey L. McLellan
___________________________________
University of Canterbury 
2008
II
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I would like to sincerely thank and acknowledge the contributions of my supervisors in 
the production of this thesis. My thanks go first to Lucy Johnston for the expertise, 
education and all the encouragement I have received while conducting this research. Her 
patience and guidance are commendable and I am grateful for the opportunity to have 
learnt much more than I can demonstrate within the bounds of this thesis. I would also 
like to sincerely thank Richard Porter and John Dalrymple-Alford for their contributions 
to this thesis. Their knowledge and support is also very much appreciated. 
Special thanks go to my children, Jake and Taylor and my parents Rayna and Russell for 
all of their support and encouragement. On many occasions during the completion of this 
research, they made sacrifices to enable me to pursue my goals. This was both 
appreciated and admired. Special thanks also go to Lynden Miles for his inspirational 
ability and friendship throughout my experience at the University of Canterbury.  
A very big thank you goes to the members of the Social Perception Laboratory, including 
Alex Mackenzie, for their assistance and friendships. I would also like to thank the 
technical and administrative staff of the Department of Psychology, specifically Gerard 
Mesman, John Barton, Glenn Lewis, Howard Patterson, Robyn Daly, Barbara Hardie and 
Marie Kavanagh for their help and friendly advice. 
Finally, I would sincerely like to thank all of the fabulous participants and their family 
members who very kindly gave their valuable time to participate in this research. 
III
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................................................................... II
TABLE OF CONTENTS ..................................................................................................III
LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................... VII
LIST OF FIGURES...........................................................................................................IX
ABSTRACT ......................................................................................................................XI
CHAPTER 1........................................................................................................................1
General Overview............................................................................................................1
The Social Function of Emotion......................................................................................4
Facial Expressions ...........................................................................................................6
Posed and Genuine Facial Expressions ...........................................................................9
Differences between Posed and Genuine Expressions.............................................11
Facial Expression Recognition ......................................................................................18
Aging and Facial Expression Recognition ....................................................................21
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and Facial Expression Recognition.....................................25
Explanations for the Impairments Found in Previous Research....................................35
Neurological Explanation.........................................................................................35
Cognitive Decline Explanation ................................................................................40
Limitations in Previous Research ..................................................................................42
The Present Research.....................................................................................................45
CHAPTER 2......................................................................................................................48
Generation and Selection of Research Materials...........................................................48
Generation of Facial Displays .......................................................................................48
Method .....................................................................................................................50
Results ......................................................................................................................55
Measures of Cognitive Functioning ..............................................................................65
Test Descriptions......................................................................................................70
CHAPTER 3......................................................................................................................81
Sensitivity to Emotion Specified in Facial Expressions: Healthy Young Adults..........81
Experiment 1a: Categorization task...............................................................................84
Method .....................................................................................................................84
IV
Results ......................................................................................................................89
Discussion ................................................................................................................99
Experiment 1b: Priming task .......................................................................................100
Method ...................................................................................................................101
Results ....................................................................................................................103
Discussion ..............................................................................................................106
Experiment 2a: Categorization task.............................................................................106
Method ...................................................................................................................107
Results ....................................................................................................................109
Discussion ..............................................................................................................122
Experiment 2b: Priming task .......................................................................................123
Method ...................................................................................................................123
Results and Discussion...........................................................................................124
General Discussion ......................................................................................................126
CHAPTER 4....................................................................................................................129
Sensitivity to Emotion Specified in Facial Expressions: Healthy Older Adults .........129
Experiment 3a: Categorization task.............................................................................131
Method ...................................................................................................................131
Results ....................................................................................................................136
Discussion ..............................................................................................................150
Experiment 3b: Priming task .......................................................................................151
Method ...................................................................................................................151
Results and Discussion...........................................................................................153
General Discussion ......................................................................................................155
CHAPTER 5....................................................................................................................157
Sensitivity to Emotion Specified in Facial Expressions: Individuals with Alzheimer’s 
disease..........................................................................................................................157
Experiment 4a: Categorization task.............................................................................159
Method ...................................................................................................................159
Results ....................................................................................................................162
Discussion ..............................................................................................................169
VExperiment 4b: Priming task .......................................................................................171
Method ...................................................................................................................171
Results and Discussion...........................................................................................172
General Discussion ......................................................................................................174
CHAPTER 6....................................................................................................................176
Sensitivity to Emotion Specified in Facial Expressions: Group Comparisons ...........176
Group-matched Comparisons ................................................................................181
Case-matched Comparisons ...................................................................................184
Judgment Response Time............................................................................................188
Group Comparisons ...............................................................................................188
The Priming Task ........................................................................................................190
Group Comparisons ...............................................................................................190
CHAPTER 7....................................................................................................................192
General Discussion and Conclusions ..........................................................................192
REFERENCES ................................................................................................................210
Appendix A: Normative Ratings for IADS and IAPS Stimuli ........................................227
Appendix B: Example from the Response Sheet: Facial Expression Generation ...........228
Appendix C: Information Sheet: Facial Expression Generation .....................................227
Appendix D: Summary of the Procedure used to Generate Facial Expressions .............229
Appendix E: Debriefing Sheet and Consent Form: Facial Expression Generation.........230
Appendix F: Summary of the Affective Responses of Targets used in the Present 
Research...........................................................................................................................232
Appendix G: Instruction Sheet: Categorization Task......................................................239
Appendix H: General Health Interview...........................................................................240
Appendix I: Information sheet: Healthy Young Adults ..................................................241
Appendix J: Consent Form: Healthy Young Adults........................................................242
Appendix K: Formulae for calculation of non-parametric indices of sensitivity (A’) and 
response bias (B”)............................................................................................................243
Appendix L: Information Sheet: Older Adults ................................................................244
Appendix M: Consent Form: Older Adults .....................................................................246
Appendix N: Match words with Definitions task............................................................247
VI
Appendix O: Consent Statement by Relative: Individuals with AD...............................248
VII
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Summary of Research on the Recognition of Facial Expressions in Older Adults 
(OA)...................................................................................................................................23
Table 2. Summary of Recognition of Facial Expressions in Alzheimer’s disease (AD) ..32
Table 3. Number of Displays Available for Coding for Each Participant who met the 
Initial Stage 1-3 Criteria for Inclusion...............................................................................57
Table 4. Description of the Relevant Action Units Discussed in Relation to Happy, Sad 
and Fear Expressions .........................................................................................................59
Table 5. Number of Displays Retained after Coding ........................................................64
Table 6. Tests Used to Assess Cognitive and Behavioral Functions.................................66
Table 7. Test Protocol for Participants ..............................................................................69
Table 8. Demographic Characteristics of Participants in Experiment 1a..........................85
Table 9. Percentage of YES Responses by Judgment Condition and Facial Expression for 
each Emotion: Experiment 1a............................................................................................90
Table 10. Mean Hit (HIT) Rates, False Alarm (FA) Rates and Estimates of A’ by 
Judgment Condition for each Emotion: Experiment 1a ....................................................94
Table 11. Sensitivity Within and Between Emotions: Experiment 1a ..............................97
Table 12. Correlations between Sensitivity and Background Characteristics: Experiment 
1a .......................................................................................................................................98
Table 13.Demographic Characteristics of Participants in Experiment 1a.......................108
Table 14.Percentage of YES Responses by Judgment Condition and Facial Expression for 
Each Emotion: Experiment 2a.........................................................................................110
Table 15. Mean Hit (HIT) Rates, False Alarm (FA) Rates and Estimates of A’ by 
Judgment Condition for Each Emotion: Experiment 2a..................................................115
Table 16. Sensitivity Within and Between Emotions: Experiment 2a ............................117
Table 17. Correlations Between Sensitivity and Background Characteristics ................118
Table 18. Demographic Characteristics of Participants in Experiment 3a......................132
Table 19. Percentage of YES Responses by Judgment Condition and Facial Expression 
for Each Emotion: Experiment 3a ...................................................................................137
Table 20. Mean hit (HIT) Rates, False Alarm (FA) Rates and Estimates of A’ by 
Judgment Condition for Each Emotion: Experiment 3a..................................................142
VIII
Table 21. Sensitivity Within and Between Emotions: Experiment 3a ............................144
Table 22. Correlations Between Sensitivity, Background Characteristics and Cognitive 
Measures: Experiment 3a ................................................................................................146
Table 23. Demographic Characteristics of Participants in Experiment 4a......................160
Table 24. Percentage of YES Responses by Judgment Condition and Facial Expression 
for Each Emotion: Experiment 4a ...................................................................................162
Table 25.Mean Hit (HIT) Rates, False Alarm (FA) Rates and Estimates of A’ by 
Judgment Condition for Each Emotion: Experiment 4a..................................................165
Table 26. Sensitivity Within and Between Emotions: Experiment 4a ............................166
Table 27. Correlations Between Sensitivity, Background Characteristics and Cognitive 
Measures: Experiment 4a ................................................................................................168
Table 28. Measures used to Assess Cognitive and Behavioural Functions.....................178
Table 29. Comparison between Groups on Estimates of A’ and B’ by Judgment 
Condition and Emotion (Experiments 1a – 4a) ...............................................................181
Table 30. Comparison between Groups on Estimates of A’ and B’ by Judgment 
Condition and Emotion (Experiments 1a – 4a, neutral data removed) ...........................183
Table 31. Demographic Characteristics of Case-Matched Young Adults and Older Adults
.........................................................................................................................................185
Table 32. Demographic Characteristics of Case-Matched Older Adults and AD 
Participants ......................................................................................................................186
IX
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. A Genuine (A) and Posed (B) Smile .................................................................12
Figure 2. A Neutral Expression (A) and a Genuine Sad Expression that Involves 
Contraction of the Frontalis and Corrugator supecilii (B).................................................16
Figure 3. A Neutral Expression (A) and a Genuine Fear Expression that Involves 
Contraction of the Frontalis and Levator palpebrae superioris (B) ...................................17
Figure 4. Neutral (A) Expression and Posed (B) and Genuine (C) Happy Expressions...60
Figure 5. Neutral (A) Expression and Posed (B) and Genuine (C) Sad Expressions .......62
Figure 6. Neutral (A) Expression and Posed (B) and Genuine (C) Fear Expressions ......63
Figure 7. Percentage of YES Responses as a Function of Expression for each Condition: 
Experiment 1a....................................................................................................................91
Figure 8. Percentage of YES Responses as a Function of Expression for each Emotion: 
Experiment 1a....................................................................................................................92
Figure 9. Response Time to Categorise Words as a Function of Facial Expression Prime 
and Word Valence: Experiment 1b .................................................................................104
Figure 10. Percentage of YES Responses for Happiness Judgments as a Function of 
Expression and Condition: Experiment 2a ......................................................................111
Figure 11. Percentage of YES Responses for Sadness Judgments as a Function of 
Expression and Condition: Experiment 2a ......................................................................112
Figure 12. Percentage of YES Responses for Fear Judgments as a Function of Expression 
and Condition: Experiment 2a.........................................................................................114
Figure 13. Mean Response Time to Identify Happy Facial Displays as a Function of 
Expression and Condition: Experiment 2a ......................................................................120
Figure 14. Mean Response Time to Identify Fear Facial Displays as a Function of 
Expression and Condition: Experiment 2a ......................................................................121
Figure 15. Response Time to Categorise Words as a Function of Facial Expression Prime 
and Word Valence: Experiment 2b .................................................................................125
Figure 16. Percentage of YES Responses for Happiness Judgments as a Function of 
Expression and Condition: Experiment 3a ......................................................................138
Figure 17. Percentage of YES Responses for Sadness Judgments as a Function of 
Expression and Condition: Experiment 3a ......................................................................139
XFigure 18. Mean Response Time to Identify Facial Displays as a Function of Emotion 
and Expression: Experiment 3a .......................................................................................148
Figure 19. Mean Response Time to Identify Facial Displays as a Function of Condition 
and Expression: Experiment 3a .......................................................................................149
Figure 20. Response Time to Categorise Words as a Function of Facial Expression Prime 
and Word Valence: Experiment 3b .................................................................................154
Figure 21. Percentage of YES Responses as a Function of Expression Type for Each 
Condition: Experiment 4a................................................................................................163
Figure 22. Response Time to Categorise Words as a Function of Facial Expression Prime 
and Word Valence: Experiment 4b .................................................................................173
Figure 23. Mean Errors as a Function of Expression Prime and Word Valence: 
Experiment 4b .................................................................................................................174
Figure 24. Sensitivity to the Difference between Posed and Genuine Expressions as a 
Function of Group for Each Condition............................................................................187
Figure 25. Mean Response Time to Make Judgments of Facial Displays as a Function of 
Group for Each Expression..............................................................................................189
XI
ABSTRACT 
This thesis describes a program of research that investigated the sensitivity of healthy 
young adults, healthy older adults and individuals with Alzheimer’s disease (AD) to 
happiness, sadness and fear emotion specified in facial expressions. In particular, the 
research investigated the sensitivity of these individuals to the distinctions between 
spontaneous expressions of emotional experience (genuine expressions) and deliberate, 
simulated expressions of emotional experience (posed expressions). The specific focus 
was to examine whether aging and/or AD effects sensitivity to the target emotions. 
Emotion-categorization and priming tasks were completed by all participants. The tasks 
employed an original set of ecologically valid facial displays generated specifically for 
the present research. The categorization task (Experiments 1a, 2a, 3a, 4a) required
participants to judge whether targets were, or were not showing and feeling each target 
emotion. The results showed that all 3 groups identified a genuine expression as both 
showing and feeling the target emotion whilst a posed expression was identified more 
frequently as showing than feeling the emotion. Signal detection analysis demonstrated 
that all 3 groups were sensitive to the expression of emotion, reliably differentiating 
expressions of experienced emotion (genuine expression) from expressions unrelated to 
emotional experience (posed and neutral expressions). In addition, both healthy young 
and older adults could reliably differentiate between posed and genuine expressions of 
happiness and sadness, whereas, individuals with AD could not. Sensitivity to emotion 
specified in facial expressions was found to be emotion specific and to be independent of 
both the level of general cognitive functioning and of specific cognitive functions. The 
priming task (Experiments 1b, 2b, 3b,4b) employed the facial expressions as primes in a 
word valence task in order to investigate spontaneous attention to facial expression. 
Healthy young adults only showed an emotion-congruency priming effect for genuine 
expressions. Healthy older adults and individuals with AD showed no priming effects. 
Results are discussed in terms of the understanding of the recognition of emotional states 
in others and the impact of aging and AD on the recognition of emotional states. 
Consideration is given to how these findings might influence the care and management of 
individuals with AD. 
1CHAPTER 1
General Overview
Accurately perceiving the affective state of an interaction partner is a fundamental aspect 
of social functioning. Knowing the affective state of a partner allows individuals to act in 
adaptive ways and allows them to maximise potentials and minimise risks in the 
environment. It also allows for smooth communication and enhances the quality of social 
relationships, which is an important aspect of quality of life. Facial expressions provide a 
valuable source of information regarding the affective state of interaction partners, they 
are accessible, readily identified and confusion is rare among normally functioning 
adults. Facial expressions however are not always reliable, as individuals can and often 
do fake, mask, or suppress their facial expressions during the course of everyday activity. 
It is important for successful social interaction to be able to accurately perceive the 
veracity of information and be able to distinguish between facial expressions that specify 
the experiencing of a specific emotional state and facial expressions that are simply 
simulations of such expressions. Previous research has shown healthy young adults to 
indeed be sensitive to the differences between facial expressions specifying happiness 
and simulated or posed expressions of happiness.
The present thesis builds on this past research by considering sensitivity to facial 
expressions of sadness and fear, in addition to happiness amongst healthy young adults, 
healthy older adults and adults with Alzheimer’s disease (AD). Previous research 
examining facial expression recognition among older adults and individuals with AD has 
found deficits. These deficits either have been attributed to the cognitive decline that 
2accompanies normal aging and AD or have been found to be independent of cognitive 
decline and therefore a specific deficit. That is, it has been argued that expression 
recognition is both a distinct skill and a skill dependant on several aspects of general 
cognitive functioning. The relationship between expression recognition and cognition is 
unclear. Accordingly, the present research considered the relationship between perceiver 
sensitivity to affective state and various cognitive functions. A brief overview of the 
structure of the thesis and contents of each chapter is given below.
Chapter 1 provides an overview of the key areas of interest in the thesis. First, the 
functional approach to the study of emotions and the recognition of facial expressions of 
emotion will be considered. Within this section, the differences between posed and 
genuine expressions of emotion will be highlighted, in terms of function, ontology and 
physiognomy. Second, a review of the facial expression recognition literature pertaining 
to older adults and individuals with AD is presented. Following this the neurological and 
cognitive explanations for poorer performance are considered with an emphasis on 
identifying the neural basis for facial expression recognition and whether these are linked 
to the neurological changes that occur as a consequence of healthy aging and AD. 
Changes in cognitive function due to aging and AD are also discussed with an emphasis 
on the relationship between facial expression recognition and cognitive functioning. 
One of the limitations of much of the research that will be reviewed in this chapter is a 
lack of ecological validity in the facial displays employed in the research, with most 
studies relying solely on posed facial expressions of emotion. To fully understand the 
3ability of individuals to correctly identify the affective state of interaction partners, rather 
than simply their facial expressions, it is vital for research to employ valid facial 
expressions that mirror those seen in the relevant referent situations. Accordingly, the 
first stage of the reported research involved the generation of suitable facial displays.
Chapter 2 presents an account of how facial displays of posed, genuine and neutral 
expressions were generated. In addition, the neuropsychological tests used to measure 
cognitive functions and behavior of participants in the reported research is also 
introduced in Chapter 2.
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 each report the findings from two experiments – an emotion 
categorization task and an emotion-priming task. These were designed to assess perceiver 
sensitivity to the affective state of others and the ability of perceivers to differentiate 
between genuine and posed expressions of emotion. Chapter 3 reports the findings for 
healthy young adults, Chapter 4 for healthy older adults and Chapter 5 for AD patients. 
Chapter 6 compares the findings from the three participant groups, reporting both group 
and case-matched analyses. 
Chapter 7 provides a discussion of the reported findings within the context of previous 
research. The implications of the reported findings are considered in terms of the 
understanding of the recognition of emotional states in others and the impact of aging and 
AD on the recognition of emotional states. Further consideration is given to the 
implications of these findings for the care and management of individuals with AD. 
Directions for future research are also considered. 
4 The Social Function of Emotion
There is potentially a large range of emotions, however, theorists of emotion have largely 
agreed to the adaptive benefit of sets of discrete primary emotions. Ekman (1973)
suggests there are seven primary emotions common to the adaptive function of all human 
beings: sadness, anger, fear, surprise, disgust, contempt, and happiness1. These emotions 
form the basis of much that we consider integral to the human condition. Emotions are 
biologically based patterns of experience, physiology, communication and ultimately 
perception and action. Emotions are arguably best defined in terms of their function, 
namely the basis to inform and prepare an individual to relate adaptively to their 
environment. They are the solutions to problems and promote adaptive modes of 
behavior (Johnston, 2003; Keltner & Haidt, 2001). Emotion provides the impetus to seek 
opportunity (Gueguen & De Gail, 2003; Owren & Bachorowski, 2001) and to identify 
risk (Dimberg & Oehman, 1996; Green, Williams, & Davidson, 2003), functioning,
therefore, to help individuals respond to the world around them (Levenson, 1999). 
The environment in which individuals exist, the world around them, is largely social in 
nature. Many of the opportunities and risks in the environment are experienced in a social 
context or are the result of the social context. Beyond the intrapersonal function of 
informing and preparing the individual to adapt to their environment, emotions have 
                                                
1 Interest, shame/shyness, distress (Izard & Bartlett, 1972; Tomkins, 1962) and guilt (Izard & Bartlett, 
1972) are also suggested as primary emotions. Panksepp (1982) suggests there are fewer, namely, fear, 
rage, panic, and expectancy.
5important interpersonal functions (Keltner & Haidt, 1999, 2001). Given human behavior
is often governed by how individuals perceive others are feeling, emotions serve an 
important social and interpersonal function by enabling the individual to behave 
adaptively in social interactions. 
A social functional account of emotion contends that emotions serve three main 
functions. First, they provide information about the affective state of others, their 
intentions (Fridlund, 1992), likely future behavior and the nature of their relationships 
with each other (Keltner & Gross, 1999). They also provide information about the 
environment. Children have been shown to rely on parental facial expressions to assess 
situations that are ambiguous to them (Klinnert, 1984). For example, a child moved 
closer to his/her mother when she portrayed a fear expression than when she did not 
portray emotion. Second, emotions evoke complementary emotions and a contagion 
effect in others, as evidenced by complementary fearful reactions to angry faces 
(Dimberg & Oehman, 1996) and a tendency to experience emotions similar to those 
expressed by others in order to promote shared experience (Hatfield, Cacioppo, & 
Rapson, 1992), and hence, interpersonal rapport. Third, emotions serve as incentives or 
deterrents for other peoples’ behavior, as evidenced by the strength of emotional rewards 
and punishments in learning and shaping behavior (Bear, Manning, & Izard, 2003; 
Weinberg, Tronick, Cohn, & Olson, 1999). For example, emotions are attached to 
commercial messages in the advertising industry to promote better memory for the 
product (Baird, Wahlers, & Cooper, 2007) or are employed in road safety campaigns to 
shape more responsible behavior (Lewis, Watson, White, & Tay, 2007).  
6On a larger scale, the social function of emotions can help define group boundaries, help 
establish roles within the group and help negotiate problems. Sharing fear and anger 
toward non-group members has been shown to enhance group solidarity (Frijda & 
Mesquita, 1994). Likewise, the display of embarrassment can confer a low status on a 
member of a group (Keltner, Young, Heerey, Oemig, & Monarch, 1998). It has been 
suggested that children are helped to learn the norms and values of their culture by 
interpreting the facial expressions of their parents (Bretherton, Fritz, Zahn-Waxler, & 
Ridgeway, 1986). 
The functional utility of emotion as a guide to adaptive social behavior is predicated on 
the notion that emotion brings about positive consequences, for instance, that the display 
of sadness will evoke sympathy, help and closer social proximity. Similarly, during an 
interaction the display of happiness will promote future interactions and closer bonds. 
These examples demonstrate a functional role for emotion in the social context, the utility 
of which is dependant on both the expression and accurate recognition of emotion. 
Facial Expressions  
Emotions have expressive, observable components that allow perceivers to know about 
the emotional state of another. Information about affective state can be communicated 
through several channels, for instance, postural cues which convey emotion in the way an 
individual walks or holds their bodies (Atkinson, Tunstall, & Dittrich, 2007; Dittrich, 
7Troscianko, Lea, & Morgan, 1996) and prosodic cues that convey emotion in the 
intonation, speed and pitch of the voice (McNeely & Parlow, 2001). More time is spent 
looking at the face, however, than any other object or part of the body (e.g., Haxby, 
Hoffman, & Gobbini, 2002). The dynamic and highly visible nature of the face permits 
arguably the most accessible and efficient communication of emotion via facial 
expressions (Buck, 1994; Ekman & Rosenberg, 2005; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994). 
Facial expressions are ubiquitous symbols, signals and symptoms of emotional 
experience and communication. It has been suggested that the communicative impact of 
the face is so powerful that it is difficult to separate the message from the medium. That 
is, there is a tendency to describe facial action, or muscle contraction, in terms of the 
emotion portrayed rather than in anatomical terms (Rinn, 1984). Thus, a face may be 
described as happy or sad rather than describe the specific movements of the face.
Darwin (1872/1998) was among the first to hypothesize that facial expressions represent 
innate and automatic behavior patterns that have links with human emotions and result 
from natural selection. Selection pressures shaped facial musculature over millions of 
years of mammalian evolution and in concert promoted changes in brain development. 
Furthermore, it is argued that facial expressions of emotion evolved because their 
adaptive value for social communication promoted survival. For instance, detecting that 
an expression specifies fear permits an individual to evade danger or protect another 
person from danger. The need to exploit social knowledge and understand fellow human 
beings influenced development and the behavioral capacity that set apart the human 
8species from other primates. Darwin concluded, therefore, that facial expressions of 
emotion were biologically linked to emotional state, but had acquired a social 
communication function.
An important debate about facial expressions centers on the definition of whether the 
displays of the basic emotions are a symptom of emotion and therefore a ‘readout’ that 
serves to express the affective state of an individual or whether they are primarily a 
means to communicate socially. The ‘emotion expression view’ (Buck, 1994) posits that 
facial displays are clearly revealed in solitude and although social functions are the basis 
for the evolution of displays, social interaction is not necessary to elicit facial 
expressions. The ‘behavioral ecology view’ (Fridlund, 1992; Frijda & Mesquita, 1994), 
in contrast, criticizes the stance that emotion should be regarded as the major determinant 
of facial displays and suggests that displays are social tools that serve social motives 
based on the intentions toward a given social environment. 
Several studies have shown these two functions are not mutually exclusively and suggest 
the primary role of social communication is not inconsistent with the presence of 
underlying affective state and vice-versa (Johnston, 2003; Keltner & Haidt, 2001; Norris, 
Chen, Zhu, Small, & Cacioppo, 2004). Facial displays therefore serve two broad 
functions: They are an expression of emotional state as well as a means to communicate 
knowledge about the social context, and accordingly both roles are crucial to successful 
social functioning. 
9Successful social functioning is also dependant on establishing the veracity of facial 
expressions. Individuals can, and often do, mask, fake and suppress their facial 
expressions for a variety of reasons and in many aspects of everyday life. This is because 
it is not always adaptive to engage in behavior that openly announces one’s affective state 
to others. For example, an individual may mask a sad expression when they deem such an 
expression might confer vulnerability to others that is not advantageous, or they might 
fake a smile to encourage convenient closer social proximity. The following section 
considers the differences between posed and genuine facial expressions, and in particular, 
how these expressions relate to affective state. 
Posed and Genuine Facial Expressions  
As has been discussed, emotions help an individual function in an adaptive way to the 
contingencies of his/her environment. The most accessible example of the expressive 
component of emotion, the facial expression, provides a social perceiver with the 
opportunity to acquire knowledge about the emotional state of others. Because 
individuals can partially decouple their facial expressions from how they feel (Ekman, 
Friesen, & O'Sullivan, 1988), they can utilize facial displays for a variety of reasons other 
than to signal their emotional experience. For example, individuals smile as part of 
cursory social etiquette regardless of whether they are happy or not. Individuals also 
smile to disguise other feelings (Gosselin, Warren, & Diotte, 2002), to communicate 
friendliness and likeability (Hecht & LaFrance, 1998), and to convey trustworthiness 
(Ekman & Friesen, 1982; Hecht & LaFrance, 1998; Provine, 1997). Similarly, individuals 
10
can look sad because they feel sad or because they wish to communicate that they 
understand that sadness is the appropriate or desired response. They may even feign a sad 
expression to ‘lure’ sympathy or forgiveness. Parents have been shown to use fake facial 
expressions as a means to facilitate children’s learning (Gerull & Rapee, 2002), by 
conveying a seemingly stronger message because it is accompanied by the concept of 
emotion. Similarly, children have been shown to control their facial expressions, hence,
attempting to decouple the expression from their experience, from as young as four years 
old (Davis, 1995).
In a variety of different ways, posed expressions may be employed to gain advantage 
over interaction partners or to facilitate a particular goal. Both posed and genuine 
expressions are therefore important, during social interaction. However, they provide 
different information to the perceiver, and are consequently meaningfully different in 
terms of social significance. Not only is the difference important, but the sensitivity of the 
perceiver to the different expressions is also an important skill that has likely developed 
in a type of ‘arms race’. In other words, the adaptive advantage of producing 
disingenuous expressions is mirrored by the adaptive advantage of developing sensitivity 
to the veracity of the emotion specified in the facial expressions. The bases of the 
difference between posed and genuine expressions are ontological and physiognomic; 
hence, the following section will consider these two types of expressions, highlighting the 
ontological distinction (Buck, 1984) and also the subtle differences in their physical 
manifestation (Ekman, Hager, & Friesen, 1981).
11
Differences between Posed and Genuine Expressions
Physiognomic Differences
There are physiognomic differences between posed and genuine expressions that result 
from and reflect the different ontological bases of these two types of expressions. The 
vast majority of research investigating the physiognomic differences between posed and a 
genuine expression has focused on expressions of happiness, that is, smiles. 
Consequently, when considering the physiognomic differences between posed and 
genuine expressions here, more detail can be provided with regard to happy expressions.
Happy expressions
Ekman and Freisen (1982) suggested that there are five potential markers that distinguish 
posed from genuine smiles. These are the Duchenne marker; the symmetry of zygomatic 
major contraction; the smoothness of contraction; the duration of expression; and the 
degree of synchrony of action. The Duchenne marker, in particular will be considered in 
the following section because this marker is the most relevant to the facial displays that 
have been employed in the present research. 
Duchenne de Boulogne (Ekman, Davidson, & Friesen, 1990) was a French neurologist 
and anatomist who was the first to report differences between spontaneous smiles 
expressing positive emotion and intentional posed smiles. Duchenne noted that deliberate 
contraction of the zygomatic major muscle, which extends from the top of the cheekbone
to the upper lip and pulls the corners of the mouth obliquely upward and is the 
12
prototypical smile configuration of the mouth, did not give an impression of happiness. In 
comparison, the facial expression that resulted from his subject hearing a joke involved,
in addition to zygomatic contraction, contraction of the orbicularis oculi muscle. This 
muscle pulls the skin surrounding the eyes toward the eyeball causing wrinkles or crow’s 
feet, and did give the impression of happiness. Duchenne concluded that contraction of 
the orbicularis oculi (later termed the Duchenne marker) was a reliable marker to 
distinguish genuine/involuntary (Duchenne smiles) from posed/voluntary smiles. Figure
1 shows an example of a genuine smile that involves contraction of the orbicularis oculi 
and zygomatic major muscles as well as a posed smile that only involves contraction of 
the zygomatic major muscle.
                 
                                     A                                                                   B
Figure 1. A Genuine (A) and Posed (B) Smile  
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The conclusion that some muscles in the face can be voluntarily controlled while others 
cannot was supported by later evidence showing that there are neurological differences in 
brain activation associated with voluntary and involuntary facial movement (Rinn, 1984). 
Genuine expressions involve older sub-cortical neural pathways (Damasio, 1994), 
specifically the anterior cingulate region, limbic region and basal ganglia. Innervations of 
the facial muscles occur via the extra-pyradimal motor system (Gazzaniga, Ivry, & 
Mangun, 2002). In contrast, posed expressions originate from the left hemisphere motor 
cortex and they are innervated via the pyradimal tract (Gazzaniga & Smylie, 1990). 
Distinctions of these neural pathways can be observed in stroke patients. Those who have 
experienced damage to the motor cortex, where voluntary expressions originate, show 
asymmetrical voluntary facial movements but the symmetry of involuntary expressions
remains intact. Those with damage to older subcortical areas like the anterior cingulate,
where involuntary expressions originate, show asymmetry during involuntary facial 
expressions but not during voluntary contraction of muscles (Damasio, 1994). Indeed,
before the advent of neural imaging, facial movement had long been used to help 
diagnose brain injury (DeJong, 1979). Ekman, Roper and Hager (1980) also provide 
support for the claim that the Duchenne marker (genuine smile) is not under volitional 
control by demonstrating that only approximately 20% of individuals can voluntarily 
contract the key lateral portion of the orbicularis oculi muscle. 
In addition to the Duchenne marker, posed and genuine smiles differ with regard to 
symmetry, with the latter being more symmetrical than the former (Ekman et al., 1981; 
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Gazzaniga & Smylie, 1990; Rinn, 1984). Likewise genuine smiles are smoother and 
involve a more regular contraction of muscles throughout the expression than do posed 
smiles, which likely appear irregular in comparison (Ekman & Friesen, 1982). Research 
has reported that posed smiles have more pauses and changes in intensity than genuine 
smiles (Hess & Kleck, 1990) and genuine smiles are more consistent in the duration of 
the different phases of the expression (Frank, Ekman, & Friesen, 1993). The overall 
duration of smiles has also been suggested as a marker. Genuine smiles are more 
consistent, typically lasting between 0.5 and 4 seconds, than posed smiles, the duration of 
which is more erratic (Ekman & Friesen, 1982).
There is no evidence to suggest these differences in symmetry, smoothness and 
consistency would be limited to expressions of happiness, rather smiles are expressions 
that are more accessible and therefore have been the expression of choice to demonstrate 
such differences. Future research is needed to confirm whether these markers have utility 
to distinguish posed from genuine expressions of other emotions.
Sad expressions
Unlike smiles, there is no converging evidence to suggest whether genuine expressions of 
sadness involve the contraction of reliable muscles that, therefore, form the basis of a 
physiognomic difference between posed and genuine expressions. However, contracting 
the frontalis and corrugator/depressor supecilii, which raise and lower the inner brow 
respectively and result in a straightening of the inner portion of eyebrow or an oblique 
angle and a triangulation of the inner upper eye lid, have been nominated as core 
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movements of sadness in most accounts of prototypic expressions (e.g., Ekman, 2002; 
Gosselin, Kirouac, & Dore, 1995; Kohler et al., 2004). In at least one study that sought to 
establish the mean probability of occurrence of specific muscle movements in the face 
during felt and unfelt emotional experience, these two muscle movements were more 
probable in felt than unfelt displays of sadness (Gosselin et al., 1995).
Figure 2 provides an example of this muscle movement combination. More research is 
needed to better understand the potential of this marker. Accordingly, it cannot be 
included as criterion to base posed versus genuine distinctions in the present research and 
such a distinction will need to be made on the ontological rather than physiognomic 
basis. In addition, posed expressions, particularly of negative emotions, are found to be 
exaggerated compared to genuine expressions (Naab & Russell, 2007; Tcherkassof, 
Bollon, Dubois, Pansu, & Adam, 2007), that is they contain additional movements as 
well as more intense muscle movements. While the presence of additional facial 
movements can also not be included as criterion in the present study, these two potential 
distinctions are noteworthy and will be considered further in Chapter 2. 
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                                 A                                                                 B
Figure 2. A Neutral Expression (A) and a Genuine Sad Expression that Involves 
Contraction of the Frontalis and Corrugator supecilii (B)
Fear expressions
As with sadness, there is no reliable evidence of a specific marker differentiating genuine 
from posed fear expressions. Contracting the frontalis and lowering the brow as well as 
contracting the levator palpebrae superioris, which widens the eye aperture, appear as 
core units in most investigations (e.g., Ekman, 2002; Gosselin et al., 1995; Kohler et al., 
2004). These movements are more probable in felt compared to unfelt experience 
(Gosselin et al., 1995). Figure 3 provides an example of this muscle movement 
combination. As noted above, there is also likely to be additional units present in the
posed compared to the genuine fear expression and this marker will also be discussed 
further in Chapter 2.
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Figure 3. A Neutral Expression (A) and a Genuine Fear Expression that Involves 
Contraction of the Frontalis and Levator palpebrae superioris (B)
Ontological Difference
There is also a fundamental ontological difference between posed and genuine 
expressions. Genuine facial expressions are the display of experienced emotional states, 
that is, they have an ontological basis in emotional experience. Genuine expressions 
occur spontaneously and within the context of a congruent emotional experience. For 
example, athletes receiving Olympic medals displayed genuine smiles more frequently 
than posed smiles (Matsumoto & Willingham, 2006). Individuals with PTSD and clinical 
depression who experience less positive affect have been shown to display fewer genuine 
smiles than healthy controls (Berenbaum & Rotter, 1992). Furthermore, the frequency of 
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genuine smiles increased as depressive symptoms decreased (Steiner, 1986). Likewise, 
schoolchildren display more smiles that are genuine after succeeding at a game and more 
posed smiles when they failed (Schneider & Unzner, 1989). In fact, most people have 
been shown to have difficulty voluntary inhibiting expressions of felt emotion, that is, 
genuine expressions (Rinn, 1984).
In contrast to genuine expressions, posed expressions, by definition, result from the 
purposeful communicative intent of the poser, which may range from deception to social 
compliance (Ekman & Rosenberg, 2005). For example, individuals displayed more posed
than genuine smiles when masking negative affect (Ekman et al., 1988; Woodzicka, 
2008). There is no systematic relationship between posed expressions and affective state; 
they are representative of not indicative of emotional experience. Posed expressions can 
be contrary to the actual felt emotional state of an individual or can accompany neutral 
state.
Facial Expression Recognition
The notion that humans have evolved adaptive responses to the affective state of others is 
consistent with the assumption that the behavior of the sender and receiver has co-
evolved in reciprocal fashion. This leads to the conclusion that the signal should be as 
perceivable as it is laden with meaning. The adaptive value of facial expressions is 
dependant on, and can only be realised by, a preparedness and ability to detect the 
information that is specified in facial expressions. Many studies support the view that 
humans are biologically predisposed to display (Dimberg, Thunberg, & Grunedal, 2002)
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and to recognise facial expressions of emotion (Bargh & Ferguson, 2000; Batty & Taylor, 
2003) as evidenced, for instance, by the ease with which individuals can learn to fear and 
avoid angry faces (Dimberg & Oehman, 1996). 
The recognition of facial expressions has long been of interest to researchers. The 
literature reports as many as 1700 empirical studies that have investigated whether, how 
and when individuals recognise emotion in the face of another person. Before the 1960s,
it was thought that facial expressions were learnt, culturally specific displays. Ekman and 
Friesen (1971) subsequently provided convincing evidence for the universality of the 
basic expressions of happiness, sadness, fear, anger, disgust and surprise. That is, there 
are clear commonalities when normally functioning adults from different cultures are 
asked to pose or to recognise the basic expressions. Universality means that emotions 
share functionality across individuals and situations and it is the functional specificity 
that is implied rather than any consistency among the antecedent events. In other words, 
the type of experience that gives rise to the emotional response might vary between 
individuals but the function the emotion serves, the way it is displayed and the ability to 
recognise the emotional response is very similar across individuals.
The Ekman and Friesen studies utilized a wide range of cultures, including preliterate 
groups and media-isolated groups from Borneo (Ekman, Sorenson, & Friesen, 1969) and 
New Guinea (Bartlett, Hager, Ekman, & Sejnowski, 1999; Ekman & Friesen, 1971). The 
recognition rates of the basic facial expressions were shown to be greater than chance 
regardless of whether they were being judged by a member of the same cultural group or 
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not. Although there was some variation between expressions and cultures, there was a 
universal understanding of what an expression meant and this understanding was 
independent of any cross-cultural learning. Subsequent studies, including a meta-analysis 
of 97 cross-cultural facial expression recognition studies, (Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002)
have confirmed these findings. 
Most subsequent studies investigating emotion processing examined the recognition of 
these basic facial expressions (Calder et al., 2003; Phillips, Drevets, Rauch, & Lane, 
2003a; Surguladze et al., 2004), since prototypical expressions are readily identifiable 
and marked confusion is rare amongst normally functioning adults. When poor 
performance on such tasks is identified, it is found to be associated with poor social skills 
in general and poor social adjustment (Boice, 1983; Leppanen & Hietanen, 2001).
Similarly, disruption in emotion perception, in particular, deficits in facial expression 
recognition has been found to play a role in a variety of clinical disorders and such 
disruptions are also associated with low levels of social functioning. For example, a 
deficit in the recognition of facial expressions is associated with functional impairment in 
social interaction skills in autism (Boraston, Blakemore, Chilvers, & Skuse, 2007). Some 
research has found that the adverse effect that inaccurate social perception has on social 
functioning is independent of cognitive deficits (Kohler, Bilker, Hagendoorn, Gur, & 
Gur, 2000) or at least mediates between cognitive and social functioning (Addington, 
Saeedi, & Addington, 2006). There are a number of groups that suffer from social 
impairments and many studies have investigated the recognition of facial expressions by 
these groups. Two such groups that have been shown to experience difficulty in particular 
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aspects of social functioning are older adults and individuals with AD. A summary
follows of previous findings regarding the effects of aging and Alzheimer’s disease (AD) 
on the recognition of facial expressions. 
 Aging and Facial Expression Recognition
Adult aging refers to a multidimensional process of physical, psychological, and social 
change. The number of people aged 65 or older has doubled since 1970. In New Zealand 
2006, ten percent of the population was aged 68 years or older and the oldest ten percent 
of the population will be 74 years or older by the year 2026 (Statistics New Zealand, 
2006). Many individuals can expect to spend a quarter of their lives over the age of 65 
years. Consequently, it is not surprising that considerable research interest has focused on 
understanding more about the effect of aging on crucial mechanisms that support health 
and the quality of life. Difficulties in emotion recognition are associated with 
interpersonal problems, reduced quality of life and the development of psychopathology 
(Surcinelli, Codispoti, Montebarocci, Rossi, & Baldaro, 2006), all of which have negative 
implications for well-being, particularly for older adults (Seeman, Lusignolo, Albert, & 
Berkman, 2001). 
Studies were considered for review when older adults were compared to younger adults, 
the mean age for older adults exceeded 65 years, and the mean age for younger adults 
was less than 35 years. Only studies in English were included and Table 1 presents a 
summary of the twelve studies that met this inclusion criteria. As can be seen in Table 1, 
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all studies employed an identification task to assess facial expression recognition, which 
required the participant to label an expression from a forced-choice list of options. Six 
basic expressions (happy, sad, fear, anger, disgust and neutral) were assessed by all but 
one study which confined investigation to happiness, sadness, anger and fear (Sullivan & 
Ruffman, 2004a). The following is a summary of results from the identification of facial 
expression tasks.
Older adults were found to have selective deficits in the recognition of several negative 
facial expressions. There were significantly fewer correct identifications of sadness made 
by older adults compared to young adults. The recognition of sadness was found to be 
impaired in almost three quarters of studies (Calder et al., 2003; Keightley, Winocur, 
Burianova, Hongwanishkul, & Grady, 2006; MacPherson, Phillips, & Della Sala, 2006; 
L. H. Phillips, R. D. MacLean, & R. Allen, 2002a; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004a; Suzuki, 
Hoshino, Shigemasu, & Kawamura, 2007; Wong, Cronin-Golomb, & Neargarder, 2005). 
Similarly, older adults had difficulty identifying anger, with impairment found in just 
over half of the studies (Calder et al., 2003; Isaacowitz et al., 2007; Phillips et al., 2002a; 
Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004a; Sullivan, Ruffman, & Hutton, 2007; Suzuki et al., 2007; 
Wong et al., 2005). Fear posed difficulty in approximately one third of studies (Calder et 
al., 2003; Isaacowitz et al., 2007; Keightley et al., 2006; Wong et al., 2005). In contrast, 
the recognition of happiness and disgust were largely spared in older age and there is 
some evidence of an age-related improvement in disgust, with a third of studies finding 
that disgust was identified better by older adults compared to younger adults (Calder et 
al., 2003; Suzuki et al., 2007; Wong et al., 2005). 
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Alzheimer’s disease (AD) and Facial Expression Recognition
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) is a progressive neurodegenerative disorder that is 
characterised by deterioration of intellectual functioning and change in personality. AD is 
the most common type of dementia and emerged as a distinct disease in the mid-20th 
century, although German physician Alois Alzheimer first described it in 1906. AD has a 
gradual course that typically involves ten years from diagnosis to death (Grossman, 
Bergmann, & Parker, 2006). It is estimated that over 26.6 million people live with AD 
worldwide (Brookmeyer, Johnson, Ziegler-Graham, & Arrighi, 2007). In New Zealand, 
the disease effects 17-21 thousand individuals (Alzheimer’s New Zealand, 2005) and this 
number is expected to quadruple by 2050 as the population ages (Brookmeyer et al., 
2007). Approximately 2-3% of individuals aged 65 years have AD and the prevalence 
rate doubles every five years for those aged 70-85 years (Hodges, 2006). The specific 
focus of the present research is late-onset sporadic AD, which is characterised by the 
presentation of symptoms after the age of 60 years. The dominant theory of pathology in 
AD is the amyloid cascade hypothesis (Grossman et al., 2006), which in brief, postulates 
that plaques are derived from an excess of amyloid ß peptides (Aß). This results in a toxic 
cascade of secondary protective responses, like free radical formation and inflammatory 
response, which contribute to the death of neurons. 
For the diagnosis of AD, the initial dysfunction necessarily requires impaired memory, 
but varying impairments in visuospatial abilities, language skills, complex attention and 
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mental speed are common changes that support its clinical delineation and trajectory 
(Calder et al., 2003; Keightley et al., 2006; MacPherson et al., 2006). A clinical diagnosis 
is obtained to determine the presence of AD, which can only be confirmed at autopsy. 
Diagnosis is made in the presence of an insidious onset and progressive cognitive decline 
that involves two or more areas of cognition, including episodic memory (Hodges, 2006). 
In addition, there is a breakdown of social function or activities of daily living. 
AD is often associated with problems in social functioning and the ability to recognise 
the affective state of others is an important aspect of social functioning. These problems 
are associated with the increase in caregiver burden (Holt et al., 2005; Reinders et al., 
2006), and are a major factor in decreased quality of life (Chiu, Chen, Yip, Hua, & Tang, 
2006). The degradation of social skills and social comprehension also effects the 
management of behavioral problems. The behavioral and psychiatric symptoms of 
dementia (BPSD) are reported to occur in approximately 90% of dementia patients (Buhr 
& White, 2006) and are the most important factor for caregivers considering 
institutionalisation (Tariot, Mack, Patterson, Edland, & et al., 1995). Poor social 
functioning contributes to the anxiety and phobic behaviors found to be problematic in 
AD (Steele, Rovner, Chase, & Folstein, 1990), as well as the agitation and aggressive 
behaviors often associated with the management of those with AD (Chiu et al., 2006). 
The majority of research interest has focused on the cognitive and psychiatric profiles 
associated with AD. Given the prevalence of social problems and how these problems 
negatively influences the quality of life of patients and carers it is necessary to also 
examine how AD influences social functioning. 
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As a means to better understand social functioning, several studies have focused on 
emotional processing and investigated whether individuals with AD demonstrate 
impaired ability to recognise facial expressions. Studies were considered for review when 
individuals diagnosed with AD were compared to age matched healthy participants to 
control for the known effects of healthy aging and the experimental paradigm involved 
the presentation of photographs of facial expressions2. Only studies in English were 
considered. Table 2 presents a summary of the eleven studies that met these criteria. As 
can be seen, unlike the healthy older adult research, the AD research is more 
heterogeneous with a variety of experimental tasks and stimuli employed. This places 
additional constraints on being able to make clear comparisons across experiments. What 
follows is a summary of results pertaining to the application of respective identification, 
discrimination and matching tasks.
Identification Tasks 
Identification tasks required the participant to label each expression individually from a 
forced-choice list of options. Each of the eleven studies investigated the ability of AD 
patients to identify expressions. No significant difference in performance was found 
between AD and healthy controls (HC) in five studies (Bucks & Radford, 2004; Burnham 
& Hogervorst, 2004; Fernandez-Duque & Black, 2005; Lavenu, Pasquier, Lebert, Petit, 
& Van der Linden, 1999; Ogrocki, Hills, & Strauss, 2000). Of the six studies that did find 
                                                
2 Studies that included cartoon stimuli representing facial expressions were excluded due to the lack of 
ecological validity.
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that AD patients performed significantly worse than the HC group, only two attribute this 
impaired performance to a specific emotion processing deficit (Allender & Kaszniak, 
1989; Hargrave, Maddock, & Stone, 2002). The remaining four studies either attribute 
poor performance to abstract reasoning deficits (Koff, Zaitchik, Montepare, & Albert, 
1999), general cognitive decline (Kohler et al., 2005), verbal deficits (Roudier et al., 
1998), or difficulty with verbal memory (Albert, Cohen, & Koff, 1991). 
Discrimination Tasks  
Discrimination tasks required the participant to look at pairs of photographs and indicate 
whether the expressions shown were the same or different. Emotion processing was 
assessed by discrimination tasks in five studies; three of which found no impaired 
performance of AD compared to healthy controls (Bucks & Radford, 2004; Fernandez-
Duque & Black, 2005; Roudier et al., 1998). Two found that AD participants performed 
significantly worse than healthy controls (Albert et al., 1991; Hargrave et al., 2002), but 
only the latter concluded this deficit was due to a specific emotion processing 
impairment. The poorer emotion discrimination performance was accounted for by the 
identity control task in the remaining study (Albert et al., 1991). 
Matching and Selecting Tasks 
Matching and selecting tasks required the participant to match a target expression to one 
of several alternative expressions and select a target expression from several alternatives, 
respectively. Five selection and/or matching tasks were performed in four studies. As 
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with the discrimination task, the poor performance in matching and selecting was 
accounted for by a naming task in one study (Albert et al., 1991) and was concluded as 
reflecting visuospatial dysfunction in another (Burnham & Hogervorst, 2004). AD 
participants did not have any difficulty with the matching task in the Bucks and Radford 
(2004) study but did show impairment in the selection task. The authors concluded that 
the more difficult selection procedure of scanning and identifying the emotion present in 
five alternative expressions might have resulted in the poor performance, particularly as 
this was the only task in their study to show deficits compared to healthy controls. AD 
patients in the final study (Hargrave et al., 2002) did not have the same difficulty with the 
matching task as they had with both the identification and discrimination tasks. 
Ability with Specific Expressions
All of the reviewed studies used expressions depicting several of the basic emotions as 
task stimuli in their respective emotion processing tasks. Only six studies, however, 
considered the performance of groups on specific emotions separately (Bucks & Radford, 
2004; Burnham & Hogervorst, 2004; Fernandez-Duque & Black, 2005; Hargrave et al., 
2002; Kohler et al., 2005; Lavenu et al., 1999). Of these, only one established the relative 
performance score between emotions and found a deficit with regard to sad expressions 
relative to the other misidentified expressions of surprise and disgust (Hargrave et al., 
2002). As discussed earlier, sad facial expressions are often problematic for healthy 
elderly, therefore, a potential deficit over and above a vulnerable baseline is worthy of 
particular attention. Fear and contempt also proved problematic (Lavenu et al., 1999). 
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In summary, two studies identified consistent problems and found AD participants were 
impaired relative to age-matched controls in all three tasks (Albert et al., 1991; Hargrave 
et al., 2002), although only the later study concluded this was due to a specific emotion 
processing deficit. The same conclusion was reached by another study (Allender & 
Kaszniak, 1989), although they only assessed skills using an identification task. The only 
other study (Koff et al., 1999) to use only an identification tasks and report poor 
performance concluded this was secondary to cognitive deficits. Three studies 
consistently found AD participants were not impaired as evidenced by performances 
similar to healthy controls in all tasks (Fernandez-Duque & Black, 2005; Lavenu et al., 
1999) or on the only task (Ogrocki et al., 2000). The remaining three studies produced 
inconsistent findings across tasks. One demonstrated that individuals with AD had 
difficulty with facial expression identification but not with the discrimination of 
expressions (Roudier et al., 1998). Another that there was no difficulty with identification 
but matching was problematic (Burnham & Hogervorst, 2004), and the last found the 
ability to process facial expressions was preserved except when assessed using a selection 
task (Bucks & Radford, 2004). 
It is difficult to conclude whether AD patients do demonstrate poorer performance in 
facial expression recognition. Just over a half of recognition tasks were performed poorly 
compared to healthy aged matched controls and a third of tasks continuing to show group 
differences independent of face processing or specific cognitive abilities. The information 
relating to deficits in specific emotions could only be garnered from a few studies and no 
consistent impairment was found, although it is noteworthy that sad expressions were 
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problematic for AD participants relative to the difficulty they had even with other 
problematic expressions. 
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Explanations for the Impairments Found in Previous Research
Older adults have demonstrated difficulties in the recognition of at least some of the basic 
expressions in previous research and individuals with AD have often demonstrated deficits. 
Two possible explanations for the impairments are discussed in the following section. The 
first explanation focuses on the neurological changes that occur with aging and are central to 
the pathology of AD. The second focuses on cognitive functions given several previous 
studies have attributed poorer performance in facial expression recognition tasks to cognitive 
decline.
Neurological Explanation
 Impaired facial expression recognition may well result from pathology affecting neural
substrates critical to emotion processing. For example, individuals with amygdala damage 
have difficulty recognising basic expressions (Adolphs, 2007), as do people with frontal 
damage (Adolphs, 2002a; Ridout et al., 2007). Conversely, deficits in facial expression 
recognition are associated with less activity in these brain regions (Benuzzi et al., 2004; 
Loughead, Gur, Elliott, & Gur, 2008; Murphy, Nimmo-Smith, & Lawrence, 2003; Salloum et 
al., 2007). There is evidence that the age differences in identifying facial expressions are 
related to the changes in neural systems due to aging (Calder et al., 2003; Isaacowitz et al., 
2007; Ruffman, Henry, Livingstone, & Phillips, 2008; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004b; Suzuki et 
al., 2007). Similarly the effect of AD has been associated with neuropathology (Rosen et al., 
2005). Accordingly the neural substrates known to support the recognition of facial 
expressions are summarised below, followed by a summary of the neurological changes that 
occur due to aging and AD.  
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The Neural Basis of Facial Expression Recognition
A large range of brain structures have been shown to be involved in the recognition of facial 
expressions of emotion (Adolphs, Tranel, & Damasio, 2003; Benuzzi et al., 2004; Biseul et 
al., 2005; Phillips, Drevets, Rauch, & Lane, 2003b), however, the frontal and temporal 
regions are the most important. Within these regions, key components are the amygdala 
(Adolphs, 2002b; Phillips et al., 2003a), orbitofrontal cortex and ventral striatum (Britton, 
Taylor, Sudheimer, & Liberzon, 2006; Norris et al., 2004; Simon, Craig, Miltner, & 
Rainville, 2006; Vuilleumier & Pourtois, 2007; Winston, O'Doherty, & Dolan, 2003). 
Previous research has shown these areas are critical for maintaining general vigilance of 
affective information (Eimer & Holmes, 2007; Haxby et al., 2002) and, therefore, respond to 
all facial expressions of emotion. 
The medial prefrontal cortex (Habel et al., 2007; Haxby et al., 2002; Vuilleumier & Pourtois, 
2007; Winston et al., 2003) and fusiform cortex (Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002b), 
which are commonly activated in response to facial expressions and also not found to be 
specific to a particular emotion, are likewise implicated in the role of general response to 
socially relevant information. In addition, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (Sprengelmeyer 
& Jentzsch, 2006), superior temporal sulcus (Winston et al., 2003), anterior cingulate 
(Burgdorf & Panksepp, 2006; Leppanen & Nelson, 2006; Sprengelmeyer & Jentzsch, 2006)
and insula (Britton, Taylor et al., 2006; Phan et al., 2002b; Phillips et al., 2003a) are 
consistently implicated in emotional information processing. 
The recognition of specific expressions of emotion has been associated with certain brain 
regions, and although the evidence to suggest which brain areas subserve which emotion is 
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tentative, there is sufficient agreement that at least partially dissociable neural pathways are 
involved with the recognition of specific emotions (Adolphs et al., 2003; Blair, Morris, Frith, 
Perrett, & Dolan, 1999). Only happy, sad and fear expressions are considered below given 
their relevance to the present set of studies. 
Happy 
Basal ganglia activation has been shown in response to happy facial expressions (Phan, 
Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002a), although not specifically, which is consistent with the 
rich innervations of dopaminergic neurons that respond to positive affect. Kesler-West et al. 
(2001) also found significant activation in the medial frontal - cingulate sulcus region which 
did not show activation in response to other emotions.
Sad
The anterior cingulate (Phillips et al., 2003a), subcallosal cingulate (Phan et al., 2002a), 
ventromedial prefrontal cortex (Britton, Taylor et al., 2006) and temporopolar area (Blair et 
al., 1999; Lee et al., 2002) have been associated with sadness. Other research has found no 
specific activation associated with the recognition of sad facial expressions (Kesler-West et 
al., 2001). 
Fear
The amygdala is often linked with the recognition of fearful facial expressions (Adolphs & 
Tranel, 2003; Loughead et al., 2008; Ohrmann et al., 2007; Phan et al., 2002b; Williams et 
al., 2005), although there has been some research that found amygdala activity was detected 
in response to anger expressions but not fear (Britton, Taylor et al., 2006). Furthermore, 
amygdala activity has been found in response to all types of expressions and was not 
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selective for any particular expression (Fitzgerald, Angstadt, Jelsone, Nathan, & Phan, 2006). 
This inconsistency may be explained by the finding that a sustained cortico-amygdala 
response differentiated the response to threat-related information (fear expressions) from the 
amygdala activation to other facial expressions or novel stimuli (Williams et al., 2004). 
Similarly a subcortical thalamic-hippocampal-amygdala response is involved in the rapid 
detection of fear expressions (Reinders et al., 2006). The recognition of fear expressions has 
also been shown to involve hippocampus activity (Britton, Phan et al., 2006) and a critical 
role for the somatosensory cortex has been suggested (Pourtois et al., 2004). 
Age-related Neurological Changes  
Aging is associated with a wide variety of changes in the structure and function of the brain 
(Keller, 2006; Peters, 2006; Tisserand & Jolles, 2003). The idea that age-related decline is 
associated with brain shrinkage has been widely accepted (Raz & Rodrigue, 2006) and it has 
therefore been generally accepted that as an individual ages, their brain ages and these 
structural changes in the brain may underlie cognitive decline. There is little evidence for 
pervasive volume loss during healthy aging; rather loss appears to be much more limited and 
restricted to specific brain areas (Raz & Rodrigue, 2006). 
The prefrontal cortex (PFC) is particularly vulnerable (Raz, Williamson, Gunning-Dixon, 
Head, & Acker, 2000; Tisserand & Jolles, 2003). Raz and Rorique (2006) state the trend to 
emerge from both in vivo volumetry and voxel-based morphometry (VBM) studies is that the 
prefrontal cortices are more significantly affected by aging than the temporal regions, which 
show moderate neuronal loss, with smaller differences still in parietal and occipital cortices. 
The volume and density of the hippocampus, amygdala, cerebellum and neostriatum are 
reported to show a moderate negative association with age (Raz & Rodrigue, 2006). VBM 
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studies also show age-related atrophy of the anterior cingulate cortex and striate cortex (Raz 
& Rodrigue, 2006; Tisserand et al., 2002). In summary, many of the brain regions effected by 
aging are also important for facial expression recognition. For example, the frontal region, 
anterior cingulate (Boccardi et al., 2003; Rosen et al., 2005), amygdala and hippocampus 
and/or amygdala-hippocampal junction (Adolphs, 2002a; Adolphs & Spezio, 2006; Blair et 
al., 1999; Vuilleumier & Pourtois, 2007). 
Neurological Changes in AD
Individuals with AD experience far more pervasive structural and morphological changes in 
the brain than that shown with normal aging. Early pathology is known to preferentially 
affect the medial temporal lobe structures; in particular, characteristic neurofibrillary tangles 
are found in the entorhinal cortex, hippocampus and amygdala (Hodges, 2006). The atrophy 
rate of medial temporal structures separated healthy elderly from those who developed 
cognitive impairment with 91% specificity and 85% sensitivity (Wenk, 2003). The posterior 
cingulate region also shows extensive hypometabolism in AD (Hodges, 2006). Beyond the 
early stages of the disease, characteristic pathology occurs in many areas of the brain 
including the frontal regions. As was shown with respect to healthy aging, individuals with 
AD experience damage to regions that are known to support the recognition of facial 
expressions, in particular, the crucial temporal lobe region is effected in the early stages of 
the disease. 
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Cognitive Decline Explanation
The neurological changes in aging and AD are also linked to poorer cognitive functions. The 
age-related changes in cognitive functions and the impact of AD on cognitive functioning are 
also discussed given general cognitive decline is often argued to account for difficulty with 
facial expression recognition. 
Age-related Cognitive Changes
Age effects fluid abilities (i.e., speed and problem solving) more than crystallised abilities 
(i.e., knowledge and expertise), as such, age differences in performance tend to increase with 
more difficult cognitive tasks. General cognitive resources, in particular, processing speed 
and working memory, are especially vulnerable and are crucial factors in the decline of the 
other cognitive functions (Salthouse, 2005). These cognitive resources are often involved in 
the completion of facial expression recognition tasks.
Many of the age-related neurological changes in the brain summarized above are also 
associated with cognitive performance3 (Gunning-Dixon et al., 2003; Gunning-Dixon & Raz, 
2000, 2003; Gunstad et al., 2006; Peters, 2006; Zimmerman et al., 2006) as well as facial 
expression perception. In particular, the decline in metabolism in the medial network, 
including the anterior cingulate and medial prefrontal cortex, is correlated with a decline in 
cognitive functioning (Pardo et al., 2007). 
                                                
3 Raz and Rodrique (2006) suggest many of the associations are modest, however, and findings are often 
inconsistent. 
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Difficulties with emotion processing and facial expression recognition have often been 
explained by task difficulty and deficits in general cognitive functioning in various 
populations, for example, schizophrenia (Russell, Green, Simpson, & Coltheart, 2008), 
ADHD (Yuill & Lyon, 2007) and also in AD (e.g., Albert et al., 1991). Many other studies, 
however, have concluded that difficulties in the ability to recognize facial expressions are 
independent of cognitive functioning (Hargrave et al., 2002; Johnston, Katsikitis, & Carr, 
2001; Marsh & Blair, 2008) and reflect a specific emotion processing impairment. 
Cognitive Changes in AD
The distinct neuropathology associated with AD results in the decline of cognitive 
functioning. Deficits in anterograde episodic memory are the most common initial symptom 
of AD (Hodges, 2006) and reflect characteristic pathology in the medial temporal lobe (Braak 
& Braak, 1995; Hodges, 2006).4 Deficits in semantic memory are also common (Hodges & 
Patterson, 1995), as are deficits in attention and executive functions (Hodges, 2006), which 
reflect frontal lobe involvement. Visuospatial and perceptual impairments are usually evident 
at a later stage of the disease process.  
Individuals with AD perform poorly on most measures of cognitive functions. As discussed 
earlier, with respect to healthy older adults, difficulties with facial expression recognition 
have been explained by general cognitive decline, but have also been found independent of 
cognitive functions and, therefore, a distinct emotional impairment. Individuals with AD 
experience damage to brain areas that are involved in facial expression recognition and 
support a variety of cognitive functions. Whether these functions are both compromised in 
                                                
4 In particular the transentorhinal cortex and then the hippocampal formation (Braak & Braak, 1995; Hodges, 
2006)
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AD or whether impairments in facial expression recognition are an artefact of cognitive 
decline and reflect task difficulty is not well established. The relationship between poorer 
cognitive and emotional functioning remains unclear and so will be investigated more fully in 
the present research. 
Limitations in Previous Research
This section discusses three particular limitations with the previous research investigating the 
effects of aging, and in particular AD, on the recognition of facial expressions of emotion as 
these are relevant to the present research. First, it may be that two separate questions were 
being asked when investigating the recognition of facial expressions of emotion: 1) Can 
participants recognise facial expressions? 2) Can participants recognise emotion as specified 
by facial expressions? As discussed earlier, facial expressions are not always a reliable 
indication of emotion because an individual can produce posed displays that are decoupled 
from affective state. If the aim of an investigation is to answer a question relating to whether 
participants have, or preserve, the ability to detect the affective state of another person via 
their facial expression, then the expressions from which they are asked to make judgments 
should contain information relevant to how the target feels. 
The terms ‘emotion’ and ‘expression’ are often used as if synonymous, not only in general 
discussion but also in various procedures. In several studies (Albert et al., 1991; Bucks & 
Radford, 2004; Isaacowitz et al., 2007; Ogrocki et al., 2000) the participant was asked how 
the target person was feeling and given acted displays where the relevant information was 
simply not present. The participant can answer what this person was showing or what 
emotion is being represented, but they are unable to answer how the person is feeling when 
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the facial expression provided has been decoupled from the affective state. This distinction 
may be especially relevant for clinical populations, where there is a potential for 
‘hypersensitivity’ to emotion or there is a tendency to rely on a more literal understanding of 
the instructions. For example, Davis and Gibson (2000) reported that individuals with 
paranoid schizophrenia demonstrated deficits in the recognition of affect when negative 
posed expressions were presented that were not evident when asked to recognise genuine 
expressions of these emotions. In addition to imposing potential confusion in the judgement 
process, such a reliance on posed displays may also dilute the area of investigation into a 
means to examine the recognition of facial expressions rather than an attempt to examine the 
perception of affective state. 
Several studies have shown that young adult perceivers are sensitive to the differences 
between genuine and posed smiles, both when making judgments about the type of smile 
(Frank, Ekman & Friesen, 1993) or when judging the affective state of targets (Hess, Kappas, 
McHugo, Kleck, & et al., 1989; Miles, 2005; Miles & Johnston, 2007). Individuals have also 
reported higher levels of enjoyment and pleasure when viewing genuine compared to posed 
smiles (Surakka & Hietanen, 1998). In addition, individuals exhibit different mimicry to 
posed and genuine smiles. Specifically they mimic genuine smiles by smiling genuinely and 
mimic posed smiles by posing a smile (Lundqvist & Dimberg, 1995). People have even been 
found to favour T-shirts when worn by people smiling genuinely than when worn by people 
with posed smiles (Peace, Miles, & Johnston, 2006). It does not appear that any research has 
investigated whether individuals are also sensitive to negative emotion specified in facial 
expressions, and furthermore, whether these fundamental skills are compromised in other 
populations such as older adults and individuals with AD.  
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Second, the majority of research investigating recognition of facial expressions of emotion 
has employed one or more of the three main types of experimental tasks. Often these tasks 
require skills that place a cognitively vulnerable participant under a substantial working load. 
Different procedures engage the participant in different ways and require different cognitive 
skills. For instance, the participant must access semantically meaningful information about 
each of the alternative response options and apply this to a single exemplar in emotion 
identification tasks. When only verbal response options are provided, the participant must 
also remember each option. In contrast, discrimination tasks require the assessment of two 
stimuli but can be completed by visuoperceptual comparisons that may have little to do with 
access or understanding of emotional information and more to do with configurations of 
visual stimuli. Emotion matching tasks, in further contrast, require the participant to scan 
several photographs and retain defining information about each so a match to the target can 
be made. Visuoperceptual information devoid of emotional content can also be used to 
complete this task. In addition, whilst these procedures require a variety of cognitive skills 
that arguably overshadow or even interfere with emotion recognition they also suffer from 
poor face validity in respect to the referent situation of an actual social interaction. 
Third, many of the studies reviewed reported ceiling or near ceiling effects for the 
recognition of happy expressions. Data is often excluded from analysis in recognition and 
imaging studies, for example, because of the ceiling effect. Rosen et al. (2006) suggested that 
more subtle positive expressions may have better demonstrated potential associations when 
they investigated the association between happiness recognition accuracy and tissue loss. 
Rather than manipulate task difficulty through the complexity of the facial displays (e.g., 
morphing, obscuring), the present research argues that subtly can be achieved by considering 
the nature of the judgments that are required within the complexity of real-life facial displays. 
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A task which assesses sensitivity to posed versus genuine expressions (Miles, 2005) would 
suffice as a more subtle task. This task requires a participant to detect affect via the face from 
not only neutral expressions but also posed expressions that closely simulate positive affect. 
Therefore, this task assesses the subtle yet functionally critical skill of detecting actual 
emotion in facial expressions.
The Present Research
The present research aimed to address the three particular limitations in the current literature 
by employing ecologically valid facial displays that provide the perceiver with information 
relevant to the affective state of another person. The displays were employed in tasks that 
minimized the use of cognitive skills such as memory, language and visuospatial 
discriminations. The categorization task required the participant to make judgments about the 
target emotion of individually presented facial expressions and the priming task required 
he/she identify the valence of unambiguous words preceded by facial expression primes. 
These two tasks involved subtle judgements, while still maintaining the meaningful 
discriminations that are required during exposure to the variety of everyday facial 
expressions. 
Having addressed these limitations, the present research investigated whether healthy young 
adults, older adults and individuals with AD were sensitive to affective state specified in 
facial expressions and how the groups compared. Specifically the reported research looked at 
whether these groups could differentiate between expressions that specified emotion (genuine 
expressions) from expressions that did not (posed and neutral expressions). 
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The focus of the present research was to investigate affect specified in faces rather than 
simply facial expressions. The tasks employed emphasise emotional rather than cognitive 
skills. However, given the inconsistency in the AD literature in particular, the present 
research also looked at whether sensitivity to emotion was associated with the general 
cognitive decline associated with aging and central to the presentation of AD, or whether it 
was a distinct skill independent of cognitive functioning. These two functions are known to 
decline with both advanced age and AD and both are linked to underlying neurological 
changes in older age and AD. To better understand the relationship between these two 
functions the present research assessed a variety of cognitive functions across the major 
domains. A comprehensive evaluation of each domain was not warranted, given the specific 
focus of the present research, rather a multi-test score relating to each broad domain was 
sought. Specifically, a measure of episodic memory (events), semantic memory (facts and 
knowledge) and working memory (temporary storage and manipulation of information), as 
well as general executive function (planning, flexibility, monitoring), attention (orientation 
and concentration) and visuoperception skills (accuracy with visual information) 5 was 
sought, as detailed in Chapter 2. 
The present study predicted that healthy young adults would be sensitive to each of the target 
emotions of happiness, sadness and fear as specified in facial expressions and would be able 
to differentiate between posed and genuine expressions of these emotions. Given the 
problems identified by previous research, it was expected that healthy older adults would 
have difficulty and would not be sensitive to sadness and fear but would maintain sensitivity 
to happiness and be able to differentiate between posed and genuine smiles. In addition, it 
was predicted that individuals with AD would show more profound deficits reflecting the 
                                                
5 Each of the descriptions in brackets are incomplete and do not acknowledge the broad and interactive function 
of systems. 
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more pervasive neurological changes associated with the disease, would not demonstrate 
sensitivity to the target emotions, and would not be able to differentiate between posed and 
genuine expressions.
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CHAPTER 2
Generation and Selection of Research Materials
The present chapter outlines the research materials that have been generated and selected for 
use in the following programme of research. In order to test whether individuals were 
sensitive to emotion, participants needed to be provided with facial displays that contained 
the relevant information. The first section of this chapter outlines the procedure employed to 
generate genuine, posed and neutral expressions of happiness, sadness and fear and the 
second section introduces the tests used to measure cognitive function.
Generation of Facial Displays  
The majority of previous research investigating the recognition of facial expressions has 
employed facial expressions that have been created to comply with the criteria defined in the 
facial action coding system (FACS; Ekman, 2002). The FACS is a widely used anatomically 
based method for describing and measuring facial behavior and it was developed by 
determining how the contraction of each facial muscle changes the appearance of the face. 
Forty-six action units (AUs) are used to describe all visual movement in the face. Specific 
combinations of FACS units that are thought to represent prototypic and major variants of 
expressions of emotion have been developed and these are often used as criteria to create and 
describe expressions for use in recognition studies and for use in studies investigating the 
differentiation of posed and genuine expressions. For example, expressions have been created 
by actors who have been trained to contract muscles that are representative of respective 
expressions (Gosselin, Perron, Legault, & Campanella, 2002; Gosselin, Warren, & Diotte, 
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2002; Williams, Senior, David, Loughland, & Gordon, 2001), or facial expressions have been 
computer generated based on FACS criteria (Krumhuber & Kappas, 2005). Imitated and 
posed expressions, generated by contracting specific muscles and pulling representative 
faces, may not always occur naturally however and may differ from those that occur in 
response to affective experience (Gosselin et al., 1995). 
Other studies have attempted to generate more ecologically valid expressions by employing 
spontaneous expressions (e.g., LaRusso, 1978; Scherer & Ceschi, 2000), in particular by 
videotaping individuals in semi-naturalistic social settings (Motley & Camden, 1988). 
Unfortunately this method involves a variety of extraneous factors, such as the potential for 
the expression of more complex compound emotions than those of interest and the limited 
control over eye gaze and lighting etc. Importantly, posed displays could not be generated 
within the same procedure in a naturalistic setting.
The present research will adopt an alternative approach reported by Miles (2005; Miles &  
Johnston, 2007) who showed that ecologically valid displays could be generated in the 
laboratory. Miles reported that genuine smiles were generated from everyday reference 
situations by individuals who importantly also reported a corresponding experience of 
positive affect, while posed smiles and neutral expressions were generated in the absence of 
positive affect. To this end, facial displays were generated specifically for the present 
research adopting a similar procedure to Miles, which was adapted to allow for the generation 
of a variety of emotional expressions. 
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Method
Participants
The participants were 17 female students recruited from the University of Canterbury, who 
ranged in age from 19 to 34 years (M = 24.8 years, SD = 4.2). None of the participants wore 
glasses or had any distinguishing features such as facial birthmarks or prominent scars. 
Participants received a $10 shopping voucher in return for their time.
Apparatus
Stimulus materials were presented via a 15 inch computer monitor using Microsoft®
PowerPoint software. The participant sat in front of a neutral wall approximately 60cm from 
the computer monitor. The session was recorded using a Canon XM2 3CCD digital video 
camera and recordings were captured and converted to computer files using Adobe Premier®
Software. The recordings were captured in PAL format at 25 frames per second.     
Materials
Each participant was shown a series of static pictures from the International Affective 
Pictures System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2001). The IAPS is a database of over 
700 pictures with normed ratings of pleasure, arousal and dominance for each photograph for 
both male and female viewers. A selection of 15 pictures was chosen, each of which had an 
arousal ratings above the mid-point of the arousal scale for female viewers (i.e., ratings > 4.5 
on a 9-point scale). Since displays of happiness, sadness and fear were desired from 
participants, pictures were included with a large range of mean pleasure ratings for female 
viewers (ranging from 1.4 to 8 on a 9-point scale). Using a range of photographs also 
prevented participants from guessing which emotions were of interest to the researcher. 
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Pictures with low arousal ratings (i.e., ratings < 3.5 on a 9 point scale) were also employed to 
elicit expressions of neutral affect. The list of IAPS pictures used in this generation procedure
can be seen in Appendix A. 
Each participant also listened to sound clips from the International Affective Digitized 
Sounds database (IADS; Bradley & Lang, 1999). The IADS is a database of 120 emotive 
sounds that, like the IAPS, have normative ratings of pleasure, arousal and dominance for 
both male and female perceivers. A selection of eleven sounds was chosen, each of which, 
like the IAPS pictures, had an arousal rating above the mid-point of the arousal rating scale
for female listeners (i.e., > 4.5 on a 9-point scale). A range of sounds with high arousal levels 
was again employed in order to elicit a variety of responses and to prevent participants 
anticipating the emotions of interest. Since displays of happiness, sadness and fear were 
desired from participants, sounds were included with a large range of mean pleasure ratings 
for female viewers (ranging from 1.9 to 7.9 on a 9-point scale). Appendix A also provides a 
list of the IADS sounds used in this procedure. 
The participant was also asked to view slides that provided instructions on how to complete 
several tasks. During the procedure, slides instructed the participant to relax, smile for an ID 
photo, smile as she would for a passport photo and pretend to be sad and fearful. She was
asked to pose how she thought she would have looked when experiencing previously elicited 
happy, sad and fearful reactions to stimuli. Each participant was asked to provide future 
confederate stimuli by faking sad, fearful and disgust reactions to blank slides. She was asked 
to imagine scenarios like playing along with a small child and ‘keeping up’ the game by 
feigning a sad reaction. Before listening to a high arousal-low pleasure sound, the participant 
was asked to imagine walking alone at night and was encouraged to concentrate on what she
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might be experiencing and feeling. Each participant was also asked to sing the National 
Anthem and was asked to stop a few seconds after the request. She was asked for permission 
to show her video tape to an undergraduate class who were discussing different people’s 
facial features and told this was not true after a few seconds. Each participant also listened to 
a portion of one of several songs listed as the saddest songs ever written according to Rolling 
Stone magazine while thinking about sad events in their own personal experience.   
The participant was asked to rate her reaction to each of the stimulus displays using a forced 
choice label option accompanied by strength of reaction analogue scales. A response booklet 
that was designed to accompany the presentation (see Appendix B for an example) was 
provided to each participant and at set intervals in the procedure, as detailed below, the 
participant was asked to self-report their affective reactions to stimuli. The response options 
were always the same and consisted of happy, sad, fear, surprise, angry, disgust and neutral 
labels, presented in several different orders. The participant circled the option that best 
described their reaction to the stimulus and if a choice other than neutral was selected, she
marked the strength of her reaction on the accompanying scale. Labels of “low” and “high” at 
the ends of the scale and “moderate” in the centre anchored the scale.      
Procedure
Participants were recruited individually to participate in a study in which they would be asked 
to provide some evaluations of a variety of stimuli. Each participant was told that the stimuli 
material would potentially be used in future research and it would, therefore, be helpful to 
obtain information regarding how suitable the material would be. Consequently, the 
participant was asked whether she would mind looking over the material and offering some 
simple ratings about any reaction she might have to the material she viewed. Each participant 
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was tested individually.
An information sheet describing the task as a pilot study looking at the suitability of stimuli 
material for future research was provided to each participant (see Appendix C). The 
information sheet also outlined the basic procedure and explained that several photographs 
and various other stimuli would be presented. The participant was informed that she would be 
videotaped during the process. An initial consent form was signed by each participant 
indicating her willingness to take part in the pilot study. 
Having answered any questions, the researcher ushered the participant to a viewing room 
where she was seated approximately 60cm in front of a computer screen. A video camera was 
mounted on a tripod behind the computer screen.  A mirror was placed in a position behind 
and to the side of the participant to capture the reflection of stimuli presented on screen and 
to be within shot of the video camera. Each participant was instructed to limit body 
movements as much as possible so she would not inadvertently interfere with the
camera/mirror configuration.    
  
The researcher informed the participant again that her task was to simply watch the various 
slides and think about how each one made her feel. She was reminded she would also see task 
slides containing instructions that she should follow as best she could. The participant was 
asked to look into the camera as much as possible whilst considering the material and 
following the instructions displayed. The camera position was set at an angle that allowed for 
direct capture of the full face with only a minor shift of eye position from screen to camera 
required. Whilst the participant was aware she was being videotaped, she was told that this 
was also to investigate how viable such a method would be in terms of future research. For 
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instance, would it be possible to capture good quality video of the future participant, the 
screen via the mirror, and would the mirror reflection interfere with the future participant 
image.
Once the participant was seated comfortably, the researcher started the Power-Point®
presentation and left for an adjacent room where she could be heard but not seen. At the 
completion of block 1, which consisted of fifteen pictures, two sounds and five tasks (see 
Appendix D), the researcher instructed the participant to complete the appropriate response 
booklet section. This required a choice of affective label and intensity ratings where 
applicable to each of the stimulus displays presented thus far and the Power-Point ©
presentation was restarted to enable the participant to view each stimulus again while 
recording their initial reaction. The second block consisted of verbal instructions from the 
researcher in the adjacent room and task/scenario slides that were advanced on screen by the 
participant via the researcher’s instructions. The self-report reactions to these instructions and 
scenario slides were elicited verbally and simply required a verbal response from the 
participant who was reminded to refer to their response booklet for response options. The 
third block (see Appendix D) started with a scenario slide and continued with the presentation 
of the IADS sounds and finished with task slides. At the completion of this block, the
researcher asked the participant to refer to her response booklet and the sounds and slides 
were replayed for her to select the option that best described how each sound/task had made 
her feel. 
At the conclusion of the procedure, each participant was debriefed and told the study was not 
a pilot study and the purpose was, in fact, to obtain her reactions to the experimental material. 
The participant was told that the videotape would be used to produce photographs of facial 
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expressions that would be utilized in research looking at the recognition of posed and genuine 
facial expressions of emotion. Each participant was invited to inspect the video if she wished 
before being asked to give consent to the use of the video material in subsequent studies (see 
Appendix E for consent form). All participants consented to the use of their video-tapes.
Results
Stage 1: Self-report Evidence
Each of the seventeen response booklets was inspected for self-reported reactions to the 
eliciting material. To remain viable a participant had to report feeling a medium to high level 
of happiness, sadness or fear in response to one or more of the eliciting stimuli. The same 
participant should also have reported feeling neutral to at least one prompt to pose a 
deliberate expression of the corresponding emotion. The information from three participants 
did not meet the criteria at stage one. Two of these participants did not report a neutral 
reaction to the posed expression of sadness (1) or happiness (1) when these were the only 
genuine reactions elicited. Therefore the video information could not yield a genuine, posed 
and neutral triad of facial expressions for any of the emotions in question.  One of the 
participants did not report any medium to high happy, sad or fear reaction.
Stage 2: Reactions Consistent with Eliciting Situation
To warrant further analysis the reactions from the remaining fourteen participants needed to 
be consistent with the eliciting situation. For example, a reported experience of medium 
happiness should follow material or a task that was consistent with positive experience. 
Happy reactions to IAPS pictures or IADS sounds with norms of high pleasure would be 
consistent and would meet the stage 2 criteria of the present study. Similarly, strong sad 
reactions should follow material with low pleasure ratings or tasks with face validity. For 
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example, a reported experience of high sadness following the task slide which asked the 
participant to recall as vividly as possible a sad personal experience would meet the stage 2 
criteria. Each of the fourteen remaining participants reported the experience of at least one 
emotion following a corresponding referent situation that was judged as consistent with the 
respective emotion.
   
Stage 3: Facial Movement during Reported Experience
The video tape of each participant was visually inspected for identifiable movement of facial 
muscles during reports of emotional experience. At this stage the information from two 
participants was removed from further analysis due to either a lighting problem that resulted 
in poor quality video (1) or to excessive movement of the participant during each incidence 
of emotional reaction (1). Facial movement was evident in at least one reported experience of 
emotion and corresponding posed expression for each of the remaining twelve participants. 
After the initial three-stage inspection of the self-report and video information for each 
participant, as described above, expressions from twelve participants were judged to be viable 
for further analysis. Table 3 provides a summary of the number of displays from each 
participant available for coding using the FACS criteria. A still photograph was captured at 
the perceived apex of each of the expressions shown in Table 3 and was converted to a 
640x480 bitmap file. Each photograph was standardized by applying auto levels and auto 
contrast in Adobe Photoshop. 
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Table 3. Number of Displays Available for Coding for Each Participant who met the Initial 
Stage 1-3 Criteria for Inclusion
Ppt# Happy Sad Fear Neutral
Self-reported
Genuine Posed Genuine Posed Genuine Posed
1 1 2 1 2 2 3 3
2 1 3 1 2 0 0 2
3 3 2 0 0 2 1 1
4 2 3 4 4 1 4 4
5 4 3 0 0 0 0 2
6 1 2 3 4 1 4 2
7 3 2 2 3 2 3 3
8 4 3 2 4 1 4 2
9 1 3 2 2 1 2 3
10 3 2 1 1 1 1 2
110 0 0 1 1 0 0 2
12 0 0 1 1 0 0 3
total 23 25 18 24 11 22 29
#Ppt’s 10 10 10 10 8 8 12
Note. Expressions have not been confirmed as genuine and posed by FACS coding.
Stage 4: Coding Facial Movement 
Stage four involved the coding of facial movement to establish and verify that each 
expression contained action units (AU) regarded as typical for the respective emotion, 
according to the FACS criteria. For instance, happy expressions should involve action units 
that specify a smile and sad expressions should involve action units that are typical of sad 
faces. The FACS provides both prototypical and major variants of each of the basic emotions 
and research has found that recognition of emotion is largely associated with the core units 
for each emotion (Gosselin et al., 1995; Kohler et al., 2004; Suzuki & Naitoh, 2003). 
In the present study core units for each of the target emotions (happiness, sadness, fear) were 
identified by means of a quasi-consensus. That is, evidence of activation of the units 
identified by FACS and those units found to be present during individual’s portrayals of felt 
(Gosselin et al., 1995; Kohler et al., 2004) and unfelt emotion (Gosselin et al., 1995; Kohler 
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et al., 2004; Suzuki & Naitoh, 2003) were sought. In addition to the core units, all action units 
were noted and intensity ratings were made according to FACS criteria. Ratings of core units 
were used to match posed and genuine expressions. Intensity ratings range from A which is 
indicative of trace movement to E which demonstrates maximum movement (see Ekman et 
al., 2002 for full description of each of the five levels of movement for each action unit). 
Table 4 provides a description of the relevant action units and a summary of intensity ratings.   
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Happy
The action units indicative of happy expressions, or more specifically smiles, are well agreed 
upon (Ekman et al., 1981; Frank, Ekman, & Friesen, 1988; Hess & Kleck, 1990; Williams et 
al., 2001). Expression of positive emotion (a genuine smile) involves AU12 and AU6. A 
simulated expression of happiness (a posed smile), in contrast, involves only contraction of 
AU12 and not AU6. Figure 4 provides an example of a neutral, posed and genuine 
expression. The facial action criterion set for coding happy expressions was, therefore, that 
all expressions contained AU12 and that genuine expressions in addition contained 
contraction of AU6. To minimise differences within and between participants, AU 25 and/or 
AU 26 were added as criteria to ensure all smiles displayed teeth.  
                        A                                               B                                               C
Figure 4. Neutral (A) Expression and Posed (B) and Genuine (C) Happy Expressions
Sad
The action units indicative of sad expressions are less well defined, indeed the FACS 
provides three prototypes and five major variants. The action units AU1, AU4 (or
combination AU1+4), AU15 and AU17 have been selected as core units because they are 
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reported to occur more consistently across four sources (Gosselin & Kirouac, 1995; Kohler et 
al., 2004; Suzuki & Naitoh, 2003) than other units, although not always in combination. 
Accordingly, for inclusion in the present study, each posed and genuine expression had to 
contain at least two of the core units. Unlike for happy expressions, and as discussed in 
Chapter 1, no specific action unit(s) has been identified in prior literature as specifying 
genuine sadness or differentiating between genuine and posed expressions of sadness. No 
criteria were therefore set to code for veracity of the expressions. Rather, all expressions 
elicited, either in response to relevant referent situations or in response to experimenter 
instructions to pose a sad expression, were coded for activation of the core units identified 
above. 
Figure 5 provides an example of a neutral, as well as posed and genuine sad expressions. 
Differentiation between genuine and posed was made on the basis of the self-report ratings of 
affect from the target, although it is noteworthy that at the completion of the selection process 
(see stage five), genuine but not posed expressions were identified as containing the AU1+4 
combination and posed expressions contained activation of more action units than genuine 
expressions. Specifically, it was additional core units that were present in posed sad 
expressions. Both the AU1+4 combination and the presence of additional movements were 
introduced in Chapter 1 as potential markers to distinguish posed from genuine sad 
expressions.  
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                        A                                               B                                               C
Figure 5. Neutral (A) Expression and Posed (B) and Genuine (C) Sad Expressions 
Fear
The core action units selected in the present study are AU4, AU5, AU7 and AU20. While AU 
1 and AU2 are also consistently associated with fear across four sources (Gosselin & 
Kirouac, 1995; Kohler et al., 2004; Suzuki & Naitoh, 2003), both of these action units are 
also associated with surprise. Accordingly, these units may be contracted in the current facial 
displays but only in association with contraction of AU4, which is not associated with 
surprise. As with sadness, there are no established coding criteria to differentiate genuine 
from posed expressions. Accordingly, the same process was followed as for sadness. All the 
fear expressions had to contain contraction of at least two core action units and differentiation 
between posed and genuine expressions was made based on self-report evidence from the 
target. 
Figure 6 provides an example of neutral, posed and genuine fear expressions. It is noteworthy 
that at the completion of the selection process (see stage five), all of the posed expressions 
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contained activation of additional AUs in comparison to the genuine expressions. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, posed expressions, particularly of negative expressions, may be 
exaggerated and contain additional muscle movements than the genuine counterparts. In this 
case, all of the posed fear expressions contained AU1 and/or AU2 in association with AU4, 
that is, the inner and/or outer brow was raised in concert with lowering the brow. The genuine 
fear expressions did not involve either AU1 or AU26.
                        A                                               B                                               C
Figure 6. Neutral (A) Expression and Posed (B) and Genuine (C) Fear Expressions 
After coding, the happy expressions from two participants were removed because there was 
no visible indication of AU6 (Ppt1) or AU25/26 (Ppt6) activation in the genuine facial 
display. Similarly, the sad expressions from participant 2 were removed because both posed 
sad expressions contained an additional action unit (AU2) that is not generally associated 
with sadness and was expressed at a moderately high intensity level. The fear expressions 
from participant 3 and participant 10 were not considered any further because the posed 
version (Ppt3) did not contain action units relevant to fear but rather surprise and additional 
                                                
6 A Cronbach’s alpha of 0.96 was found between two independent coders.
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action units were displayed (Ppt10) which more closely identified surprise. 
Intensity has been shown to influence the recognition of facial expressions (Hess, Banse, & 
Kappas, 1995; Kohler, Turner, Gur, & Gur, 2004). To minimize the differences between 
expression types the intensity ratings were inspected for each participant to ensure there were 
displays of posed and genuine expressions where core units were expressed within one level 
of intensity. For example, the activation of AU 12 in a posed smile (AU 12B) should be 
matched with similar activation of AU12 in a genuine smile (AU 12B +1 level). Action units 
that appeared in one type of expression but not the other could not be matched. The sad 
expressions from participant 1 and participant 10 were removed because the intensity ratings 
of core units in the posed expressions were two levels higher than in the genuine expression.
Table 5 shows the number of displays retained after coding for characteristic action units and 
intensity using the FACS criteria. 
Table 5. Number of Displays Retained after Coding
Ppt# Happy Sad Fear Neutral
Genuine Posed Genuine Posed Genuine Posed
2 1 1 0 0 0 0 2
3 2 2 0 0 0 0 1
4 2 2 3 2 1 1 2
5 4 2 0 0 0 0 2
6 0 0 2 4 1 2 2
7 3 2 2 3 2 3 3
8 3 2 2 3 1 2 2
9 1 3 1 2 1 1 3
10 3 2 0 0 0 0 2
11 0 0 1 1 0 0 2
12 0 0 1 1 0 0 3
total 19 16 12 16 7 11 25
#Ppt’s 8 8 7 7 6 6 12
Stage 5: Selecting Displays for the Present Research
Four facial displays of each emotion were required for the research presented in subsequent 
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chapters. Consequently, four triads that met the selection criteria were chosen for each 
emotion and an attempt was made to utilize as few targets as possible to minimize the effect 
of target between emotions. Consequently, two targets (Ppt 4 & Ppt 7) provided displays for 
all three emotions, another (Ppt. 8) for both sadness and fear, and four (Ppt 12, Ppt 6, Ppt 3 & 
Ppt 5) provided the final sad, fear and final two happy expressions respectively. A summary 
of the response data for each of the selected targets can be found in Appendix F.
Measures of Cognitive Functioning   
The research presented in the subsequent chapters investigated whether sensitivity to 
emotion, as specified in facial expressions, was related to cognitive function. The selection of 
tests was determined by empirical findings and the characteristics of individuals with AD. 
Tests were chosen that have been widely used to assess cognitive functioning in the AD 
population and are sensitive to AD or help supplement the clinical diagnosis and differentiate 
AD from other dementias such as Dementia with Lewy bodies (DLB) or fronto-temporal 
dementia (FTD). As discussed in Chapter 1, AD is characterised by deterioration of memory 
and diagnosis is supported by the decline in function of at least one other domain of cognitive 
function. The range of deficits that may be present secondary to memory impairments 
requires the administration of a wide range of tests that span the main cognitive domains to 
capture the scope of current cognitive functioning for each participant. Furthermore, AD is 
associated with deterioration of social function, impacts on daily living skills and often 
involves psychiatric sequelae. The following tests (see Table 6) were used to evaluate a broad 
range of cognitive abilities and to provide demographic and clinical information about the 
participants. 
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The present testing protocol aimed to assess each cognitive domain using multiple tests so 
that a robust domain score could be used in correlational analysis investigating the 
relationship between sensitivity to emotion and cognitive functioning. Research has reported 
that deficits in the recognition of facial expressions are related to general cognitive changes,
particularly associated with age (Orgeta & Phillips, 2008). There is little converging evidence 
supporting the role of any particular cognitive ability, although, as discussed in Chapter 1, 
deficits in language and visuospatial skills have been suggested as an explanation for poor 
performance by individuals with AD. Similarly executive deficits (Hoaken, Allaby, & Earle, 
2007) constructional praxis and nonverbal memory deficits (Luzzi, Piccirilli, & Provinciali, 
2007) have been shown to be associated with expression recognition deficits in other 
populations.   
Several other issues influenced the selection of tests, specifically relating to the requirements 
of individuals with AD. The literature suggests that fatigue is a problem for some individuals 
with AD, consequently short tests (completed within 15 minutes) were chosen and the testing 
protocol was designed (see Table 7) to engage but not overtax an AD participant by 
dispersing tests throughout a session without any concentrated demands on any one particular 
cognitive domain for a sustained period.   

70
Test Descriptions
Each test is briefly described below in alphabetical order.
Adaptive Digit Ordering Task – DOT-A (Werheid et al., 2002)
The DOT-A provides a measure of verbal working memory and requires the participant to 
recall an increasing sequence of numbers in ascending order. A total score and span score are 
recorded with a half point added if one of the sequences is recalled correctly in the 
subsequent set. The tests are discontinued following the incorrect recall of any set.  
Alzheimer’s Disease Assessment Scale – ADAS (Rosen, Mohs, & Davis, 1984)
The ADAS was designed to provide an assessment of the major characteristics and range of 
dysfunction in individuals with AD. There are eleven cognitive items and ten non-cognitive 
items that provide two subscale measures. Each item is rated 0-5 with higher scores 
indicative of greater impairment. The ADAS is sensitive to AD in elderly, differentiating 
between AD patients and controls, and has been shown to discriminate between mild, 
moderate and severe AD (Zec et al., 1992).    
Beck Depression Inventory-II - BDI-II (Beck, Steer, & Brown, 1996)
The BDI-II consists of twenty-one items and provides information regarding the presence of 
depressive symptoms. Each item is rated on a scale value of 0-3 with higher scores indicative 
of greater intensity of depressive symptoms. Scores below 14 suggest normal/minimal 
depressive symptoms (Beck et al., 1996), consequently a cut-off score of >14 was used to 
detect the presence of depression as part of the exclusion criteria in the present study.
71
Bristol Activities of Daily Living Scale - BADLS (Bucks, Ashworth, Wilcock, & Siegfried, 
1996)
The BADLS is a carer rated scale for use with individuals with dementia. The ability of the 
patient to perform twenty daily living tasks, for example eating, mobility and hygiene, are 
rated and total scores range from 0 (totally independent) to 60 (totally dependent). Disparate 
profiles of functional ability have been shown between patients with dementia with Lewy 
bodies (DLB) and AD (McKeith et al., 2006).
CLOX (Royall, Cordes, & Polk, 1998)
The CLOX is used to assess both visuospatial and executive abilities. In CLOX-I the 
participant is required to produce a drawing of a clock that reads 1.45. In CLOX-II the 
participant copies a clock that the examiner has first drawn. CLOX-I&II are assessed 
according to fifteen separate criteria, for example, whether Arabic numerals were used, 
whether the sequence of 1-12 was intact and whether all numbers were inside the perimeter. 
Each criteria was given a score of one if correct. Scores range from 0-15 with lower scores 
equating to greater impairment. CLOX subscales have shown significant discriminative 
capacity between AD and controls, and between AD subgroups (Royall et al., 1998) and AD 
and MCI (De Jager, Hogervorst, Combrinck, & Budge, 2003).   
Consortium to Establish a Registry for Alzheimer’s Disease – CERAD (Morris et al., 1989)
The CERAD battery provides a means to assess the manifestation of cognitive impairment in 
AD. The present study administered the Modified Boston Naming Test and the Word List 
Recall and Recognition tests.
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Modified Boston Naming Test – (M)BNT (Mack, Freed, Williams, & Henderson, 1992)
The MBNT provides a measure of semantic memory. The test involves the presentation of 
fifteen line drawings that represent five high, medium and low frequently occurring objects, 
for example, a tree, a house and a funnel. The participant has ten seconds to name each 
object. A variety of procedures have been associated with the presentation of the BNT, 
particularly relating to the types of cues that can be given. Neither semantic nor phonemic 
cues were provided in the present study. The MBNT has been shown to discriminate between 
AD and controls (Ferman et al., 2006; Mack et al., 1992).
Word List Recall and Recognition I&II
The word list tests are conducted in two phases: An immediate recall/recognition phase (I) 
and a 10-minute delay phase (II). The administration of this memory test involves the 
presentation of ten words on individual cards. In the first phase, the participant reads each 
word aloud and at the end of the trial is asked to recall as many words as possible. The same 
ten words are presented in different orders in three trials. Twenty words (10 list words & 10 
new words) also presented individually on cards are then shown to the participant who is 
asked whether each word was from the learnt list or not. Following a 10-minute delay the 
participant is asked to recall as many words as possible from the original list and is asked to 
identify learnt words from the list of twenty. In addition to the mean correct and number 
correct in Recall-I&II and Recognition-I&II respectively, the mean errors in Recall-I and the 
number of errors in Recognition-I were also recorded in the present study to contribute to the 
cognitive subtest of ADAS. 
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Continuous Performance Task – CPT, based on (Conner, 1995)
The CPT provides a measure of sustained attention and is administered via a computer. It 
involves the 2-second presentation of a letter that appears at varying inter-stimulus intervals 
(2-4 seconds). The participant is required to press a key, as quickly as possible, in response to 
each letter except when the letter is an X. The test duration was 4 minutes in the present 
study. Errors of omission and commission were recorded within 1-minute blocks. 
Daneman Carpenter Reading Span Test (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980)
This test provides a measure of verbal working memory. The participant is required to read 
aloud sentences consisting of eight to thirteen words, judge whether the sentence makes sense 
or not and recall the last word in each of the sentences. Trials start with two sentences, and in 
the present study, progress to five sentences. There are three trials in each set and 42 
sentences in total. Five two-sentence practice trials are used to familiarise the participant with 
the test. A score of 1 is achieved for each correct recall and veracity judgment. The reading 
span score equates to the set in which all sentences in at least two of the three trials were 
recalled. A half point is added for the complete recall of one of the three trials in the 
subsequent set. In the present study the test was discontinued if the participant was unable to 
recall any of the words in two consecutive trials.  
Delis Kaplan Executive Functioning System – D-KEFS (Delis, Kaplan, & Kramer, 2001)
The verbal fluency subtest of the D-KEFS was used to measure verbal executive functions 
across three conditions:
Letter Fluency
The participant is required to generate as many different words as they can in 60-seconds that 
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start with the letters F, A and S. The participant must not produce proper nouns, numbers or 
the same word with different endings. Letter fluency has been shown to discriminate AD 
from healthy controls and those with DLB (Metzler-Baddeley, 2007).   
Category Fluency
The participant is instructed to name as many different words as they can in 60-seconds 
associated with a specific semantic category. Animals and boys names were used in the 
present study. Category fluency is shown to discriminate AD from healthy controls (Metzler-
Baddeley, 2007).
Category Fluency-switching
The participant is required to alternate between two semantic categories and generate as 
many words as possible in 60 seconds. Fruits and pieces of furniture were used in the present 
study. Each condition is scored with regard to the total number of correct words generated, 
the number of words in each 15 second interval, the number of repetition errors, and the 
number of set-loss errors. The total number of switches is also scored in the category 
switching condition. Raw scores were then converted to age corrected scaled scores. Verbal 
Fluency has been reported to differentiate AD from controls (Standish, Molloy, Cunje, & 
Lewis, 2007).
Dementia Rating Scale-2 – DRS-2 (Jurica, Leitten, & Mattis, 2001)
The DRS-2 is a screen of impaired cognitive function that measures memory, attention, 
initiation/perseveration, construction ability and conceptualisation. The five sub-scales 
provide an overall measure of cognitive function. Scores range from 0-144 with lower scores 
indicative of greater impairment. Sub-scale scores are scaled and combined to provide a total 
scale score. 
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Digit Span: Wechsler Memory Scale III  – WMSIII (Wechsler, 1997)
The Digit Span subtest was used in the present study to provide a measure of working 
memory/attention from verbal presentation. 
Digits Forward
The participant is required to recall a sequence of numbers. The sequences range from two to 
nine numbers and there are two sequences in each set resulting in sixteen trials.    
Digits Backward
The participant must recall the numbers in reverse order. The sequences range from two to 
eight numbers, with fourteen trials in total. Each correct sequence scores one point to provide 
a total score. The digit span score is the maximum set correctly recalled in both sequences. A 
half point is added if one of the sequences is recalled correctly in the subsequent set. The 
span tests are discontinued following the incorrect recall of any set. Individuals with DLB 
have been shown to perform poorly compared to those with AD (Calderon et al., 2001).   
Edinburgh Handedness Inventory – EHI (Oldfield, 1971)
The short version of the EHI was used to provide a quantitative assessment of handedness. 
The EHI is a self-report measure of hand preference for 10 everyday activities. The 
assessment results in a laterality quotient where right handedness is +30 and left handedness 
is -30.  
Frontal Systems  Scale – FrSBe (Grace & Molloy, 2001)
The FrSBe was used to quantify behaviors associated with frontal lobe brain damage. A self-
76
rated version and family-rated version were used and both versions consisted of 46 items. 
Each item is rated on a 5-point scale relating to behavior before illness or injury and at the 
present time. Scores have been shown to be related to deficits in the abilities of daily living in 
AD (Norton, Malloy, & Salloway, 2001).  
General Health and Demographic Screen
The inclusion and exclusion criteria were checked during the collection of general 
information. To be included in the study, participants had to fulfil a number of inclusion 
criteria. All participants had to have normal or corrected to normal vision, and have English 
as their primary spoken language. Furthermore, participants had to have no history of alcohol 
dependence, poorly controlled diabetes, or major depression in the last six months because 
these disorders have been previously shown to impact on the ability to recognise facial 
expressions (Frigerio, Burt, Montagne, Murray, & Perrett, 2002; Surguladze et al., 2005). 
Similarly, participants were required to have no history of a significant psychiatric condition 
requiring hospitalisation, neurological, thyroid, or cardiovascular disorder and were not to be 
currently involved in trials of psychoactive drugs. Basic demographic data was gathered as 
well as information regarding current medications and conditions.
Geriatric Depression Scale - GDS (Yesavage & et al., 1982)
The GDS consisted of 30 items and provided a basic screening measure for depression in 
older adults. Each item is answered ‘yes’ or ‘no’ and scores range from 0-30 with higher 
scores indicative of more depressive symptoms. The GDS has been validated with AD 
patients and cut-off values >= 9 have been recommended to screen for depression (Korner et 
al., 2006). 
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MINI International Neuropsychiatric Interview – MINI (Sheehan et al., 1997)
The MINI is a brief structured screen and interview used to detect psychopathology 
indicative of Axis I psychiatric disorders according to DSM-IV (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994) and ICD-10 (World Health Organisation, 1992) criteria. Twenty-one 
screening questions corresponding to the Axis I disorders are administered. An interview is 
initiated with further questions if a “yes” answer is provided to any of the screening items. 
The MINI was used to detect psychopathology as part of the exclusion criteria for the present 
study. If a specific disorder was identified the participant would be excluded from the study 
and referred to their health provider. 
National Adult Reading Test – NART (Nelson, 1982)
An estimate of premorbid intelligence was obtained using the NART. The participant was 
required to pronounce 50 irregular words presented individually from the NART booklet. The 
words were scored 0 for incorrect pronunciation and 1 for correct pronunciation. Total raw
scores were then converted to estimated premorbid IQ scores using standard procedures 
outlined in the NART manual.  
One Day Fluctuation Assessment Scale (Walker et al., 2000)
The One Day Fluctuation Scale was used to screen for fluctuations in awareness and 
consisted of 7 items of confusion behavior. Scores of 0-3 for falls, fluctuation in awareness, 
drowsiness, attention, disorganised thinking, altered level of consciousness and 
communication were added to provide a severity score for fluctuating confusion. 
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Pyramids and Palm Trees – PPT (Howard & Patterson, 1992)
The PPT is a test designed to assess an individual’s ability to access semantic information. 
The three-picture triad was used in the present study which comprised simple line drawings.  
The test required the participant to match a given item to either a target item or distracter 
item. For example, the participant was asked to match a line drawing of a glove to either a 
line drawing of a hand or a foot. There are 52 trials in the test and a score of one is given for 
each correct answer. The PPT test has previously been found to be sensitive to AD and 
discriminate between mild and moderate AD (Hodges & Patterson, 1995).
Rey-Osterreith Complex Figure Test – ROF (Lezak, 1995)
The ROF was used to assess both visual-constructional ability and memory. The participant is 
asked to copy the Rey figure onto a piece of paper. Without warning, the participant is asked 
to reproduce the figure from memory after a 3 minute delay and then after a 30 minute delay. 
Each figure was scored according to 18 separate components which were rated between 0-2 
depending on the accuracy and correct positioning of the component. Total scores for each 
figure ranged from 0-36. 
Map Search: Test of Everyday Attention – TEA (Robertson, Ward, Ridgeway, & Nimmo-
Smith, 1994)
The map search subtest of the TEA provides a measure of visual selective attention. The 
participant is required to search a map for target symbols among a variety of distracter 
symbols and circle as many target symbols as possible in two minutes. A cue card 
demonstrating the symbol of interest is visible during the test. The total correctly circled in 
each minute is then converted to age adjusted percentile scores.  
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Standardized Mini-Mental State Examination - (S)MMSE (Molloy, Alemayehu, & Roberts, 
1991)
The (S)MMSE provides information regarding the current cognitive status of a participant 
and offers standardised administration and scoring guidelines. An individual’s orientation, 
registration, memory, attention and language are assessed to provide a score ranging from 0-
30, with lower scores indicative of greater impairment. The (S)MMSE has been reported to 
differentiate AD from Mild Cognitive Impairment and healthy elderly (Standish et al., 2007). 
Visual Object and Space Perception Battery – VOSP (Warrington & James, 1991)
The VOSP provides measures of space and object perception. A screen and two subtests were 
selected in the present study. 
Shape Detection Screen
To ensure adequate visual sensory capability a screen is administered. The participant is 
required to identify the presence of a degraded X superimposed on random patterns. Each of 
the 20 items is scored 1 for a correct answer. The participant only moves on to the following 
subtests if they score >17.  
Incomplete Letters
The participant is asked to name capital letters presented individually on separate cards. The 
test begins with two practice letters degraded by 30% and consists of 20 trial letters degraded 
by 70%. Correct answers are scored with a 1 (maximum total=20). A fail mark is given if the 
total score is below the 5th percentile for the over 50 age band (<16).  
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Object Decision
The participant is asked to identify the silhouette of a real object from three distracters. Each 
of the 20 trials consists of four silhouettes presented on cards. The participant is asked to 
point to the real object and each correct answer is scored 1 (maximum total=20). A fail mark 
is given if the total score is below the 5th percentile for the over 50 age band (<14). 
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CHAPTER 3
Sensitivity to Emotion Specified in Facial Expressions: Healthy Young Adults
As discussed in Chapter 1, facial expressions are not always a reliable guide to the affective 
state of others. Only genuine expressions are coupled with emotion. Posed expressions 
provide no meaningful information regarding the affective state of an interaction partner; they 
simply represent and approximate the facial configurations that do express specific emotions. 
Within the vast facial expression literature very few studies have purported to examine 
emotion processing by providing participants with information that specifies emotion (e.g. 
Carroll & Russell, 1997; Davis & Gibson, 2000; Frank et al., 1993; Gosselin, Beaupre, & 
Boissonneault, 2002; Kohler et al., 2005; Miles, 2005; Miles & Johnston, 2007; Motley & 
Camden, 1988). More often than not the posed expression is employed, as an analogous 
substitute under the assumption that the information provided by posed and genuine 
expressions is largely the same given the relatively similar configurations involved in both 
types of expression. 
The perception of information that does specify emotion from the information that does not is 
crucial to the functionality of emotion perception. Mistaking posed expressions for genuine 
expressions can result in negative outcomes for the social perceiver, for instance, offering 
sympathy, help or social proximity to someone disingenuous can leave an individual 
vulnerable to manipulation or exploitation. Likewise, approaching an individual who is 
smiling yet angry (i.e., responding to an expression of posed happiness as if it were genuine 
happiness) can leave an individual open to the potential of an avoidable confrontation. The 
facial expression would lose utility as an observable indicator of affective state if individuals 
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were not able to reliably discriminate the different opportunities for action afforded by 
different types of expressions.  
Of the few studies to investigate or acknowledge the differences between posed and genuine 
expressions and examine the recognition of emotion specified in facial expressions, research 
conducted by Miles and Johnston (2007) provides the most suitable platform for the current 
investigation as the focus centres on affect rather than expression. This research showed that 
healthy young adults are sensitive to positive affective state in others, differentiating between 
posed and genuine smiles. The latter was identified as representing that the target is happy 
more frequently than the former. Further, this sensitivity to the information provided by 
smiles had an impact on subsequent behavior, with greater cooperation being shown toward 
individuals displaying genuine than posed smiles (Miles, 2005) and individuals being more 
likely to purchase items displayed by a model displaying a genuine than a posed smile (Peace 
et al., 2006). 
The present study aimed to replicate the former finding employing similar methodology and, 
with an eye to subsequent studies looking at aging and Alzheimer’s disease, extend 
consideration to the sensitivity of healthy young adults to genuine and posed expressions of 
sadness and fear, in addition to happiness. It is important to accurately detect genuine sadness 
and fear in others, not only to avoid missing the emotion and subsequently the opportunity to 
act adaptively, but also to avoid the potential negative outcomes associated with disingenuous 
signals. 
The sensitivity of healthy young adults to the underlying states of happiness, sadness and fear 
was tested using two tasks – an emotion categorization task and a priming task. In the 
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categorization task, each participant was asked whether facial displays were showing and 
feeling each target emotion. The show and feel conditions were imposed to manipulate the 
decision making criteria so that response bias could be investigated, that is, whether 
participants simply demonstrated a proclivity to respond with one answer over the other 
regardless of the information being judged. This was primarily calculated to allow more 
accurate estimates of sensitivity to be generated, as bias was considered over different levels 
(Miles, 2005). The show condition involved less stringent decision-making criteria as 
participants were only instructed to attend to whether emotion was being shown, while the 
feel condition required more stringent criteria as participants were required to attend to the 
felt state of the targets. There would be evidence of sensitivity if posed expressions were
identified as showing but not feeling target emotion while genuine expressions were 
identified as both showing and feeling target emotion. In other words, sensitivity is 
demonstrated if genuine expressions were identified as specifying the target was feeling 
emotion more often than posed expressions. 
The priming task involved participants making judgments about the valence of words that 
were preceded by facial display primes. That is, each participant was ostensibly engaged in a 
separate task that did not require him/her to attend to the facial displays. Previous research 
has shown that word valence is categorized in less time when preceded by a prime of the 
same valence as the target (Fazio & Olson, 2003). The present research argues only genuine 
expressions of emotion specify positive or negative effect and are therefore conceptually 
related to the target words, whereas posed expressions do not. For example, genuine smiles 
specify positive emotion which is congruent with positive words, whereas posed and neutral 
expressions are not congruent given they are only simulations of positive emotion. A 
difference in the response times as a function of the type of expressions prime would 
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demonstrate participants were sensitive to the emotion specified in the expressions. 
A sex categorization task was also included to control for deficits in the ability to extract 
information from faces other than emotional information. In this categorization task, each 
participant was asked whether each display was of the target sex. Two samples of healthy 
young adults were used in the present studies. The second sample completed additional 
cognitive measures to allow for subsequent group matching with a sample of healthy older 
adults.  
It was predicted that participants would show sensitivity to information that specifies sadness 
and fear, and hence, differentiate between genuine and posed expressions of both sadness and 
fear, in addition to happiness. The present study also aimed to look at whether sensitivity to 
emotion is a generalised skill or whether it is emotion specific. That is, whether individuals 
who are sensitive to one emotion are also sensitive to others. It was predicted that participants 
would demonstrate a generalised ability and there would be a relationship in sensitivity 
between the three target emotions. 
Experiment 1a: Categorization task
Method
Participants
The participants were 24 young adults (female = 11) recruited from the University of 
Canterbury and the local community, who volunteered to participate in return for a $10 
shopping voucher. Demographic characteristics are presented in Table 8. They ranged in age 
from 18 years to 34 years (M = 22.9 years, SD = 4.3) and had on average 7.4 years (SD = 2.6) 
of post-primary education. Twenty participants (83%) were right-handed. Inclusion/exclusion 
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criteria were applied. All participants had normal or corrected to normal vision, and spoke 
English as their primary spoken language. Furthermore, participants had no history of alcohol 
dependence, poorly controlled diabetes, major depression in the last six months or a 
significant psychiatric condition requiring hospitalisation. They had no history of 
neurological, thyroid, or cardiovascular disorder and were not be currently involved in trials 
of psychoactive drugs. These specific exclusion criteria were applied to control for conditions 
that have been shown to effect emotion processing. No participants were excluded from the 
present study.  
Table 8. Demographic Characteristics of Participants in Experiment 1a
Mean (%) SD Range
Age 22.9 4.3 18-34
BDI-II 4.5 4.4 0-18
Education 7.4 2.6 3-13
Sex (% female) 46% - -
Handedness (% right) 83% - -
Materials
Emotion-categorization task
An emotion-categorization task was used to assess the recognition of happy, sad and fear 
emotions in facial expressions, using custom written software (Walton, 2004). The three 
emotions were assessed in separate blocks that consisted of 12 photographs 7 from the 
displays generated for the present research (see Chapter 2). There were four targets for each 
emotion and each target provided a genuine, posed and neutral facial display. Across the 
three emotions, seven female targets provided the 36 facial displays.
                                                
7 An attempt was made to reduce the number of trials so that individuals with AD could complete the task 
within 15 minutes.
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The participant was seated comfortably in front of a 14-inch laptop computer with an external 
keyboard displaying only YES and NO buttons. The participant was provided with an 
instruction sheet (see Appendix G) informing him/her that six separate questions would be 
asked, with each question followed by a block of photographs. The six questions (blocks) 
were “Are the following people showing happiness?” 2) “Are the following people showing 
sadness?” 3) “Are the following people showing fear?” 4) “Are the following people feeling 
happiness?” 5) “Are the following people feeling sadness?” 6) “Are the following people 
feeling fear?” Their task was to answer YES or NO for each photograph that appeared on the 
screen. The participant was asked if they understood the instructions or had any questions. 
Once each participant acknowledged he/she understood the instructions he/she was asked to 
attend to the first question. The order of emotion (happy/sad/fear) and condition (show/feel) 
blocks was counterbalanced to give twelve unique orders of presentation. Within each block 
of trials (e.g., Feeling happiness?), the facial displays were presented in a unique random 
order for each participant.
The instructions were repeated on the computer screen for each question and were followed 
by three practice trials completed in front of the experimenter. If the instructions were 
followed satisfactorily, the task was advanced to the actual trials that involved the 
presentation of the twelve facial displays relevant to the emotion in question. Each display 
remained on the screen until the participant made a response. It was then replaced by a new 
display. The inter-stimulus interval was randomly varied between 1500 and 3000 
milliseconds to prevent anticipatory responses. The experimenter advanced to the next 
question and block of trials when all twelve judgments had been made. When the participant 
had completed all six blocks of trials (total = 72 trials), he/she was asked to complete the sex 
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categorization task.   
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Sex-categorization task 
A sex categorization task (Walton, 2004) was used to control for possible impairments in face 
perception, which might influence the ability to detect emotion in faces. The task employed a 
display of a neutral expression from each of eight targets (4 female). The female displays 
were from individuals who had completed the generation procedure described in Chapter 2 
but who did not provide displays involved in the emotion categorization tasks. The male 
displays were provided by Lynden Miles and had been developed for research on facial 
expressions of emotion in a similar manner to that described in Chapter 2 (Miles, 2005; Miles 
& Johnston, 2007). The sex categorization task involved two questions (blocks of trials); 
“Are the following people male?” and “Are the following people female?” The participant 
was asked to answer YES or NO to each photograph by pressing the appropriate key. The 
participant completed both blocks of trials and the order of blocks was counterbalanced. Each 
block began with two practice trials, which were completed in the presence of the researcher. 
If instructions were understood, the researcher advanced to the actual trials and the 
participant was required to make eight sex judgments in each block. 
General health screen and demographic information
The specific inclusion and exclusion criteria were verified for each participant by completing 
a semi-structured general health interview (see Appendix H). A M.I.N.I. psychiatric screen, 
and M.I.N.I. interview (Sheehan et al., 1998), where applicable, was completed by each 
participant to assess the presence of Axis 1 disorders according to DSM-IV (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994) criteria. The BDI-II (Beck et al., 1996) was administered to 
measure depressive symptoms. 
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Design
The categorization task involved a 3 (Emotion: happy/sad/fear) x 2 (Condition: show/feel) x 
3 (Expression: genuine/posed/neutral) design, with all factors being within subjects. The 36 
facial displays were presented in both the show and feel conditions, resulting in 72 trials.
Procedure
Each participant was invited to take part in a study investigating the ability of perceivers to 
differentiate between posed and genuine facial expressions of emotion. He/she was provided 
with an Information Sheet that briefly outlined the study and their rights as research 
participants (see Appendix I). The sheet also provided information about the definition of 
posed and genuine expressions, more specifically, that posed expressions are not related to 
how one feels while genuine expressions are the result of actual felt emotion. Each 
participant signed a consent form (see Appendix J) and he/she was taken to the testing room 
when he/she was ready to begin. The researcher administered a semi-structured general 
health interview and M.I.N.I. screen to verify that the participant met the specific inclusion 
and exclusion criteria described above. Each participant met the criteria and continued with 
the procedure. Following the screening, the participant completed the emotion categorization
task, sex categorization task and priming task that is described as Experiment 1b. 
Results 
Sex-categorization
Accuracy rates were calculated by establishing the percentage of correct sex identifications 
across both blocks (16 trials). The mean accuracy rate was 99%. (range= 88%-100%). The 
participants were reliably able to detect information relevant to sex identification from facial 
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displays. Consequently, the control task was eliminated from further analysis and no 
participant was excluded based on difficulties perceiving this information from the face. 
Emotion-categorization
The percentage of YES responses for each participant was calculated as a function of 
emotion, condition and expression type and is shown in Table 9.  If participants differentiate 
between posed and genuine expressions we would expect to find that genuine expressions 
were identified as both showing and as feeling the target emotion, but that posed expressions 
were identified as showing but not feeling the target emotion. Neutral expressions would not 
be identified as showing or feeling emotion. Visual inspection of the data suggests that this is 
the case for each emotion, as the percentage of YES responses for posed expressions is less in 
the feel condition than the show condition, for each emotion but there is little difference in 
the percentage of YES responses to genuine expressions in the show and feel conditions.
Table 9. Percentage of YES Responses by Judgment Condition and Facial Expression for 
each Emotion: Experiment 1a
Judgment condition
Facial expression SHOW
(%YES)
FEEL
(%YES)
Happy
Neutral 17% 11%
Genuine 99%a 95%a 
Posed 96%a 40%b 
Sad
Neutral 12% 17%
Genuine 75%a 64%a
Posed 78%a 28%b
Fear
Neutral 4% 2%
Genuine 76%a 73%a
Posed 94%b 54%c
Note. Significant differences are shown with different subscript between conditions and between 
posed and genuine expressions within emotion.
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To confirm this observation, data were subjected to analysis of variance (ANOVA). 
Preliminary analyses found there was no effect of sex, handedness or presentation order on 
the dependant variables and therefore these factors were not considered further. A 3 
(Emotion: happy/sad/feel) x 2 (Condition: show/feel) x 3 (Expression: genuine/posed/neutral) 
repeated measures ANOVA revealed main effects of Emotion, F (2,46) = 10.25, p <  0.001, 
ŋp2 = .308, Condition, F (1,23) = 51.61, p < .001, ŋp2 = .692 and Expression, F (2,46) = 
305.81, p < .001, ŋp2 = .930.  These main effects were qualified by significant Condition by 
Expression, F (2,46) = 67.73, p < .001, ŋp2 = .747, and Emotion by Expression  interactions F 
(4,92) = 12.61,  p < .001, ŋp2 = .354, which can be seen in Figure 7 and Figure 8. 
    
Genuine Posed Neutral
Expression
-10
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
%
 o
f Y
ES
 re
sp
on
se
s
 Show
 Feel
Figure 7. Percentage of YES Responses as a Function of Expression for each Condition:
Experiment 1a
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Tukey post-hoc tests (p < .05) were conducted to investigate the interactions. The Condition 
by Expression interaction revealed no significant difference in the percentage of YES 
responses in the show and feel conditions for either genuine (M = 83.3% vs. 77.1%), or 
neutral (M = 10.8% vs. 10.0%) expressions. There were, however, more YES responses to 
posed expressions in the show than the feel (M = 89.2% vs. 40.6%) condition. Furthermore, 
in the show condition there was no difference in the percentage of YES responses to the 
genuine and posed expressions, but both were significantly higher than to the neutral 
condition. In the feel condition, the highest percentage of YES responses was given to the 
genuine expressions, the lowest to the neutral expressions with posed expressions
intermediate, and all differences between expression types reached significance.
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Post-hoc tests compared the percentage of YES responses to each emotion type separately for 
each expression type. For genuine expressions, a higher percentage of YES responses was 
made to happy (M = 97%) than sad (M = 69%) and fear (M = 74%) which did not differ from 
one another. For posed expressions, significantly fewer YES responses were made to sad (M
= 53%) than happy (M = 68%) and fear (M = 74%) which did not differ from one another, 
and there was no difference for neutral expressions. In addition, the percentage of YES 
responses as a function of expression type was considered separately for each emotion. For 
happiness and sadness, there were more YES responses to genuine than posed expressions 
and both were higher than neutral. For fear, there was no difference between responses to 
genuine and posed expressions, which were both higher than neutral. Participants, therefore,
judged genuine expressions as both showing and feeling the target emotion but posed 
expressions as showing but not feeling the target emotion.
Sensitivity 
The responses in the categorization task were further analysed using a non-parametric signal 
detection analysis. Two analyses were conducted, the first analysis included all expressions to 
look at sensitivity to emotion in facial displays; that is reliability of perceivers to detect 
information in the face that specifies affective state from information that does not. In other 
words, the first analysis looked at whether participants correctly identified that a genuine 
expression specified a congruent underlying emotional state, whereas neutral and posed 
expressions did not. Neutral expressions were removed in the second analysis to look at 
sensitivity to the differences between posed and genuine expressions. Sensitivity in this 
analysis refers to the ability to detect information that specifies affective state from 
information that closely approximates but is representational rather than indicative of 
affective state. In other words, identifying genuine expressions but not identifying posed 
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expressions as specifying a congruent underlying emotional state. 
The data from each participant was collated into hits and false alarms separately for each 
emotion, judgment condition and facial expression. In both analyses, a hit was defined as 
correctly responding YES to a genuine expression, while a false alarm was defined as 
responding YES to either a neutral expression or a posed expression in the first analysis and 
responding YES to a posed expression in the second analysis. The correction recommended 
by Snodgrass and Corwin (1988) was applied to the frequency of hits and false alarms to 
convert to the associated rates of hits and false alarms. These rates were then used to 
calculate measures of sensitivity (A’) for each participant as a function of emotion and 
judgment condition. The hits, false alarms and estimates of A’ are shown in Table 10.8
Table 10. Mean Hit (HIT) Rates, False Alarm (FA) Rates and Estimates of A’ by Judgment 
Condition for each Emotion: Experiment 1a
Analysis 1 Analysis 2
Judgment condition HIT FA A’ HIT FA A’
Show Happy .89 .55 .79* .89 .86 .53
Sad .71 .45 .75* .71 .71 .53
Fear .71 .49 .68* .71 .84 .39
Feel Happy .85 .29 .86* .85 .43 .78*
Sad .62 .26 .76* .62 .32 .71*
Fear .69 .31 .77* .69 .53 .61*
Note. Analysis 1 includes posed, genuine and neutral expressions.
Note. Analysis 2 includes posed and genuine expressions.
Note. A’ is compared to chance level of 0.5.
* p < .05.
                                                
8 A measure of response bias (B’) was also calculated to confirm that participants adopted a more stringent 
response criterion in the feel than in the show condition. Response bias was compared to 0 using single-sample t 
tests. A response bias was found in the show but not in the feel condition, therefore, participants did not 
demonstrate a proclivity to respond with one response over the other in the feel condition. The formula (see 
Appendix K) used to calculate sensitivity takes response bias into account and therefore it is not considered 
further.   
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As discussed, in the context of the first analysis, sensitivity refers to the ability to detect 
information relevant to recognising affective state (e.g., happy vs. not happy). The higher the 
sensitivity scores9 the greater the discrimination of genuine expressions that specify emotion 
from expressions that do not (posed and neutral expressions). Sensitivity scores ranged from 
.75 to .86. Single-sample t-tests (p < .05) showed that the sensitivity scores were significantly 
greater than expected by chance (0.5), in each experimental condition, indicating that 
participants were indeed sensitive to the differences between experienced and non-
experienced emotional states. 
In the context of the second analysis, sensitivity refers to the ability to differentiate between 
posed and genuine expressions. The level of sensitivity in the feel condition ranged from .61 
to .78. Single-sample t-tests (p < .05) showed that the sensitivity scores were significantly 
greater than expected by chance (0.5), indicating that participants were sensitive to the 
differences between posed and genuine expressions of each emotion. The sensitivity scores in 
the show condition (range = .39 - .53) were, however, not significantly greater than chance.
Analysis of variance was used to confirm these observations. Preliminary analysis showed 
that sex and handedness 10 did not influence sensitivity and these factors are not considered 
further. Separate 3 (Emotion: happy/sad/fear) x 2 (Condition: show/feel) repeated measures 
ANOVAs were conducted for each sensitivity analysis. The first analysis revealed main 
effects of Emotion, F (2,46) = 9.37, p <  0.01, ŋp2 = .289 and Condition, F (1,23) = 20.36, p < 
.01, ŋp2 = .470 but no interaction. Post-hoc tests (Tukey p < .05) on the Emotion main effect 
                                                
9 It is accepted that the meaningful range of A’ is from 0 – 1.00. Higher scores are indicative of higher 
sensitivity.  
10 Although there was a main effect of handedness, F (1,20) = 5.4, p < .05, on sensitivity scores with left-handed 
individuals being more sensitive than right-handed individuals (Ms = .82 v .75), there were no interaction 
effects between handedness and any of the key IVs (emotion; condition) and the same pattern of results was 
seen for both right and left-handed individuals. Hence handedness was not considered further.  
96
showed participants were more sensitive to happiness (M = .82) than to sadness (M = .73) and 
fear (M = .72), which did not differ from one another. Participants were also more sensitive 
when asked how targets were feeling (M = .80) than when asked what targets were showing 
(M = .72). 
The second ANOVA also revealed main effects of Emotion, F (2,46) = 9.67,  p <  0.01, ŋp2 = 
.296 and Condition, F (1,23) = 50.19,  p < .01, ŋp2 = .686, but no interaction. Sensitivity to 
the difference between posed and genuine expressions of happiness (M = .66) and sadness (M
= .62) did not differ from one another and both were significantly higher than for fear (M = 
.50, Tukey, p < .05). Sensitivity in the feel condition (M = .70) was also higher than 
sensitivity in the show condition (M = .48). 
Relationship between Sensitivity Variables 
Kendall’s tau rank order correlations were used to assess the relationship between sensitivity 
scores both within and across emotions and are shown in Table 11. Correlations were 
computed to investigate whether there was a relationship between sensitivity in the show and 
feel conditions for each emotion and to investigate whether there was a relationship in 
sensitivity to the three target emotions. These correlations look specifically at whether the 
participants who were sensitive in one condition, for example, were likely to be sensitive in 
the other condition. Similarly, the correlations examined whether the participants who were 
sensitive to one emotion were also likely to be sensitive to the others. The correlations were 
computed separately for sensitivity to emotion in facial expressions (1) and sensitivity to the 
difference between posed and genuine expressions (2). Bonferroni-corrected significance 
levels (p < .006) were used to control for multiple comparisons.
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Table 11. Sensitivity Within and Between Emotions: Experiment 1a 
Happy Sad Fear
show feel show feel show feel
Mean SD τ τ τ τ τ τ 
Analysis 1 Happy (show) .79 .05 -
Happy (feel) .86 .08 .181 -
Sad (show) .70 .13 .102 -.143 -
Sad (feel) .76 .11 .038 -.050 .218 -
Fear (show) .68 .14 .132 .341 -.036 .207 -
Fear (feel) .77 .15 .046 .475* -.136 .136 .338 -
Analysis 2 Happy (show) .53 .09 -
Happy (feel) .78 .14 .339 -
Sad (show) .53 .24 -.048 -.151 -
Sad (feel) .71 .16 .135 .108 .000 -
Fear (show) .39 .15 .286 .355 -.108 .134 -
Fear (feel) .61 .22 .135 .304 -.334 .363 .460* -
Note. Analysis 1 includes posed, genuine and neutral expressions.
Note. Analysis 2 includes posed and genuine expressions.
* p < .006.
Considering the relationships within emotions, only one significant correlation between the 
sensitivity scores in the show and feel conditions was found. There was a positive correlation 
for fear in the second analysis (without the neutral expressions included), τ (24) = .46, p < 
.006, indicating that those who were more sensitive in the show condition were also more 
sensitive in the feel condition. Because there was no consistent relationship across conditions, 
however, it is not possible to collapse sensitivity scores across the show and feel conditions 
within each emotion. 
Considering the relationship across emotions, the correlations between sensitivity scores for 
happy, sad and fear were considered separately in the show and feel conditions (given the 
lack of correlation between conditions reported above). Overall, there was little support for 
relationships across emotions. For the sensitivity to emotion scores (1) there was only one 
significant correlation in the feel condition, with those who were more sensitive to happiness 
also being more sensitive to fear, τ (24) = .48, p < .006. For the sensitivity to the difference 
between expressions (2) there were no significant correlations across emotions, indicating 
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that being sensitive to one emotion was not related to being sensitive to any other emotion.  
Relationship between Sensitivity and Background Characteristics
Table 12 details the correlations found between sensitivity scores and background 
characteristics. A significant negative correlation was found between sensitivity to happiness 
in the feel condition and both age τ (24) = -.39, p < .008 and years of education τ (24) = -.41, 
p < .008. Participants who were older and had more years of education were less sensitive to 
happiness when asked to attend to affective state. This relationship was not found when 
considering sensitivity to the differences between posed and genuine expressions, however. 
In fact no significant relationships were found within the second analysis. 
Table 12. Correlations between Sensitivity and Background Characteristics: Experiment 1a 
Age Education BDI-II
τ τ τ
Age -
Education .592* -
BDI-II -.273 .023 -
Analysis 1 Happy (show) -.120 -.370 .313
Happy (feel) -.392* -.414* .016
Sad (show) -.046 -.079 -.047
Sad (feel) .260 -.206 -.207
Fear (show) -.113 -.185 -.114
Fear (feel) -.046 -.338 -.062
Analysis 2 Happy (show) .000 -.382 .196
Happy (feel) -.355 -.380 .000
Sad (show) .036 .186 -.049
Sad (feel) .208 -.184 -.210
Fear (show) -.158 -.211 -.128
Fear (feel) -.026 -.307 -.101
Note. Analysis 1 includes posed, genuine and neutral expressions.
Note. Analysis 2 includes posed and genuine expressions.
* p < .008.
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Discussion
As predicted, the participants in Experiment 1a demonstrated they were sensitive to emotion 
specified in facial expressions, regardless of whether they were instructed to attend to felt 
state or not. That is, they were sensitive when asked to judge whether the target was showing 
emotion as well as when asked to judge whether the target was feeling emotion. Furthermore, 
participants were sensitive to the differences between posed and genuine expressions of each 
emotion, but only when instructed to consider how the target was feeling. The explicit 
instruction to attend to felt state, therefore, facilitated the differentiation between posed and 
genuine expressions. In line with many other studies (Calder et al., 2003; Gosselin et al., 
1995; Hargrave et al., 2002; Kohler et al., 2004; Motley & Camden, 1988; Rosen et al., 2006; 
Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004a), participants in Experiment 1a were more sensitive to happiness 
specified in facial expressions than to either sadness or fear. They could establish, however, 
the veracity of happiness and sadness, that is differentiate between posed and genuine 
expressions, equally well, although contrary to predictions being sensitive to one was not 
related to being sensitive to the others.   
The results of Experiment 1a suggest that the instructions to actively attend to affective state 
influenced whether participants were sensitive to emotion in facial expressions or not. Of 
particular interest, however, is whether individuals can spontaneously perceive emotion from 
the information provided in facial expressions, that is ‘do they’ rather than ‘can they’ detect 
the affective state of others. The following experiment sought to establish whether 
participants would attend to the different information provided by posed and genuine 
expressions when not explicitly required to make overt judgments of either the facial 
expressions or the targets displaying those expressions.  
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Experiment 1b: Priming task
Experiment 1a provided evidence that individuals are sensitive to information in facial 
expressions that specify the affective state of another person. The present study examined 
whether this can be demonstrated without imposing an explicit instruction to attend to facial 
expressions or to make explicit judgments about the facial expressions. Several studies have 
shown that facial expressions can be detected automatically (Batty & Taylor, 2003; Dimberg 
& Oehman, 1996; Stenberg, Wiking, & Dahl, 1998). Indeed the priming literature provides 
evidence of facial expressions as effective primes that can moderate subsequent behaviors 
such as valence judgments of surprise expressions (Li, Zinbarg, Boehm, & Paller, 2008), the 
response latency to identify word valence (Aguado, Garcia-Gutierrez, Castaneda, & Saugar, 
2007) and muscle activity of the face (Dimberg et al., 2002).  
Furthermore, Miles (2005; Miles & Johnston, 2007) found that the veracity of smiles 
employed as primes had an impact on the response time taken to judge the valence of words. 
Genuine smiles that specified positive affect facilitated faster response to positive words 
compared to neutral primes, whereas posed smiles that do not specify affect did not. A 
priming methodology was employed in the present study with the aim of replicating previous 
findings with regard to expressions of happiness, as evidenced by faster responding to 
positive words preceded by genuine happy expressions (congruent stimuli) compared to 
posed and neutral expressions which do not specify positive affective state (incongruent 
stimuli). In addition, the present study extended previous findings by establishing if 
individuals were also spontaneously sensitive to the differences in posed and genuine 
expressions of sadness and fear. Evidence of faster responding to negative words preceded by 
genuine sadness and fear expressions (congruent stimuli) compared to posed and neutral 
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expressions (incongruent stimuli) was sought.
Given the potential consequences of inefficient perception of sadness and fear it is 
hypothesized that the veracity of these expressions will also moderate subsequent behavior. 
Specifically, it was predicted that healthy young adults would respond faster to words when 
primed with emotion (genuine expressions) than when primed with simulations of emotion 
(posed expressions) or no emotion (neutral expressions). Consequently, planned comparisons 
were employed to directly examine the difference in response latency between judgments
preceded by posed, genuine and neutral primes. The time taken to identify positive words was 
compared when preceded by genuine and posed primes as well as each expression to neutral. 
Likewise, the time taken to identify negative words was compared when preceded by genuine 
and posed primes as well as each to neutral.
Method
Participants
The same 24 participants (female = 11) who completed Experiment 1a also completed 
Experiment 1b.
Material
Word judgment task 
Seven facial displays (neutral, genuine happy, genuine sad, genuine fear, posed happy, posed 
sad and posed fear) from a single female target who completed the generation procedure 
described in Chapter 2 and who provided a set of expressions for each target emotion in the 
categorization task employed in Experiment 1 were used as primes in a word judgment task. 
To examine the effect of the facial display on response time to word valence, it was necessary 
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to select words that were easily read and understood with very clear positive or negative 
valence. Ten target words (5 positive: good, honest, sincere, loyal, kind and 5 negative: bad, 
mean, cruel, liar, selfish) were chosen based on an extreme positive or negative likeableness 
rating, that is having a rating of above 3.5 on a 5 point scale or a rating below 1.5 on a 5 point 
scale (Anderson, 1968; Bochner, 1985). Only words with one or two syllables were chosen.11
The participant was instructed that he/she would see several words appear on screen one at a 
time and his/her task was simply to judge whether the word was positive or negative, as 
quickly and as accurately as possible. That is, he/she was asked to quickly decide whether the 
word had a positive meaning or a negative meaning. The participant was also informed that 
before each word appeared he/she would see a photograph of a person, but his/her task was to 
attend to the meaning of the word. He/she was asked to respond to each word by pressing 
either the POSITIVE button or the NEGATIVE button on the external response keyboard. All 
instructions were shown on screen and were also read aloud by the researcher. 
The procedure began with four practice items. A positive and a negative word not used in the 
actual trials were presented along with two neutral expressions from two targets not presented 
in the actual trials. A fixation cross appeared in the middle of the screen for a time varying 
from 1500-3000 milliseconds before being replaced by the facial display which was 
presented for 100ms. The facial display was immediately replaced by the target word, which 
remained on screen until a response had been made. If the instructions were followed 
satisfactorily, the participant proceeded to the actual trials. Each participant made a judgment 
on all 70 word and facial display prime combinations, which were presented in a unique 
random order for each participant. A 30-second break was scheduled into the procedure after 
every 25 trials to alleviate fatigue.
                                                
11 Each participant demonstrated a clear understanding of the words prior to completing the task by completing a 
word-definition matching task (see Appendix M).  
103
Design
The priming task was presented on a 14 inch colour computer monitor using custom-written 
software (Walton, 2004) and involved a 7 (Prime: neutral/genuine happy/genuine sad/genuine 
fear/posed happy, posed sad and posed fear) x 2 (Word valence: positive/negative) design 
with repeated measures on both factors. 
Procedure
Following the completion of Experiment 1a each participant was advised they would begin 
another task that involved making judgments about the valence of common words. At the 
completion of the priming task the participant was fully debriefed, paid and thanked for 
his/her time.  
Results
The response latency served as the dependant variable for this study. The process of cleaning 
the data began with the removal of incorrect responses (i.e., judging a positive word as 
negative and vice-versa). A visual inspection of the remaining data showed a positively 
skewed distribution, which did not therefore meet the normality assumptions of ANOVA. A 
log10 transformation was applied to the data from each participant and data remaining outside 
M + 3.0 SD were removed as outliers. Data cleaning removed 15 (0.9%) incorrect responses 
and 12 (0.7%) outliers from the data set prior to analysis. The analyses was performed on 
log10-transformed data but are reported as raw response times.
The median response time was calculated for each participant as a function of expression 
prime and word valance. Figure 9 presents the group mean response times to positive and 
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negative words as a function of expression prime and word valence. 
A visual inspection indicates that response to positive words was faster after genuine than 
posed happy primes and response to negative words was faster after genuine than posed fear 
expression primes. To confirm this observation, analysis of variance was performed to 
compare the effect of expression prime on response times. 
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Figure 9. Response Time to Categorise Words as a Function of Facial Expression Prime and 
Word Valence: Experiment 1b
Neither sex nor handedness influenced response times and were not considered further. A 7 
(Prime: neutral/genuine happy/genuine sad/genuine fear/posed happy, posed sad and posed 
fear) x 2 (Word valence: positive/negative) repeated measures ANOVA revealed a two-way 
interaction effect F (6,138) = 2.67, p < .05, ŋp2 = .104. The planned comparisons as stated 
above were performed to assess the hypothesised effects on response times. That is, the time 
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taken to identify positive words was compared when preceded by genuine versus posed 
happy primes as well as each to neutral primes. Likewise, the time taken to identify negative 
words was compared when preceded by genuine versus posed sad primes as well as each to 
neutral and when preceded by genuine versus posed fear primes and each to neutral.
The mean response time to identify positive words was compared between posed and genuine 
happiness conditions. A significant difference was found between the time taken to identify 
positive words preceded by posed expressions (M = 637 msec) and genuine expressions (M = 
588 msec). Specifically participants were faster to identify positive words following genuine 
happy expressions. No significant differences were found when time to identify positive 
words was compared between both posed and genuine expressions and neutral expressions 
(M = 629 msec).  
The mean response time to identify negative words was compared between posed and 
genuine conditions for sadness and fear separately. A significant difference was found 
between the time taken to identify negative words preceded by posed fear expression (M = 
643 msec) and genuine fear expressions (M = 600 msec). Participants were faster to identify 
negative words following exposure to genuine fear. No significant differences were found 
when time to identify negative words was compared between both posed and genuine fear 
expressions and neutral expressions (M = 636 msec). No significant differences, however, 
were found when time to identify negative words was compared between posed and genuine 
sadness conditions. Although unplanned, it is noteworthy that response to positive words was 
significantly slower when preceded by genuine sadness (M = 660 msec) than posed sad 
expressions (M = 590 msec) 
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Discussion
As expected, sensitivity to affective state was manifest without explicit instructions to attend 
to the information or make overt judgments. Participants were faster to respond to positive 
words following exposure to genuine than posed expressions of happiness and were faster to 
respond to negative words following exposure to genuine than posed expressions of fear. 
Experiment 1b provided evidence that individuals attend to the veracity of facial expressions 
and are sensitive to the meaningful differences between posed and genuine expressions. The 
results indicate that sensitivity to affective state is not reserved simply for explicit judgment. 
In addition to establishing that individuals ‘can’ detect affective state in others, the present 
study has established that individuals ‘do’ detect information that specifies the affective state 
of other people with consequences for subsequent behavior.
Experiment 2a: Categorization task
Another group of healthy young adults was recruited to complete the same tasks in 
Experiment 1a described above. These participants also completed several cognitive 
measures (see Chapter 2) and provided information that would allow for suitable group 
matching with subsequent samples of healthy older adults and individuals with AD. In 
addition to investigating sensitivity within and across emotions, the present study examined, 
without specific expectation, whether performance was related to these cognitive skills. The 
time taken to make judgments was also calculated in Experiment 2a.12 Several studies have 
shown that response time provides valuable information about the level of performance 
achieved in judgments tasks (e.g., Ferrari & Pychyl, 2007; Myerson, Robertson, & Hale, 
                                                
12 Response time data was not available for the first group of healthy young adults.
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2007; Sopory, 2006). Of particular interest in the present study is whether response time 
differs as a function of expression type and emotion. An examination of the time taken to 
make judgments may provide insight into the nature of potential deficits and the nature of 
group differences that are reported in Chapter 6.
It was predicted that the present study would replicate the findings of Experiment 1a and find 
that participants are sensitive to emotion and are able to differentiate between posed and 
genuine expressions. Given the finding of Experiment 1a, that sensitivity was emotion 
specific, no relationship between being sensitive to one emotion and another was expected in 
the present study. In addition, it was predicted that participants would make faster judgments 
of genuine and neutral expressions, because these already contain the relevant affective 
information, than posed expressions that do not and therefore necessarily require additional 
mental processing. 
Method
Participants
The participants were 20 healthy young undergraduate students (female = 12) recruited from 
the University of Canterbury, who volunteered to participate in return for partial course 
credit. Demographic characteristics are shown in Table 13. As can be seen participants age 
ranged from 18 years to 34 years (M = 22.5 years, SD = 5.2) and they had on average 7.3 
years (SD = 2.0) of post-primary education. Fourteen participants (70%) were right-handed. 
All participants meet the inclusion and exclusion criteria as outlined above for Experiment 
1a. 
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Table 13.Demographic Characteristics of Participants in Experiment 1a
Mean (%) SD Range
Age 22.5 5.2 18-34
BDI-II 5.7 3.6 0-13
Education 7.3 2.0 5-13
Sex (% female) 60%
Handedness (% right) 70%
Materials
The facial displays presented to participants in Experiment 2a were the same as those 
presented to participants in Experiment 1a, in both the emotion categorization task and 
control sex categorization task. Participants were also required to complete the same general 
health screen and demographic interview.  
Cognitive measures
Each participant completed a number of cognitive tasks in order to allow for between group 
comparisons (see Chapter 6). Full details of each of these tests and the rationale for their 
inclusion can be found in Chapter 2. The National Adult Reading Test NART-II (Nelson, 
1982)was used to provide an estimate of pre-morbid IQ. Depressive symptoms that might 
impact on emotion perception were measured by the Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II 
Beck et al., 1996). The Letter fluency subtest of the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function 
System, (D-KEFS Delis et al., 2001) was used to provide a measure of executive function. 
Working memory was assessed using the Adaptive Digit Ordering Task, (DOT-A Werheid et 
al., 2002), while semantic memory was measured with a modified Boston Naming Test 
(MBNT) as part of the CERAD battery. To assess visuoperceptual skills participants were 
required to complete the Incomplete Letters subtest of The Visual Object and Space 
Perception Battery, (VOSP Warrington & James, 1991). 
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Design
The categorization task involved a 3 (Emotion: happy/sad/fear) x 2 (Condition: show/feel) x 
3 (Expression: genuine/posed/neutral) design, with all factors being within subjects. 
Procedure
The same procedure was followed for Experiment 2a as for Experiment 1a. The above 
cognitive measures were administered to participants after they completed Experiment 2b.
Results
Sex-categorization
Accuracy rates were calculated by establishing the percentage of correct sex identifications. 
The mean accuracy rate was 99%. (range = 94%-100%). The participants were reliably able 
to detect information relevant to sex identification from facial displays; so consequently, the 
control task was eliminated from further analysis and no participant was removed from the 
sample. 
Emotion-categorization
The percentage of YES responses for each participant was calculated as a function of 
emotion, condition and expression type and is shown in Table 14. Visual inspection suggests 
that genuine expressions were identified as showing and feeling the target emotion, but posed 
expressions were identified as showing but not feeling the target emotion, with the exception 
of fear where there was no difference between conditions. To confirm this observation, 
analyses of variance were conducted. 
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Table 14.Percentage of YES Responses by Judgment Condition and Facial Expression for 
Each Emotion: Experiment 2a
Judgment condition
Facial expression SHOW
(%YES)
FEEL
(%YES)
Happy
Neutral 15% 6%
Genuine 99%a 94%a 
Posed 86%a 43%b 
Sad
Neutral 18% 25%b
Genuine 84%a 75%a
Posed 75%a 34%b
Fear
Neutral 4% 4%
Genuine 70%a 58%a
Posed 78%a 56%a
Note.  Significant difference in percentage of YES responses is shown with different subscript between 
conditions and between posed and genuine expressions within emotion.
Preliminary analyses revealed there was no effect of sex, handedness or presentation order, 13
and therefore, these factors were not considered further. Data were subjected to a 3 (Emotion: 
happy/sad/feel) x 2 (Condition: show/feel) x 3 (Expression: genuine/posed/neutral) repeated 
measures ANOVA. The analysis revealed main effects of Emotion, F (2,38) = 3.68, p < .05, 
ŋp2 = .162, Condition, F (1,19) = 33.41, p < .001 ŋp2 = .638, and Expression F (2,38) = 
196.16, p < .001, ŋp2 = .912 as well as Emotion by Expression F (4,76) = 12.40, p < .001 ŋp2
= .395 and Condition by Expression interactions F (2,38) = 21.62, p < .001 ŋp2 = .532, which 
were qualified by a three-way interaction F (4,76) = 3.99, p < .01, ŋp2 = .174. 
In light of a three-way interaction, separate 2 (Condition: show/feel) x 3 (Expression: 
genuine/posed/neutral) repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for each emotion. For 
happiness, analysis revealed a main effect of Condition F (1,19) = 38.96, p < .01, ŋp2 = .629 
                                                
13 There was a main effect of emotion order, F (2,17) = 8.49, p < .01, with fewer YES responses when fear 
judgments were made first compared to when happy or sad judgments were made first (Ms = 35.2% vs 49% & 
47.7%). There were no interaction effects, however, between order and any of the key IVs (emotion; condition; 
expression) and the same pattern of results was seen regardless of which emotion was judged first.   
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and Expression F (2,38) = 275.17, p < .01, ŋp2 = .923 as well as an interaction effect F (2,38) 
= 39.90, p < .01, ŋp2 = .634, which is shown in Figure 10. Post hoc testing (Tukey, p < .05) 
compared the percentage of YES responses between each condition for each expression type 
separately and revealed there no significant differences between conditions for genuine (M = 
99% vs. 95%) and neutral expressions (M = 17% vs. 12%), but there was a significant 
difference between conditions for posed expressions (M = 96% vs. 40%). Specifically, more 
YES responses were made in the show condition than the feel condition.  In addition, the 
percentage of YES responses was compared between expression types in each condition. No 
difference was found between genuine and posed expressions in the show condition but there 
was a significant difference in the feel condition, with more YES responses to genuine than 
posed expressions. Significant differences between neutral and both posed and genuine 
expressions were found in both conditions. 
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Figure 10. Percentage of YES Responses for Happiness Judgments as a Function of 
Expression and Condition: Experiment 2a 
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For sadness, analysis revealed a main effect of Condition F (1,19) = 35.60, p < .01, ŋp2 = .608 
and Expression F (2,38) = 65.33, p < .01, ŋp2 = .740 as well as an interaction effect F (2,38) = 
29.66, p < .01, ŋp2 = .563, which is shown in Figure 11. Post hoc testing (Tukey, p < .05) 
compared the percentage of YES responses between each condition separately for each 
expression type and revealed there was no significant difference between conditions for 
genuine (M = 75% vs. 64%) and neutral expressions (M = 12% vs. 17%), but there was a 
significant difference between condition for posed expressions (M = 78% vs. 28%). 
Specifically, more YES responses were made in the show condition than the feel condition.  
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Figure 11. Percentage of YES Responses for Sadness Judgments as a Function of Expression 
and Condition: Experiment 2a 
In addition, the percentage of YES responses was compared between expression types in each 
condition. No difference was found between genuine and posed expressions in the show 
condition but there was a significant difference in the feel condition, with more YES 
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responses to genuine than to posed expressions. A significant difference between neutral and 
both posed and genuine expressions was found in the show condition, however, neutral was 
found to differ from genuine but not posed expressions in the feel condition. 
For fear, analysis revealed a main effect of Condition F (1,19) = 15.28, p < .01, ŋp2 = .399 
and Expression F (2,38) = 144.44, p < .01, ŋp2 = .863 as well as an interaction effect F (2,38) 
= 18.64, p < .01, ŋp2 = .445, which is shown in Figure 12. Post hoc testing (Tukey, p < .05) 
compared the percentage of YES responses between each condition for each expression type 
separately and revealed there was no significant difference between conditions for genuine 
(M = 76% vs. 73%) and neutral expressions (M = 4% vs. 2%), but there was a significant 
difference between conditions for posed expressions (M = 94% vs. 54%). Specifically, more 
YES responses were made in the show condition than the feel condition.  In addition, the 
percentage of YES responses was compared between expression types in each condition. 
Significant differences were found between genuine and posed expressions in both 
conditions, specifically, more YES responses were made to posed than genuine in the show 
condition and more were made to genuine than posed in the feel condition. Significant 
differences between neutral and both posed and genuine expressions were found in both 
conditions. Participants, therefore, judged genuine expressions as both showing and feeling 
the target emotion but posed expressions as showing but not feeling the target emotion.
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Figure 12. Percentage of YES Responses for Fear Judgments as a Function of Expression and 
Condition: Experiment 2a 
Sensitivity
Estimates of sensitivity were calculated using the same correction and formulae as described 
in Experiment 1a, and likewise, were calculated for each participant as a function of emotion 
and judgment condition.14 The hits, false alarms and estimates of A’ are shown in Table 15.
As can be seen in Table 15 sensitivity scores in analysis 1 ranged from .67 - .87 in the feel 
condition and from .68 to .80 in the show condition. Single sample t-tests showed that all 
sensitivity scores were significantly greater than chance (0.5, p < .05). Participants, therefore, 
were able to detect information specifying emotion from other information that did not, even 
                                                
14 Response bias was calculated and compared to 0 to confirm that participants adopted a more stringent 
response criterion in the feel than in the show condition. As with Experiment 1a, a response bias was found in 
the show condition but not in the feel condition (p < .05). 
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when not instructed to attend to the felt state of targets (i.e., show condition). Analysis 2 
revealed the level of sensitivity in the feel condition ranged from .48 to .75. Single sample t-
tests showed that the sensitivity scores for happy (M = .75) and sad (M = .73) but not fear (M
= .48) were significantly higher than expected by chance (0.5, p < .001), indicating that 
participants were sensitive to the differences between happy and sad expressions but not fear 
expressions. None of the sensitivity scores in the show condition was above chance. 
Table 15. Mean Hit (HIT) Rates, False Alarm (FA) Rates and Estimates of A’ by Judgment 
Condition for Each Emotion: Experiment 2a
Analysis 1 Analysis 2
Judgment condition HIT FA A’ HIT FA A’
Show Happy .90 .51 .80* .90 .86 .56
Sad .77 .47 .73* .77 .71 .55
Fear .66 .44 .68* .66 .84 .41
Feel Happy .84 .26 .87* .84 .43 .75*
Sad .70 .32 .76* .70 .32 .73*
Fear .56 .34 .67* .56 .53 .48
Note. Analysis 1 includes posed, genuine and neutral expressions.
Note. Analysis 2 includes posed and genuine expressions.
Note. A’ is compared to chance level of 0.5.
* p < .05.
Sex, handedness and presentation order did not influence sensitivity scores and therefore, 
were not considered any further. Separate 3 (Emotion: happy/sad/fear) x 2 (Condition: show/ 
feel) repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted on the sensitivity scores from each 
analysis to assess the impact of emotion and judgment condition on the level of sensitivity. 
Analysis 1 revealed a main effect of Emotion, F (2,38) = 21.08, p <  .001. ŋp2 = .526. Post 
hoc testing (Tukey, p < .05) showed sensitivity to happy expressions (M’ = .83) was highest, 
fear lowest (M = .67) and sad expressions (M = .75) were intermediate. All differences 
between emotions reached significance. 
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Analysis 2 revealed main effects of Emotion, F (2,38) = 18.45,  p <  0.01, ŋp2 = .493 and 
Condition, F (1,19) = 41.57,  p < .001, ŋp2 = .636, but no interaction. Post-hoc tests (Tukey, p
< .05) on the main effects showed that the mean sensitivity score for happy (M = .66) and sad 
(M = .64) were higher than for fear (M = .44). Sensitivity in the feel condition (M = .65) was 
also higher than sensitivity in the show condition (M = .51). These findings, as in Experiment 
1a, suggest that participants were more sensitive to happiness compared to sadness and fear, 
but were as sensitive to the differences between posed and genuine sad expressions as to 
these differences in happy expressions. They were not sensitive to the difference in fear 
expressions. That is, sensitivity to happiness and sadness extends to being able to 
differentiate between posed and genuine expressions, while sensitivity to fear does not.  
Relationship between Sensitivity Variables
The relationship between sensitivity scores both within and across emotions was assessed 
using Kendall’s tau rank order correlations. Table 16 details the correlations with Bonferroni-
corrected significance levels (p < .006) shown to control for multiple comparisons. The 
correlations were computed separately for sensitivity to emotion in facial expressions (1) and 
sensitivity to the difference between posed and genuine expressions (2). There were no 
significant correlations between the show and feel conditions for any emotion. As in 
Experiment 1a, sensitivity scores could not be collapsed across conditions. Consequently 
when considering the relationship across emotions, the correlations between sensitivity scores 
for happy, sad and fear were considered separately in the show and feel conditions. A 
significant correlation was found between sensitivity to sadness and fear, indicating that those 
who were more sensitive to the difference between posed and genuine sad expressions were 
also more sensitive to this difference in fear expressions τ (20) = .621, p < .003.  
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Table 16. Sensitivity Within and Between Emotions: Experiment 2a 
Happy Sad Fear
show feel show feel show feel
Mean SD τ τ τ τ τ τ 
Analysis 1 Happy (show) .80 .06 -
Happy (feel) .87 .07 .050 -
Sad (show) .73 .12 -.062 -.066 -
Sad (feel) .76 .14 .132 -.202 .396 -
Fear (show) .68 .11 .043 .112 .152 .152 -
Fear (feel) .67 .16 .348 .028 .310 .429* .338 -
Analysis 2 Happy (show) .56 .15 -
Happy (feel) .75 .15 -.023 -
Sad (show) .55 .21 .129 -.122 -
Sad (feel) .73 .19 .247 -.042 .222 -
Fear (show) .41 .19 .141 .126 .057 .304 -
Fear (feel) .48 .22 .452 .000 .194 .621* .450* -
Note. Analysis 1 includes posed, genuine and neutral expressions.
Note. Analysis 2 includes posed and genuine expressions.
* p < .006.
Relationship between Sensitivity and Cognitive function
Kendal tau rank order correlational analysis, which is shown in Table 17, was also applied to 
look at the relationships between sensitivity scores and cognitive functions. Bonferroni-
corrected significance levels (p < .008) were used to control for multiple comparisons. Only 
two significant correlations emerged. A negative correlation was found between sensitivity to 
fear in the show condition and DOT-A span scores, a measure of working memory, τ (20) = -
.51, p < .01. This relationship was not maintained in analysis (2) when considering sensitivity 
to the difference between posed and genuine fear expressions. A positive correlation was 
found between sensitivity to happiness in the show condition and incomplete letters τ (20) 
=.49, p < .01. Again, this relationship did not extend to sensitivity to the difference between 
happy expressions.  
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Judgment response time
The response time to make judgments in Experiment 2a served as the dependant variable in 
the following analysis. A visual inspection of the data showed a positively skewed 
distribution, therefore, a log10 transformation was applied to the data from each participant 
and data remaining outside M + 3.0 SD were removed as outliers prior to analysis (4 
responses, 0.3%). The analyses was performed on log10-transformed data but are reported as 
raw response times. The median response time was calculated for each participant as a 
function of emotion, condition and expression type.15
Preliminary analyses revealed there was no effect of sex, handedness or presentation order, 16
and therefore, these factors were not considered further. Data were subjected to a 3 (Emotion: 
happy/sad/feel) x 2 (Condition: show/feel) x 3 (Expression: genuine/posed/neutral) repeated 
measures ANOVA. The analysis revealed main effects of Emotion, F (2,38) = 17.42, p < .01, 
ŋp2 = .478, Condition, F (1,19) = 14.55, p < .01, ŋp2 = .434, and Expression F (2,38) =  9.71, p
< .01, ŋp2 = .338 as well as Emotion by Condition F (2,38) =  4.40, p < .05, ŋp2 = .188, 
Emotion by Expression F (4,76) = 3.48, p < .05 ŋp2 = .155 and Condition by Expression 
interactions F (2,38) = 9.73, p < .01 ŋp2 = .339, which were qualified by a three-way 
interaction F (4,76) = 3.29, p < .05, ŋp2 = .148. 
In light of a three-way interaction, separate 2 (Condition: show/feel) x 3 (Expression: 
genuine/posed/neutral) repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for each emotion. For 
                                                
15 It was not possible to calculate RTs as a function of response type (YES/NO) as neutral expressions were 
infrequently responded YES to and genuine expressions were infrequently responded NO to in the show 
conditions.  
16 There was a main effect of condition order, F (1,18) = 5.73, p < .05, with faster response times when the show  
(M = 1432 msec) rather than the feel condition (M = 1830 msec) was presented first. There were no interaction 
effects, however, with any of the key IVs (emotion; condition; expression) and the same pattern of results was 
seen regardless of which emotion was judged first.   
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happiness, analysis revealed a main effect of Condition F (1,19) = 15.68, p < .01, ŋp2 = .455 
and Expression F (2,38) = 7.70, p < .01, ŋp2 = .288 as well as an interaction effect F (2,38) = 
9.31, p < .01, ŋp2 = .329, which is shown in Figure 13. 
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Figure 13. Mean Response Time to Identify Happy Facial Displays as a Function of 
Expression and Condition: Experiment 2a 
Post hoc testing (Tukey, p < .05) compared the response time between expression types in 
each condition and revealed faster judgments were made to genuine than neutral expressions 
in the show condition (M = 865 vs. 1151 msec) with neither different to posed expressions (M
= 1057 msec). Slower judgments were made to posed (M = 1832 msec) than genuine and 
neutral expressions in the feel condition (M = 1230 & 1211 msec) and these did not differ 
from one another. In addition, the response time was compared between conditions for each 
expression type. There was no significant difference between conditions for neutral 
expressions, but there was a significant difference between conditions for genuine and posed 
expressions. Specifically, faster judgments were made in the show condition than the feel 
condition.  
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For sadness, there was no main effects or interaction found. For fear, analysis revealed a main 
effect of Condition F (1,19) = 5.11, p < .05, ŋp2 = .212 and Expression F (2,38) = 7.39, p < 
.01, ŋp2 = .280 as well as an interaction effect F (2,38) = 6.09, p < .01, ŋp2 = .243, which is 
shown in Figure 14. Post hoc testing (Tukey, p < .05) compared the response time between 
each expression type in each condition. No difference was found between expressions in the 
show condition but there was a significant difference in the feel condition, with faster 
judgment of neutral expressions (M = 1265 msec) than posed and genuine expressions (M = 
1845 vs. 1730 msec), which did not differ from each other. In addition, the response time was 
compared between each condition for each expression type separately and revealed there was 
no significant difference between conditions for neutral expressions, but there was a 
significant difference between conditions for posed expressions and genuine expression.
Specifically, faster judgments were made in the show condition than the feel condition.  
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Figure 14. Mean Response Time to Identify Fear Facial Displays as a Function of Expression 
and Condition: Experiment 2a 
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These findings suggest that when required to attend to whether the target was feeling 
happiness, participants were faster to judge genuine and neutral expressions than posed 
expressions. When simply judging whether the target was showing happiness there was no 
difference in response time between posed and genuine expressions and only genuine 
expressions were faster to judge than neutral. There was no significant difference between 
posed and genuine expressions when judging fear, however, and both were slower than 
neutral. Furthermore, the type of expression did not effect the time taken to make judgments 
about whether the targets were showing fear. Likewise the type of expression did not effect 
response time when making either show or feel judgments about sadness. Judgments were 
faster in the show than feel condition for both posed and genuine expressions of happiness 
and fear but not neutral.
Discussion
As predicted, the participants in Experiment 2a demonstrated sensitivity to emotion specified 
in facial expressions, regardless of whether they were instructed to attend to felt state or not. 
Furthermore, participants were sensitive to the differences between posed and genuine 
expressions of happiness and sadness but only when instructed to consider how the target was 
feeling. They were unable to differentiate fear expressions regardless of instructions, 
although those who were more sensitive were also likely to be more sensitive to sadness 
judgments. The participants in Experiment 2a were more sensitive to happiness specified in 
facial expressions than to sadness and fear but they could establish the veracity of happiness 
and sadness equally well. Sensitivity to emotion was not reliably related to any background 
characteristic, mood or cognitive function as measured by working memory, executive 
function, visuoperceptual and semantic memory tests. The predictions concerning the time 
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taken to make judgments were partially supported. Participants were faster to judge 
expressions that provided affective information (genuine and neutral expressions) than posed 
expressions which did not. This effect was only evident when making judgments about felt 
happiness, however, and was not evident when making judgments about the other target 
emotions or when judging whether emotion was being shown. 
Although Experiment 2a has provided clear evidence that individuals are sensitive to emotion 
specified in facial expressions and that they demonstrate selective ability to judge the veracity 
of happy and sad emotion, it is less clear whether individuals will spontaneously attend to 
affective information. Experiment 2b seeks to investigate the proclivity toward spontaneous 
perception of emotion and aims to replicate the findings of Experiment 1b. 
Experiment 2b: Priming task
Method
Participants
The same 20 participants (female = 12) who completed Experiment 2a also completed 
Experiment 2b. 
Material
Word judgment task
The same seven facial displays and ten target words that were used in Experiment 1b were 
used in Experiment 2b.17
                                                
17 Each participant demonstrated a clear understanding of the words prior to completing the task by completing a 
word-definition matching task (see Appendix 10).  
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Design
The priming task involved a 7 (Prime: neutral/genuine happy/genuine sad/genuine fear/posed 
happy, posed sad and posed fear) x 2 (Word valence: positive/negative) design with repeated 
measures on both factors. 
Procedure
The procedure was the same in Experiment 2b as it was in Experiment 1b. In addition, 
participants in Experiment 2b completed the cognitive measures described in Experiment 2a 
at the conclusion of the procedure. These measures are described as Materials in Experiment 
2a. 
Results and Discussion
Data cleaning, as described in Experiment 1b, resulted in the removal of 22 (1.5%) incorrect 
responses and 25 (1.7%) outliers from the data set prior to analysis. The analysis was 
performed on log10-transformed data but is reported as raw response times. Figure 15 presents 
the response times to positive and negative words as a function of expression prime and word 
valence. As can be seen in Figure 16 the response time to positive words was faster after a 
genuine than a posed happy prime. The response time to negative words does not appear to 
differ as a function of the type of expression prime. To confirm this, data were subjected to a
7 (Prime: neutral/genuine happy/genuine sad/genuine fear/posed happy, posed sad and posed 
fear) x 2 (Word valence: positive/negative) repeated measures ANOVA.
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Figure 15. Response Time to Categorise Words as a Function of Facial Expression Prime and 
Word Valence: Experiment 2b
No significant main effects or interaction was found nor did planned comparisons to assess 
the hypothesized differences in response times reveal any significant differences. That is, 
there was no significant difference in response time when identifying positive words when 
preceded by genuine compared to posed expressions of happiness or either compared to 
neutral. Likewise, when identifying negative words there was no significant difference in 
response time when words were preceded by genuine compared to posed expressions of 
sadness or fear or either to neutral.   Contrary to predictions, participants in Experiment 2b 
were not sensitive to affective state when engaged in a task that did not require them to make 
overt judgments about the facial displays. 
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General Discussion 
The present studies aimed to replicate and extend the research reported by Miles (2005; Miles 
& Johnston, 2007) that investigated sensitivity to happiness, as specified in facial 
expressions. The results from both participant groups indicated that when explicitly asked to 
judge facial displays, perceivers were able to reliably detect the presence or absence of 
emotional state regardless of whether they were instructed to attend to felt state or not (i.e., 
show or feel condition). Furthermore, perceivers were reliably able to differentiate between 
posed and genuine expressions of happiness and sadness when asked to attend to the felt state 
of the target. Sensitivity to emotion was not reliably related to any background characteristic, 
cognitive function or measure of depressive symptoms.
Establishing sensitivity to fear was problematic. Despite being sensitive to information that 
specified fear from information that did not, perceivers did not differentiate between posed 
and genuine fear expressions. The results from Experiment 1a which found participants could 
differentiate were not replicated in Experiment 2a. It may well be that fear poses a risk to the 
perceiver that outweighs the need to establish the veracity of fear expressions. The negative 
consequences of not detecting fear in the environment may lean a perceiver adaptively 
toward considering even approximations of the emotional display as valid indicators of the 
underlying affective state. Conversely, the opportunity and concomitant consequences of 
being duped or manipulated by unauthentic fear is likely to be rare and trivial in comparison 
to not detecting authentic fear. In contrast, for example, the opportunity and consequence of 
being duped by unauthentic happiness is likely to be relatively common in comparison to fear 
and can have stern consequences (approaching smiling but angry person), whereas not 
detecting happiness poses no immediate danger to the perceiver.
127
The present studies also sought to establish if perceivers were sensitive to emotion when 
engaged in a task that did not require them to explicitly attend to the facial displays or did not 
draw attention to the nature of the judgment required. The research question, therefore, 
focused on ‘do’ individuals demonstrate sensitivity to emotion, rather than ‘can’ they 
demonstrate sensitivity to emotion. In this sense, the priming study engaged the participant in 
a task that more closely resembled real-life interactions where attention to affective state is 
predominantly spontaneous. The priming methodology used by Miles (2005; Miles & 
Johnston, 2007) was employed with additional expressions of sadness and fear included. 
Few consistent findings emerged from the priming studies. However, despite not being asked 
to attend to the facial displays, perceivers’ in Experiment 1b demonstrated sensitivity to 
happiness by being faster to identify positive words preceded by genuine compared to posed 
expressions. Given both primes were smiles, the findings suggests that the positive affective 
information specified by the genuine smile resulted in a preparedness for congruent positive 
responding that was not evident following the presentation of the affectively devoid posed 
smile. The same pattern was found in Experiment 2b although the difference did not reach 
significance. Presenting fear expressions as primes resulted in different patterns of 
responding. Perceivers were sensitive to fear as evidenced by faster responding to negative 
words preceded by genuine compared to posed expressions, but this finding was not 
replicated. 
In summary, healthy young adults were able to reliably detect the presence or absence of 
emotional state regardless of whether they were instructed to attend to felt state or not. 
Furthermore, they could reliably distinguish between posed and genuine expressions of 
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happiness and sadness. Sensitivity to happiness was also demonstrated spontaneously. 
Healthy young adults attended to the differences between posed and genuine expressions 
even when ostensibly engaged in another task. The accurate perception of happiness 
influenced their subsequent behavior. Further research is required to fully explore the 
inconsistent patterns of response to incidental perception of sadness and fear.
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CHAPTER 4
Sensitivity to Emotion Specified in Facial Expressions: Healthy Older Adults
Having continued quality social interaction is as important as biological risk factors for 
preserving cognitive function (Beland, Zunzunegui, Alvarado, Otero, & Del Ser, 2005; 
Bennett, Schneider, Tang, Arnold, & Wilson, 2006). The consequences of impairment in the 
recognition of facial expressions of emotion such as poor communication, social isolation and 
inappropriate behavior can have a severe impact on the quality of life of older adults 
(Cavallero, Morino-Abbele, & Bertocci, 2007; Kharicha et al., 2007). Underlying successful 
social interaction is the ability to detect the affective state of interaction partners (Ekman & 
Rosenberg, 2005; Frank, Neil, & Paul, 2001; Keltner & Haidt, 2001). Accordingly, the 
experiments reported in this chapter investigated the abilities of healthy older adults to 
recognize the affective state of another person and to differentiate between genuine and posed 
expressions of emotion. The findings of these experiments may provide insights into declines 
in social functioning amongst older adults.
Several studies have recognized the need to investigate the impact of normal adult aging on 
facial expression recognition and have found selective deficits in the recognition of several 
negative expressions, specifically, sadness, fear (Calder et al., 2003; Keightley et al., 2006; 
Wong et al., 2005) and anger (Isaacowitz et al., 2007; Phillips et al., 2002a; Sullivan & 
Ruffman, 2004a). These deficits have been attributed to neurological changes due to aging 
(Calder et al., 2003), or to an attention bias to positive information (Isaacowitz, Wadlinger, 
Goren, & Wilson, 2006; Mather & Carstensen, 2003), although as discussed in Chapter 1, 
older adults often performed better than young adults when identifying expressions of 
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disgust. There is certainly some overlap between the neural systems that are consistently 
shown to subserve the recognition of facial expressions and the neural systems that are 
preferentially impacted by aging. Reductions in amygdala volume in old age (Grieve, Clark, 
Williams, Peduto, & Gordon, 2005) might explain the difficulty in recognizing fear 
expressions. Similarly, reductions in the anterior cingulate cortex (Garraux et al., 1999; 
Tisserand et al., 2002; Volkow et al., 2000) might explain problems with the identification of 
sadness. 
Age-related neurological changes in the brain are also associated with cognitive 
performance18 (Gunning-Dixon et al., 2003; Gunning-Dixon & Raz, 2000, 2003; Gunstad et 
al., 2006; Peters, 2006; Zimmerman et al., 2006), as well as facial expression perception. In 
particular, the decline in metabolism in the medial network, including the anterior cingulate, 
and medial prefrontal cortex, is correlated with a decline in cognitive functioning (Pardo et 
al., 2007). Difficulties with facial expression recognition have often been explained by 
deficits in general cognitive functioning in various populations, for example, schizophrenia 
(Russell et al., 2008), ADHD (Yuill & Lyon, 2007) and also in AD (e.g., Albert et al., 1991). 
Many other studies, however, have concluded that difficulties are independent of cognitive 
functioning (Hargrave et al., 2002; Johnston et al., 2001; Marsh & Blair, 2008) and reflect a 
specific emotion processing impairment. The relationship between cognitive functions and 
emotion perception remains unclear.
The present study investigated facial expression recognition in healthy older adults by 
employing the categorization and priming tasks detailed in Chapter 3. The present study also 
explored whether sensitivity to emotion was related to cognitive functioning, to this end, a 
                                                
18 Raz and Rodrique (2006) suggest many of the associations are modest and findings are often inconsistent. 
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comprehensive battery of neuropsychological measures, as detailed in Chapter 2, was 
completed. Given the overlap in neural structures known to support the recognition of 
sadness and fear and the areas affected by normal aging, it was predicted that older adults 
would not be sensitive to sadness and fear specified in facial expressions, but would maintain 
sensitivity to happiness. As in Experiment 2a, the judgment response time of healthy older 
adults was also examined. It was predicted that when making happiness judgments 
participants would be faster to judge genuine and neutral expressions than posed expressions. 
Given healthy older participants are not expected to demonstrate sensitivity to sadness and 
fear this effect was not expected with regard to making judgments about these emotions.
  
Experiment 3a: Categorization task
Method
Participants
The participants were 25 older adults (female = 18) recruited from the community at senior 
citizen meetings and activities, who volunteered to participate in return for a $30 shopping 
voucher. They ranged in age from 58 years to 90 years (M = 73 years, SD = 7.6) and had on 
average 6.2 years (SD = 4.1) post-primary education. Demographic characteristics are 
presented in Table 18. All participants were required to have normal or corrected to normal 
vision, speak English as their primary spoken language and be aged over 55 years. 
Furthermore, participants were required to have no history of alcohol dependence, poorly 
controlled diabetes or major depression in the last six months or a significant psychiatric 
condition requiring hospitalisation. They were also required to have no serious history of 
neurological, thyroid, or cardiovascular disorder and not to be currently involved in trials of 
psychoactive drugs. 
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Table 18. Demographic Characteristics of Participants in Experiment 3a
Mean (%) SD Range
Age 73.0 7.6 58-90
(S)MMSE 28.9 1.1 26-30
DRS-2 140.9 2.6 135-144
NART PVIQ 111.9 9.0 87-124
GDS 2.9 2.8 0-8
Education 6.2 4.1 0-14
Sex (% female) 74% - -
Handedness (% right) 87% - -
Material
The facial displays employed in Experiment 3a were the same as those in Experiment 1a, in 
both the emotion categorization task and control sex categorization task. Participants were 
also required to complete the same general health screen and demographic interview.  
Cognitive Measures
Each participant completed a number of cognitive tasks in order to allow for between group 
comparisons (see Chapter 6) and to investigate relationships between cognition and 
sensitivity to emotion. Full details of each of these tests and the rationale for their inclusion 
can be found in Chapter 2. Composite scores were calculated from all elderly participants 
(Healthy and AD) to provide a measure of each major cognitive domain. Reliability analyses 
were conducted on items within each domain (details below). Scores within each domain 
were standardised and the mean standardised score was calculated for each participant.  
The Executive Function score consisted of scores from CLOX-I, letter fluency, category 
fluency, category switching and the initiation/perseveration subtest of the DRS-2. Reliability 
analysis was conducted on the data from all elderly participants which resulted in a suitable 
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Cronbach’s alpha of 0.85. The Attention score combined the Test of Everyday Attention, map 
search scores at one and two minutes with the attention subtest of the DRS-2. A Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.83 was found. A measure of Episodic Memory was established by combining the 
following measures; ROF 3-minute delayed recall; ROF 30-minute delayed recall; the 
memory subtest of the DRS-2; the immediate and delayed word list recall and word list 
recognition scores. Reliability analysis on episodic memory items resulted in a Cronbach’s 
alpha of 0.88. The Semantic Memory score consisted of scores from pyramids and palm 
trees, category fluency, the modified Boston naming test and the conceptualisation subtest of 
the DRS-2. A Cronbach’s alpha of 0.78 was found. A measure of Working Memory was 
calculated from digits forwards and backwards, digit ordering span and the Daneman and 
Carpenter reading span and total correct scores. A Cronbach’s alpha of 0.57 was found. After 
viewing the item-total correlations, it was decided to remove the total correct score from the 
Daneman and Carpenter reading test from this composite measure, which resulted in an 
improved reliability coefficient of 0.75. The Visuoperceptual score was calculated from the 
CLOX-II, ROF copy, the incomplete letters and object decision subtests from the VOSP and 
the construction subtest of the DRS-2. A Cronbach’s alpha of 0.61 was found. Removing the 
ROF copy item resulted in reliability of 0.83. 
     
General health screen and demographic information
The specific inclusion and exclusion criteria were verified for each participant by completing 
a standardised semi-structured interview (see Appendix H). A M.I.N.I. psychiatric screen, 
and interview, where applicable, was completed by each participant to assess the presence of 
Axis 1 disorders according to DSM-IV criteria. Two participants were excluded from the 
present study following this screen.
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Design
The categorization task involved a 3 (Emotion: happy/sad/fear) x 2 (Condition: show/feel) x 
3 (Expression: genuine/posed/neutral) design, with all factors being within subjects. The 36 
facial displays were presented in both the show and feel conditions, resulting in 72 trials.
Procedure
Each participant was invited to take part in a study investigating whether dementia influenced 
the ability to recognise facial expressions of emotion. He/she was advised of the specific 
inclusion/exclusion criteria required to be a control participant and was provided with an 
Information Sheet that briefly outlined the study and his/her rights as a research participant 
(see Appendix L). Signed consent (see Appendix M) was obtained from each participant and 
each was tested on campus at the University of Canterbury. 
The investigator administered a semi-structured interview and M.I.N.I. screen to verify that 
each participant met the specific inclusion and exclusion criteria described above. Two 
participants did not meet the criteria but opted to continue with the procedure under the 
understanding that their data may not contribute toward the final sample of the present study. 
The two participants were found to have a serious history of a neurological disorder and 
cardiovascular disorder respectively; consequently, the data provided by these participants 
were removed from the sample. The final sample therefore consisted of 23 participants (17 
female). 
Once the screening was completed, each participant began the test protocol (see Table 7, 
Chapter 2). The test protocol was administered during two separate sessions, conducted one 
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week apart. Each session took approximately 2.5 hours. The participant was asked to 
complete the copy phase of the Rey-Osterreith Complex Figure (ROF-I) and during a three 
minute delay he/she was were asked to match the personality words used in Experiment 3b to 
basic definitions (see Appendix N). Following the three-minute delay, the participant 
completed a recall phase of the ROF-II and then completed the emotion-categorization task 
(Experiment 3a), sex-categorization control task (Experiment 3a) and priming task 
(Experiment 3b). Each participant was then asked to complete ROF-II, which required they 
reproduce the complex figure following a 30-minute delay. 
Following a scheduled break, the participant completed Letter, Category and Category 
Switching verbal fluency tests from the Delis Kaplan Executive Function System (D-KEFS), 
along with a Mini Mental Status Exam S(MMSE), the National Adult Reading Test  (NART-
II), an executive clock drawing task (Royall CLOX-I & II) and the Geriatric Depression 
Scale (GDS). The first session was concluded following another scheduled break with the 
participant completing a modified confrontational naming test (MBNT) from the CERAD 
battery, the Daneman and Carpenter Reading Span Test and the Edinburgh Handedness 
Inventory. The participant was instructed how to complete their homework and was issued 
with a pack containing the Frontal Systems Scale (FrSBe: self-rated & significant other-
rated), the One Day Fluctuation Assessment Scale and the Bristol Activities of Daily Living 
Scale (BADLS).
The second session began with the completion of three subtests from The Visual Object and 
Space Perception Battery (VOSP); Shape detection, incomplete letters and object decision. 
The participant was then asked to complete the Word List Recall and Recognition tests from 
the CERAD battery and following the completion of the Map Search subtest from the Test of 
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Everyday Attention (TEA) he/she was asked to complete the 10-minute delay phase of the 
Word List Recall and Recognition test. Following a scheduled break the participant was 
administered the Dementia Rating Scale (DRS-2) and the cognitive scale of the Alzheimer’s 
Disease Assessment Scale (ADAScog), as well as Digits forward, backward (WMS-III) and 
ordering (DOT-A) span tests. The second session was concluded, following a scheduled 
break, with the completion of a Continuous Performance Test (CPT), the three-picture 
version of Pyramids and Palms Trees and the non-cognitive scale from the Alzheimer’s 
Disease Assessment Scale (ADASnon-cog).         
Results
Sex-categorization
Accuracy rates were calculated by establishing the percentage of correct sex identifications. 
The mean accuracy rate was 99%. (range= 88%-100%). The participants were reliably able to 
detect information relevant to sex identification from facial displays. Consequently, the 
control task was eliminated from further analysis and no participants were excluded from 
subsequent data analysis
Emotion-categorization
The percentage of YES responses for each participant was calculated as a function of 
emotion, condition and expression type and is shown in Table 19.  Preliminary analyses 
showed that sex, handedness and presentation order did not influence the dependant variable 
and therefore these factors were not included in subsequent analyses. Data were subjected to 
a 3 (Emotion: happy/sad/feel) x 2 (Condition: show/feel) x 3 (Expression: genuine/posed/
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neutral) repeated measures ANOVA. The analysis revealed main effects of Emotion, F (2,44) 
= 8.57, p <  0.001, ŋp2 = .280 Condition, F (1,22) = 49.18, p < .001, ŋp2 = .691 and 
Expression, F (2,44) = 389.1, p < .001, ŋp2 = .947.  In addition, significant Condition by 
Expression, F (2,44) = 20.37, p < .001, ŋp2 = .481 and Emotion by Expression  F (4,88) = 
16.04,  p < .001, ŋp2 = .422  interactions were found, that were qualified by a three-way 
interaction F (4,88) = 2.55, p < .05, ŋp2 = .104. 
Table 19. Percentage of YES Responses by Judgment Condition and Facial Expression for 
Each Emotion: Experiment 3a
Judgment condition
Facial expression SHOW
(%YES)
FEEL
(%YES)
Happy
Neutral 13% 2%
Genuine 99%a 96%a 
Posed 87%a 55%b 
Sad
Neutral 25% 23%b
Genuine 78%a 72%a
Posed 72%a 32%b
Fear
Neutral 9% 9%
Genuine 73%a 65%a
Posed 71%a 55%a
Note. Significant difference in percentage of YES responses is shown with different subscript between 
conditions and between posed and genuine expressions within emotion.
To look at the three way interaction, separate 2 (Condition: show/feel) x 3 (Expression: 
genuine/posed/neutral) repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted for each emotion. For 
happiness, analysis revealed a main effect of Condition F (1,22) = 34.22, p < .01, ŋp2 = .609 
and Expression F (2,44) = 551.5, p < .01, ŋp2 = .962 as well as an interaction effect F (2,44) = 
11.44, p < .01, ŋp2 = .342, which is shown in Figure 16. Post hoc testing (Tukey, p < .05) 
compared the percentage of YES responses between each condition for each expression type 
separately and revealed there was no significant difference between conditions for genuine 
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(M = 99% vs. 96%) and neutral expressions (M = 13% vs. 2%), but there was a significant 
difference between conditions for posed expressions (M = 87% vs. 55%). Specifically, more 
YES responses were made in the show condition than the feel condition.  In addition, the 
percentage of YES responses was compared between expression types in each condition. No 
difference was found between genuine and posed expressions in the show condition but there 
was a significant difference in the feel condition, with more YES responses to genuine than 
posed expressions. Significant differences between neutral and both posed and genuine 
expressions were found in both conditions. Participants, therefore, judged genuine 
expressions as both showing and feeling the target emotion but posed expressions as showing 
but not feeling the target emotion.
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Figure 16. Percentage of YES Responses for Happiness Judgments as a Function of 
Expression and Condition: Experiment 3a 
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For sadness, analysis revealed a main effect of Condition F (1,22) = 22.80, p < .01, ŋp2 = .509 
and Expression F (2,44) = 84.53, p < .01, ŋp2 = .793 as well as an interaction effect F (2,44) = 
12.23, p < .01, ŋp2 = .357, which is shown in Figure 17. Post hoc testing compared the 
percentage of YES responses between each condition separately for each expression type and 
revealed there was no significant difference between conditions for genuine (M = 78% vs. 
72%) and neutral expressions (M = 25% vs. 23%), but there was a significant difference 
between condition for posed expressions (M = 72% vs. 32%). Specifically, more YES 
responses were made in the show condition than the feel condition.  
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Figure 17. Percentage of YES Responses for Sadness Judgments as a Function of Expression 
and Condition: Experiment 3a 
In addition, the percentage of YES responses was compared between expression types in each 
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condition. No difference was found between genuine and posed expressions in the show 
condition but there was a significant difference in the feel condition, with more YES 
responses to genuine than posed expressions. A significant difference between neutral and 
both posed and genuine expressions was found in the show condition, however, neutral was 
found to differ from genuine but not posed expressions in the feel condition. Participants,
therefore, judged genuine expressions as both showing and feeling the target emotion but 
posed expressions as showing but not feeling the target emotion.
For fear, analysis revealed a main effect of Condition F (1,22) = 7.56, p < .05, ŋp2 = .256 and 
Expression F (2,44) = 70.09, p < .01, ŋp2 = .761, but no interaction. More YES responses 
were made in the show than feel condition (M = 51% vs. 43%) and post hoc testing (Tukey, p
< .05) on the Expression effect showed no significant difference between genuine and posed 
expressions (M = 69% vs. 63%), both of which were significantly higher than neutral (M = 
9%). 
Sensitivity 
The responses in the categorization task were further analysed using a signal detection 
paradigm. The data from each participant was collated into hits and false alarms separately 
for each emotion, judgment condition and facial expression. As with the healthy young adult 
study (Experiment 1a), two analyses were conducted, the first included all expressions to 
look at sensitivity to emotion in facial displays and the second included only posed and 
genuine expressions to look at sensitivity to the differences between these expressions. In 
both analyses, a hit was defined as correctly responding YES to a genuine expression, while a 
false alarm was defined as responding YES to either a neutral expression or a posed 
expression in the first analysis and responding YES to a posed expression in the second 
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analysis. The correction recommended by Snodgrass and Corwin (1988) was applied to the 
frequency of hits and false alarms to convert to the associated rates of hits and false alarms. 
These rates were then used to calculate measures of sensitivity (A’) for each participant as a 
function of emotion and judgment condition. The hits, false alarms and estimates of A’ are 
shown in Table 20. 19
With regard to the first analysis that examined sensitivity to underlying affective state,
sensitivity in the feel condition ranged from .72 to .86, which a single sample t-test found was 
significantly greater than chance (0.5, p < .001), for each emotion indicating that participants 
could reliably detect emotional from non-emotional expressions. The level of sensitivity 
observed in the show condition, when participants were not explicitly asked to consider 
actual felt emotion, ranged from .68 to .80 which a single sample t-test showed was also 
significantly greater than would be expected by chance (0.5, p < .001), for each emotion. 
Participants, therefore, were able to detect information specifying emotion from other 
information that did not, even when not instructed to attend to the felt state of targets.  
Sensitivity, as calculated in the second analysis and which examines the ability to 
differentiate between posed and genuine expressions, ranged from .56 to .76 in the feel 
condition. Single sample t-tests showed that mean sensitivity scores for happiness (M = .76) 
and sadness (M = .74) were greater than expected by chance (0.5, p < .01), indicating that 
participants could reliably detect the difference between posed and genuine expressions. The 
sensitivity score for fear (M = .56), however, was not significantly greater than chance. The 
                                                
19 A measure of response bias (B’) was also calculated to confirm that participants adopted a more stringent 
response criterion in the feel than in the show condition. Response bias was compared to 0 using single-sample t 
tests. As was found in Experiment 1a and 2a, a response bias was found in the show but not in the feel 
condition. Participants did not demonstrate a proclivity to respond with one response over the other in the feel 
condition. . The formula used to calculate sensitivity takes response bias into account and therefore it is not 
considered further.     
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level of sensitivity observed in the show condition, when participants were not explicitly 
asked to consider actual felt emotion, ranged from .51 to .59. Sensitivity to happiness (M = 
.59) was significantly greater than chance, showing that participants differentiated between 
posed and genuine expressions without explicit instruction to attend to felt state. 
Table 20. Mean hit (HIT) Rates, False Alarm (FA) Rates and Estimates of A’ by Judgment 
Condition for Each Emotion: Experiment 3a
Analysis 1 Analysis 2
Judgment condition HIT FA A’ HIT FA A’
Show Happy .89 .50 .80* .89 .80 .59*
Sad .66 .44 .68* .66 .64 .53
Fear .68 .40 .71* .68 .68 .51
Feel Happy .87 .31 .86* .87 .54 .76*
Sad .66 .32 .76* .66 .37 .74*
Fear .63 .34 .72* .65 .55 .56
Note. Analysis 1 includes posed, genuine and neutral expressions.
Note. Analysis 2 includes posed and genuine expressions.
Note. A’ is compared to chance level of 0.5.
* p < .05.
Preliminary analysis showed no effect of sex, handedness and presentation order on 
sensitivity variables calculated in the first analysis, but sex did influence the sensitivity 
statistics calculated in the second analysis. A separate 3 (Emotion: happy/sad/fear) x 2 
(Condition: show/feel) repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the sensitivity scores 
from Analysis 1, while sex was included as a factor in the ANOVA conducted for Analysis 2. 
Analysis 1 revealed main effects of Emotion, F (2,44) = 14.62, p <  0.05, ŋp2 = .289 and 
Condition, F (1,22) = 12.69, p < .01, ŋp2 = .289 but no interaction. Sensitivity was higher in 
the feel than show condition (M = .78 vs. 73) and post-hoc testing (Tukey p < .05) showed 
sensitivity to happiness (M = .83) was higher than to sadness or fear expressions (M = .72 & 
M = .71), which did not differ from one another. 
143
Analysis 2 revealed a main effect of Sex F (1,21) = 6.78,  p <  0.05, ŋp2 = .244, Emotion F
(2,42) = 4.66,  p <  0.05, ŋp2 = .182 and Condition F (1,21) = 24.09,  p <  0.05, ŋp2 = .534 with 
no interactions.  Males were more sensitive to the differences between posed and genuine 
expressions than were females (M = .66 vs .59) and sensitivity was higher in the feel than 
show condition (M = .68 vs. .54). Post hoc testing (Tukey, p < .05) revealed sensitivity to the 
differences between fear expressions (M = .53) was lower than to happy and sad expressions 
(M = .67 & .63), which did not differ from one another.   
Relationship between Sensitivity Variables  
Although it was predicted that healthy older adults would not be sensitive to sadness or fear, 
the relationship between sensitivity variables was examined without specific expectations to 
maintain consistency across the reported studies. The relationship between sensitivity scores 
both within and across emotions was assessed using Kendall’s tau rank order correlations. 
The correlations looked at whether the participants who were sensitive in one condition were 
sensitive in the other condition and whether the participants who were sensitive to one 
emotion were sensitive to the other emotions. The correlations are detailed in Table 21 and 
were computed separately for (1) sensitivity to emotion in facial expressions and (2) 
sensitivity to the difference between posed and genuine expressions. Bonferroni-corrected 
significance levels (p < .006) were used to control for multiple comparisons. 
With regard to the relationship within emotions, no significant correlations were found, that 
is there was no significant relationship between those who were sensitive in the show 
condition and those who were sensitive in the feel condition. Consequently, sensitivity scores 
could not be collapsed across conditions and are considered separately when considering the 
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relationship across emotions. 
A negative correlation was found between sensitivity scores to happiness and fear in the show 
condition τ (23) = -.43, p < .01, indicating that those who were more sensitive to happiness 
were less sensitive to fear. This relationship was also found with regard to the sensitivity to 
the difference between posed and genuine expressions τ (23) = -.49, p < .01, indicating that 
those who were more sensitive to the differences between posed and genuine happy 
expressions were less sensitive to these differences in fear expressions. No other relationships 
were found between emotions, nor were sensitivity scores across emotions related in the feel 
condition.  
Table 21. Sensitivity Within and Between Emotions: Experiment 3a 
Happy Sad Fear
show feel show feel show feel
Mean SD τ τ τ τ τ τ 
Analysis 1 Happy (show) .80 .07 -
Happy (feel) .86 .07 -.033 -
Sad (show) .68 .12 .142 -.280 -
Sad (feel) .76 .12 .128 .070 .017 -
Fear (show) .71 .10 -.431* -.109 -.013 .189 -
Fear (feel) .72 .14 -.034 .000 -.038 -.167 .047 -
Analysis 2 Happy (show) .59 .14 -
Happy (feel) .76 .13 -.041 -
Sad (show) .51 .19 .306 -.061 -
Sad (feel) .74 .14 .005 .029 .005 -
Fear (show) .51 .18 -.485* -.361 -.126 .092 -
Fear (feel) .56 .18 .064 -.105 -.111 -.014 -.030 -
Note. Analysis 1 includes posed, genuine and neutral expressions.
Note. Analysis 2 includes posed and genuine expressions.
* p < .006.
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Relationship between Sensitivity and Cognitive function 
The focus of this section is on the relationship between cognitive functioning and emotional 
tasks. The absolute levels of performance on cognitive tasks (Mean and SD) are presented in 
Table 22 and the differences between groups will be considered in Chapter 6. Kendall Tau 
rank order correlations were used to assess whether there was a relationship between 
sensitivity to emotion and cognitive functioning. The correlations were computed separately 
for sensitivity to emotion in facial expressions (1) and sensitivity to the difference between 
posed and genuine expressions (2). Bonferroni-corrected significance levels (p < .008) were 
used to control for multiple comparisons. As can be seen in Table 22, fear was the only 
emotion related to background characteristics, with sensitivity to the difference between fear 
expressions found to be positively correlated with age τ (23) = .46, p < .01, indicating older 
participants achieved higher sensitivity scores. No other characteristic or measure of specific 
cognitive domain was associated with sensitivity to emotion including depressive symptoms 
and general cognition as measured by both the (S)MMSE and DRS-2.
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Judgment response time
The response time to make judgments in Experiment 3a served as the dependant variable for 
this analysis. A log10 transformation was applied to the data from each participant because of 
a positively skewed distribution. Data remaining outside M + 3.0 SD were removed as 
outliers prior to analysis (6 responses, 0.4%). The analyses was performed on log10-
transformed data but are reported as raw response times. The median response time was 
calculated for each participant as a function of emotion, condition and expression type. 
Preliminary analyses revealed there was no effect of sex, handedness or presentation order, 
and therefore, these factors were not considered further. Data were subjected to a 3 (Emotion: 
happy/sad/feel) x 2 (Condition: show/feel) x 3 (Expression: genuine/posed/neutral) repeated 
measures ANOVA. The analysis revealed main effects of Emotion, F (2,44) = 23.55, p < .01, 
ŋp2 = .517, Condition, F (1,22) = 20.01, p < .01, ŋp2 = .476, and Expression F (2,44) = 10.00, 
p < .01, ŋp2 = .313 as well as Emotion by Expression F (4,88) = 8.30, p < .01 ŋp2 = .274 and 
Condition by Expression interactions F (2,44) = 6.96, p < .01 ŋp2 = .240, which are shown in 
Figures 18 and 19 respectively.
Post hoc testing (Tukey, p < .05) on the first interaction compared the response time between 
each emotion for each expression type and revealed there were no differences for neutral 
expressions (M = 2239 vs. 2793 vs. 2661 msec) for happiness, sadness and fear respectively, 
however there was a significant difference for posed (M = 2312 vs. 3954 msec & 3357 msec) 
and genuine expressions (M = 1683 vs. 3507 & 3451 msec). Specifically, response time was 
faster when making happy judgments than both sad and fear which did not differ from one 
another.
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Figure 18. Mean Response Time to Identify Facial Displays as a Function of Emotion and 
Expression: Experiment 3a 
In addition, the response time between each expression type for each emotion revealed 
significant differences. Specifically, faster happiness judgments were made to genuine than 
both posed and neutral expressions, which did not differ from one another. Slower sadness 
judgments were made to posed than neutral expressions. The response time to genuine 
expressions did not differ from either posed or neutral expressions. Finally, slower fear 
judgments were made to genuine than neutral expressions with no other significant 
differences between expressions.  
Post hoc testing (Tukey, p < .05) on the second interaction compared the response time 
between each condition for each expression type separately and revealed there was no 
significant difference between conditions for neutral expressions (M = 2455 vs. 2655 msec), 
but there was a significant difference between conditions for genuine (M = 2455 vs. 3041 
msec) and posed expressions (M = 2570 vs. 3819 msec). Specifically, faster judgments were 
made in the show condition than the feel condition.  
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Figure 19. Mean Response Time to Identify Facial Displays as a Function of Condition and 
Expression: Experiment 3a 
In addition, the response time was compared between expression types in each condition. No 
difference was found between expressions in the show condition but there was a significant 
difference in the feel condition, with slower judgments to posed than both genuine and 
neutral expressions, which did not differ from each other.
These results suggest that when attending to felt state healthy older adults were slower to 
judge posed expressions than genuine and neutral expressions. However, when simply 
judging whether emotion was being shown, there were no differences in response time 
between the expressions and judgments were faster than when considering felt state. In 
addition, healthy older adults were faster to judge happiness than sadness and fear, and 
different patterns of response times were found for each emotion. Only when judging 
happiness, was there a difference in response time between posed and genuine expressions. 
Specifically faster responses were made to genuine than both posed and neutral expressions. 
When judging sadness, healthy older adults were slower to judge posed than neutral 
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expressions, whereas when judging fear, they were slower to judge genuine than neutral 
expressions. 
Discussion
Older adults were sensitive to emotion specified in facial expressions regardless of whether 
they were asked to attend to felt state or not (i.e., show or feel condition). The findings with 
regard to happiness were expected, but the findings relating to sadness and fear were not, as it 
was predicted, older adults would not be sensitive to these emotions. In addition, older adults 
were sensitive to the differences between posed and genuine expressions of happiness and 
sadness when attending to felt state but not fear. In line with many other studies (Calder et al., 
2003; Gosselin et al., 1995; Hargrave et al., 2002; Kohler et al., 2004; Motley & Camden, 
1988; Rosen et al., 2006; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004a), participants in Experiment 3a were 
more sensitivity to happiness specified in facial expressions than to sadness and fear. They 
could establish the veracity of happiness and sadness, that is differentiate between posed and 
genuine expressions, equally well, although being sensitive to one was not related to being 
sensitive to the other. A specific sex difference was also found with males demonstrating they 
were more sensitive to the differences between posed and genuine expressions than were 
females, although further research based on larger sample sizes would be needed to establish 
the merit of the present finding. In addition, sensitivity to emotion was not reliably related to 
any background characteristic or cognitive function. Finally as predicted, participants were 
faster to judge genuine than posed expressions of happiness but they did not demonstrate this 
effect when making either sadness or fear judgments. 
Although Experiment 3a has provided clear evidence that older adults are sensitive to 
emotion specified in facial expressions and that they demonstrate selective ability to judge 
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the veracity of happiness and sadness, it is less clear whether individuals will spontaneously 
attend to affective information. Experiment 3b looked at whether sensitive to affective 
information manifests during the incidental viewing of facial expressions that do not require 
overt judgments.   
Experiment 3b: Priming task
The present study examined whether sensitivity to emotion can be demonstrated without 
imposing an explicit constraint to attend to facial expressions or to make explicit judgments 
about the facial expressions. A priming methodology was employed to investigate whether 
different types of facial expressions would moderate the response times to identify the 
valence of personality characteristic words. Given the findings of Experiment 3a, it was 
hypothesized that older adults would demonstrate sensitivity to emotion specified in facial 
expressions. Specifically, it was predicted that healthy older adults would respond faster to 
words when primed with emotion (genuine expressions) than when primed with simulations 
of emotion (posed expressions) or no emotion (neutral expressions). Consequently, planned 
comparisons will be employed to directly examine the difference in response latency between 
judgments preceded by posed, genuine and neutral primes. The time taken to identify positive 
words will be compared when preceded by genuine and posed primes as well as each to 
neutral. Likewise, the time taken to identify negative words will be compared when preceded 
by genuine and posed primes as well as each to neutral.
Method
Participants
The same 23 participants (female = 17) who completed Experiment 3a also completed 
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Experiment 3b.
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Materials
Word judgment task
The same seven facial displays (neutral, genuine happy, genuine sad, genuine fear, posed 
happy, posed sad and posed fear) and target words (5 positive: good, honest, sincere, loyal, 
kind and 5 negative: bad, mean, cruel, liar, selfish) were used from Experiment 1b.20
Design
The priming task involved a 7 (Prime: neutral/genuine happy/genuine sad/genuine fear/posed 
happy, posed sad and posed fear) x 2 (Word valence: positive/negative) design with repeated 
measures on both factors. 
Procedure
The procedure was the same in Experiment 3b as in Experiment 1b. Participants were asked 
to identify the valance of words as quickly and as accurately as they could. Each word was 
preceded by a facial display that was presented for 100 msec.
Results and Discussion
Data cleaning, as described in Experiment 1b, resulted in the removal of 22 (1.7%) incorrect 
responses and 15 (.9%) outliers from the data set prior to analysis. In addition, the data from 
one participant was removed because individual response latencies were consistently outside 
                                                
20 Each participant had a clear understanding of the words as evidenced by completion of word-definition task.   
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3 standard deviations from the group mean. The analysis was performed on log10-transformed
data but results are reported as raw response times for clarity. Figure 20 presents the response 
times to positive and negative words as a function of expression prime and word valence. 
A visual inspection of the data suggests that the predicted difference in response time to
identify positive words was not demonstrated, although the time to identify negative words 
looks slower following exposure to genuine compared to posed expressions of happiness. 
Analysis of variance was used to confirm these observations. Preliminary analysis revealed 
no effect of sex or handedness, consequently these factors were not considered further. A 7 
(Prime: neutral/genuine happy/genuine sad/genuine fear/posed happy, posed sad and posed 
fear) x 2 (Word valence: positive/negative) repeated measures ANOVA was used to compare 
the effect of expression prime on response time. 
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Figure 20. Response Time to Categorise Words as a Function of Facial Expression Prime and 
Word Valence: Experiment 3b
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No significant main effects or interaction was found nor did planned comparisons to assess 
the hypothesized differences in response times reveal any significant differences. That is, 
there was no significant difference in response time when identifying positive words when 
preceded by genuine compared to posed expressions of happiness or either compared to 
neutral. Likewise, when identifying negative words there was no significant difference in 
response time when words were preceded by genuine compared to posed expressions of 
sadness or fear or either to neutral. Although unplanned, the difference in response time to 
negative words preceded by happy expressions was examined. Response times were 
significantly slower following the genuine happy prime than the posed happy prime (M = 880 
msec vs. 808 msec). Contrary to predictions, participants did not demonstrate sensitivity to 
emotion specified in facial expressions and the only significant difference in response times 
as a function of expression prime was an inhibition effect rather than a facilitation effect as 
predicted. 
General Discussion   
As predicted, older adults were sensitive to happiness specified in facial expressions 
regardless of whether they were asked to attend to felt state or not. Contrary to predictions,
they were also sensitive to sadness and fear. In addition, older adults were able to 
differentiate between posed and genuine expressions of happiness and sadness when 
attending to whether the targets were feeling each emotion. An advantage for positive 
information was demonstrated by older adults being more sensitive to happiness specified in 
facial expressions than to either sadness or fear. However, they could establish the veracity of 
happiness and sadness, that is differentiate between posed and genuine expressions when 
asked to attend to felt state, equally well, and therefore did not demonstrate an advantage 
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with positive versus negative information in this skill. Older adults were faster making 
judgments about genuine expressions of happiness that provided affective information than 
posed expressions that did not. 
Experiment 3b was different to Experiment 3a in that each older adult was ostensibly
engaged in another task when exposed to the facial expressions. In the priming task there was 
no evidence that older adults were sensitive to emotion without explicit instruction to attend 
to facial displays and make overt judgments, as response times were not reliably different 
following exposure to the different types of expressions. Finally, the present study found that 
sensitivity to emotion specified in facial expressions was not related to any of the specific 
cognitive functions measured and, therefore, appears to be a distinct skill.    
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CHAPTER 5
Sensitivity to Emotion Specified in Facial Expressions: Individuals with Alzheimer’s disease.
Alzheimer’s disease (AD) is a progressive neurodegenerative disorder that is characterized by 
a deterioration of intellectual functioning and a change in personality (Hodges, 2006). The 
majority of past research has focused on the cognitive and psychiatric profiles associated with 
AD with surprisingly few studies examining how AD influences social functioning. 
Interpersonal and social problems are often, however, a feature of AD (Chiu et al., 2006). 
Given the association between social function and the ability to detect affective states in 
others (Ekman & Rosenberg, 2005; Shimokawa et al., 2001), one possible cause of 
impairment in social function in AD is an impairment in the ability to recognize emotions in 
others. Accordingly, the experiments reported in this chapter investigated the ability of 
individuals with AD to recognize the affective state of another person, and especially to 
differentiate between genuine and posed expressions of emotion. 
Individuals with AD experience pervasive structural and morphological changes in the brain
and early pathology is known to preferentially affect the medial temporal lobe structures such 
as the entorhinal cortex, hippocampus and amygdala (Boccardi et al., 2003; Poulin & 
Zakzanis, 2002; Rosen et al., 2005; Wenk, 2003). As discussed in Chapter 1, several studies 
highlighted the central role of the amygdala in emotion processing (Adolphs, 2002a; Adolphs 
& Spezio, 2006; Blair et al., 1999; Vuilleumier & Pourtois, 2007) and the hippocampus 
and/or amygdala-hippocampal junction have also been implicated in the modulation of facial 
expression perception (Holt et al., 2005; Reinders et al., 2006). Damage to these structures 
may well result in deficits during facial expression perception.
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The recognition of facial expressions in AD has been investigated in several studies and 
findings have been inconsistent, although the majority of studies do report some impaired 
performance relative to healthy elderly controls (Allender & Kaszniak, 1989; Cadieux & 
Greve, 1997; Hargrave et al., 2002; Kohler et al., 2005; Roudier et al., 1998). The present 
study investigated facial expression recognition in AD by employing the categorization and 
priming tasks detailed in Chapter 3. The simple instructions and response format are well 
suited to individuals with cognitive impairment. Simplifying the task, while retaining fine-
grain discriminations (i.e., posed versus genuine expressions) that are unlikely to produce 
ceiling effects, means that individuals with general cognitive decline are not disadvantaged in 
the testing situation. 
Given the overlap in neural structures known to support emotion processing and the areas 
involved in AD pathology, as well as the social problems that are characteristic of AD, it was 
predicted that individuals with AD would not be sensitive to affective state specified by facial 
expressions. The present study also investigated, without specific expectations, whether 
sensitivity to emotion was related to specific cognitive functions. A comprehensive battery of 
neuropsychological measures, as detailed in Chapter 2, was completed to assess the 
relationships between sensitivity to emotion and cognitive functioning. As in Experiment 2a, 
the judgment response time of individuals with AD was also examined. It was predicted that 
given the expected lack of sensitivity to emotion specified in facial expressions there would 
be no difference between expressions in the time taken to make judgments. 
159
Experiment 4a: Categorization task
Method
Participants
The participants were nine patients diagnosed with Alzheimer’s disease (AD, female = 3) by 
a Psychogeriatrican. Participants were recruited from the outpatient clinic of The Princess 
Margaret Hospital or from the Papanui Medical Centre both in Christchurch, New Zealand. 
They ranged in age from 69 years to 87 years (M = 76.8 years, SD = 5.7) and had on average 
4.1 years (SD = 3.9) post-primary education. Demographic characteristics are presented in 
Table 23. 
All AD participants had a diagnosis of possible or probable AD according to the criteria of 
the National Institute of Neurological and Communicative Disorders and Stroke and the 
Alzheimer’s disease and Related Disorders Association (NINCDS/ADRDA). Participants 
were required to have normal or corrected to normal vision, speak English as their primary 
spoken language and be aged over 55 years. Furthermore, participants were required to have 
no history of alcohol abuse or dependence, poorly controlled diabetes, or major depression in 
the last six months21 and no significant psychiatric condition unrelated to the diagnosis of AD 
that required hospitalisation. They were also required to have no serious history of 
neurological, thyroid, or cardiovascular disorder and not to be currently involved in trials of 
psychoactive drugs. 
                                                
21 One participant scored above the cut=off (>=9) on the GDS.
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Table 23. Demographic Characteristics of Participants in Experiment 4a
Mean (%) SD Range
Age 76.8 5.7 69-87
(S)MMSE 22.7 3.7 17-28
DRS-2 121.3 14.3 89-140
NART PVIQ 107.2 8.4 93-121
GDS 6.6 3.3 4-14
Education 4.1 3.9 0-13
Sex (% female) 33%
Handedness (% right) 89%
Materials
The facial displays used in Experiment 4a were the same as those presented to participants in 
Experiment 1a, in both the emotion categorization task and control sex categorization task. 
Participants were also required to complete the same general health screen and demographic 
interview.  
Cognitive Measures
Each participant completed a number of cognitive tasks in order to allow for between group 
comparisons (see Chapter 6) and to investigate relationships between cognitive functioning 
and sensitivity to emotion. Full details of each of these tests and the rationale for their 
inclusion can be found in Chapter 2. To achieve a composite score for each of the cognitive 
domains of interest, scores for all elderly participants within each domain were standardised 
and the mean score was calculated for each participant. The tests used to measure each 
cognitive domain and the Cronbach’s alpha for each domain have been reported in Chapter 4. 
General health screen and demographic information
The specific inclusion and exclusion criteria were verified for each participant by completing 
a standardised semi-structured interview (see Appendix H). A M.I.N.I. psychiatric screen, 
and interview, where applicable, was completed by each participant to assess the presence of 
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Axis 1 disorders according to DSM-IV criteria. No participant was excluded. 
Design
The categorization task involved a 3 (Emotion: happy/sad/fear) x 2 (Condition: show/feel) x 
3 (Expression: genuine/posed/neutral) design, with all factors being within subjects. The 36 
facial displays were presented in both the show and feel conditions, resulting in 72 trials.
Procedure
Each participant, with their support person/spouse, was invited to take part in a study 
investigating whether dementia influenced the ability to recognise facial expressions of 
emotion. The invitation was extended from the participant’s Psychogeriatrician or G.P. 
during a regular outpatient consultation. Each participant was advised of the specific 
inclusion/exclusion criteria and was provided with an Information Sheet that briefly outlined 
the study and his/her rights as a research participant (see Appendix L). The researcher
contacted individuals and their support person/spouse who had expressed an interest in 
participating in the study. Contact was made no less than one week following the invitation, 
to allow for consultation and consideration. Signed consent was obtained from each 
participant and from his/her support person or spouse (see Appendix M and Appendix O).
The participant was tested either on campus at the University of Canterbury or at his/her own 
home if appropriate (1). The researcher completed all testing sessions. The same testing 
protocol employed in Experiments 3a and 3b, as described in chapter 4, was followed with 
regard to the assessment of AD participants. 
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Results
Sex-categorization
Accuracy rates were calculated by establishing the percentage of correct sex identifications. 
The mean accuracy rate was 99%. (range = 94%-100%). The participants were reliably able 
to detect information relevant to sex identification from facial displays. Consequently, the 
control task was eliminated from further analysis. In addition, no participant was excluded 
from further analyses on basis of this task.
Emotion-categorization
The percentage of YES responses for each participant was calculated as a function of 
emotion, condition and expression type and is shown in Table 24
Table 24. Percentage of YES Responses by Judgment Condition and Facial Expression for 
Each Emotion: Experiment 4a
Judgment condition
Facial expression SHOW
(%YES)
FEEL
(%YES)
Happy
Neutral 36% 17
Genuine 100%a 94%a 
Posed 89%a 75%a  
Sad
Neutral 22% 36%b
Genuine 81%a 81%a
Posed 83%a 72%a
Fear
Neutral 19% 14
Genuine 64%a 72%a
Posed 78%a 61%a
Note. Significant difference in percentage of YES responses is shown with different subscript between 
conditions and between posed and genuine expressions within emotion.
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Preliminary analyses showed that sex, handedness and presentation order did not influence 
the dependant variable and therefore these factors were not included in subsequent analyses. 
Data were subjected to a 3 (Emotion: happy/sad/feel) x 2 (Condition: show/feel) x 3 
(Expression: genuine/posed/ neutral) repeated measures ANOVA. The analysis revealed main 
effects of Emotion, F (2,16) = 3.74, p <  0.05, ŋp2 = .318 and Expression, F (2,16) = 107.7, p
< .001, ŋp2 = .931 as well as a significant Condition by Expression interaction F (2,16) = 4.2, 
p < .05, ŋp2 = .344, which is shown in Figure 21. 
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Figure 21. Percentage of YES Responses as a Function of Expression Type for Each 
Condition: Experiment 4a
Post-hoc analyses (Tukey, p < .05) of the Condition by Expression interaction revealed no 
significant difference in the percentage of YES responses in the show and feel conditions for 
either genuine (M = 81.4% vs. 82.4%), or neutral (M = 25.9% vs. 22.2%) expressions. There 
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were, however, more YES responses to posed expressions in the show than the feel (M = 
83.3% vs. 69.4%) condition. Furthermore, in the show condition there was no difference in 
the percentage of YES responses to the genuine and posed expressions, but both were 
significantly higher than to the neutral expressions. In the feel condition, the highest 
percentage of YES responses was made to genuine expressions, the lowest to the neutral 
expressions with posed expression intermediate, and all differences between expression types 
reached significance. Participants, therefore, judged genuine expressions as both showing and 
feeling the target emotion but posed expressions as showing but not feeling the target 
emotion.
Sensitivity 
The data from the emotion-categorization task was further analysed using signal detection 
analysis. Two analyses were again conducted to look at (1) sensitivity to emotion in facial 
displays and (2) sensitivity to the differences between posed and genuine expressions. 22
As can be seen in Table 25 the level of sensitivity in the feel condition for the first analysis 
ranged from .71 to .78. Single sample t-tests showed the sensitivity scores were significantly 
greater than would be expected by chance (0.5, p < .01), indicating that participants could 
reliably detect emotional expressions from non-emotional expressions. The level of 
sensitivity observed in the show condition, when participants were not explicitly asked to 
consider affective state, ranged from .60 to .76. Single sample t-tests showed the sensitivity 
                                                
22 Single sample t-tests found the bias scores for happy and sad judgments were significantly different from zero 
in both conditions, (p < .05), indicating that participants did not adopt a more stringent approach when asked to 
attend to the felt state of targets and had a proclivity to respond YES. Conversely, the response bias when 
making fear judgements in both conditions did not differ significantly from zero. The formula used to calculate 
sensitivity takes response bias into account and therefore it is not considered further.   
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scores for happy (M = .76) and sad (M = .69) but not fear (M = .60) were significantly 
greater than would be expected by chance (0.5, p < .01). Sensitivity in the second analysis 
ranged from .41 to .58 across both conditions. Single sample t-tests showed that mean 
sensitivity scores did not differ than that expected by chance (0.5) for any of the target
emotions in either the show or the feel conditions, indicating that participants could not 
reliably detect the difference between posed and genuine expressions even when asked to 
attend to the affective state of targets. 
Table 25.Mean Hit (HIT) Rates, False Alarm (FA) Rates and Estimates of A’ by Judgment 
Condition for Each Emotion: Experiment 4a
Analysis 1 Analysis 2
Judgment condition HIT FA A’ HIT FA A’
Show Happy .90 .60 .76* .90 .86 .55
Sad .74 .53 .69* .74 .77 .48
Fear .61 .49 .60 .61 .70 .41
Feel Happy .86 .48 .78* .86 .77 .58
Sad .74 .54 .69* .74 .74 .49
Fear .68 .39 .71* .68 .66 .52
Note. Analysis 1 includes posed, genuine and neutral expressions.
Note. Analysis 2 includes posed and genuine expressions.
Note. A’ is compared to chance level of 0.5.
* p < .05.
Preliminary analysis showed no effect of sex, handedness and presentation order on 
sensitivity scores, and therefore these factors were not included in the following analyses. 
Separate 3 (Emotion: happy/sad/fear) x 2 (Condition: show/feel) repeated measures 
ANOVAs were conducted to assess the impact of emotion and judgment condition on both 
sensitivity scores. With regard to Analysis 1, only a main effect of Condition was revealed F
(1,8) = 5.58, p < .05, ŋp2 = .411, with higher sensitivity in the feel compared to the show 
condition (M = .73 vs. .68). Similarly, only a main effect of Condition was found in Analysis 
2 F (1,8) = 6.20, p < .05, ŋp2 = .437, with higher sensitivity to the difference between posed 
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and genuine expressions in the feel compared to the show condition (M = .53 vs. .48).  
Relationship between variables  
The relationship between sensitivity scores both within and across emotions was assessed 
using Kendall’s tau rank order correlations. The correlations were computed separately for 
(1) sensitivity to emotion in facial expressions and (2) sensitivity to the difference between 
posed and genuine expressions. Bonferroni-corrected significance levels (p < .006) were used 
to control for multiple comparisons. As can be seen in Table 26 there was no significant 
correlations within or across emotions. The participants who were sensitive in one condition 
were no more likely to be sensitive in the other condition; likewise, there was no relationship 
between being sensitive to one emotion and sensitivity to another. 
  
Table 26. Sensitivity Within and Between Emotions: Experiment 4a 
Happy Sad Fear
show feel show feel show feel
Mean SD τ τ τ τ τ τ 
Analysis 1 Happy (show) .55 .10 -
Happy (feel) .58 .17 .361 -
Sad (show) .48 .17 -.069 .678 -
Sad (feel) .49 .10 -.105 .000 .030 -
Fear (show) .41 .14 .135 -.121 -.203 -.235 -
Fear (feel) .52 .21 .367 -.030 -.114 -.203 .310 -
Analysis 2 Happy (show) .76 .09 -
Happy (feel) .78 .10 .051 -
Sad (show) .69 .09 -.303 .618 -
Sad (feel) .70 .09 -.552 .298 .634 -
Fear (show) .60 .13 -.347 .536 .351 .192 -
Fear (feel) .71 .15 .093 .101 .197 -.135 .194 -
Note. Analysis 1 includes posed, genuine and neutral expressions.
Note. Analysis 2 includes posed and genuine expressions.
* p < .006.
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Relationship between Sensitivity and Cognitive functioning
Kendall Tau rank order correlations were used to assess whether there was a relationship 
between sensitivity to emotion and cognition. Bonferroni-corrected significance levels (p < 
.008) were used to control for multiple comparisons. As can be seen in Table 27 no 
significant correlations were found, indicating that sensitivity to emotion was not related to 
performance in any specific cognitive domain. Such an interpretation should be accepted with 
caution, however, as several correlations that did not exceed conventional thresholds for 
statistical significance  were indicative of large effect sizes and accordingly are likely 
reflective of noteworthy relationships. Given the small sample size and the corrections made 
for multiple comparisons, it may well be that the present analysis lacked the power to find 
meaningful relationships between sensitivity to emotion and cognition. 
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Judgment response time
The judgment response time in Experiment 4a served as the dependant variable for this 
analysis. A visual inspection of the data showed a positively skewed distribution, therefore, a 
log10 transformation was applied to the data from each participant and data remaining outside 
M + 3.0 SD were removed as outliers prior to analysis (2 responses, 0.3%). The analyses was 
performed on log10-transformed data but are reported as raw response times. 
The time taken to make judgments was also analysed. Preliminary analyses revealed there 
was no effect of sex, handedness or presentation order, and therefore, these factors were not 
considered further. Data were subjected to a 3 (Emotion: happy/sad/feel) x 2 (Condition: 
show/feel) x 3 (Expression: genuine/posed/neutral) repeated measures ANOVA. The analysis 
revealed main effects of Emotion F (2,16) = 6.65, p < .01, ŋp2 = .454 and Expression F (2,16) 
= 4.84, p < .05, ŋp2 = .377 with no interactions. Post hoc testing (Tukey, p < .05) showed that 
faster happiness judgments were made (M = 2128 msec) than sadness (M = 3184 msec) and 
fear judgments (M = 3573 msec), which did not differ. In addition, genuine expressions were 
judged faster (M = 2506 msec) than posed (M = 3111 msec) and neutral expressions (M = 
3105 msec), which did not differ from one another.  
Discussion
It was predicted that individuals with AD would not be sensitive to affective information 
specified in facial expressions. Somewhat contrary to the prediction, individuals with AD 
were able to distinguish information that specified affective state from information that did 
not. Specifically, they were sensitive to happiness and sadness regardless of whether they 
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were instructed to attend to felt state or not, while they were sensitive to fear emotion only 
when instructed to attend to felt state. Individuals with AD were not, however, sensitive to 
the differences between posed and genuine expressions, they made no distinction between 
information that specified and information that represented the affective state of others even 
when explicitly asked to make judgments about how the targets were feeling. The judgment 
condition, that is being explicitly instructed at attend to affective state, did not facilitate 
differentiation between these expressions. Participants did, however, make faster judgments 
of genuine expressions than posed and neutral expressions
These findings also highlight that happiness was no more readily identified than sadness and 
fear. Individuals with AD were similarly sensitive to each emotion but similarly unable to 
distinguish posed from genuine displays of each emotion. The advantage consistently found 
in recognizing positive compared to negative emotion was not evident in the present study. 
There was also no relationship between the likelihood of being sensitive to one emotion and 
another. The participants who were sensitive to happiness, for instance, were no more likely 
to be the participants who were sensitive to sadness.  Similarly, there was no relationship 
between sensitivity to emotion and background characteristics or cognition. This suggests 
that sensitivity to emotion specified in facial expressions is a distinct skill and is independent 
of cognitive functioning, although larger sample sizes may be needed to confirm this finding. 
The results of Experiment 4a suggest that individuals with AD have limited sensitivity to 
emotion. Furthermore, the instructions to actively attend to affective state did not facilitate 
AD participant’s sensitivity to emotion in facial expressions. The present study also 
investigated whether individuals with AD would spontaneously perceive emotion when they 
are not required to attend to the information specified in facial displays. The following 
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experiment looked at whether differentiation of posed and genuine expressions manifests 
during incidental viewing of facial expressions that do not require overt judgments.   
Experiment 4b: Priming task
A priming methodology was employed to investigate whether different types of facial 
expressions would moderate the response times to identify the valence of words. Based on 
the findings of Experiment 4a, it was hypothesized that individuals with AD would not be 
sensitive to emotion specified in facial expressions, as evidenced by no significant difference 
in response time as a function of expression prime. 
Method
Participants
The same 9 participants (female = 4) who completed Experiment 4a also completed 
Experiment 4b.
Material
Word judgment task
The same seven facial displays (neutral, genuine happy, genuine sad, genuine fear, posed 
happy, posed sad and posed fear) and ten target words (5 positive: good, honest, sincere, 
loyal, kind and 5 negative: bad, mean, cruel, liar, selfish) were used from Experiment 1b.23
                                                
23 Each participant demonstrated an understanding of the words by completing the word-definition matching 
task. Prompts were given to each AD participant. Prompts included reading the definition aloud to the 
participant, asking in turn if each option was the best definition, and asking the participant to define each word 
in their own words and choose a definition that best matched their own definition.  
172
Design
The priming task involved a 7 (Prime: neutral/genuine happy/genuine sad/genuine fear/posed 
happy, posed sad and posed fear) x 2 (Word valence: positive/negative) x 2 (Word valence: 
positive/negative) design with repeated measures on both factors. 
Procedure
The procedure was the same in Experiment 4b as it was in Experiment 1b. Participants were 
asked to identify the valance of words as quickly and as accurately as they could. Each word 
was preceded by a facial display that was presented for 100 msec.
Results and Discussion
Data cleaning, as described in Experiment 1b, resulted in the removal of 159 (25.2%) 
incorrect responses and 6 (1%) outliers from the data set prior to analysis. The analysis was 
performed on log10-transformed data but is reported as raw response times. Figure 22 presents 
the response times to positive and negative words as a function of expression prime and word 
valence. Visual inspection of the data suggests that there is no pattern or trend toward a 
difference in response time as a function of expression prime, to confirm this, analysis of 
variance was performed. No effect of sex was found, consequently a 7 (Prime: 
neutral/genuine happy/genuine sad/genuine fear/posed happy, posed sad and posed fear) x 2 
(Word valence: positive/negative) repeated measures ANOVA was used to compare the 
effect of expression prime on response time. 
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Figure 22. Response Time to Categorise Words as a Function of Facial Expression Prime and 
Word Valence: Experiment 4b
No main effects were found and although this was predicted to be consistent the planned 
comparisons performed in Experiments 1b, 2b and 3b were also performed in 4b and no 
significant differences were found. These results suggest that individuals with AD were not 
spontaneously sensitive to affective state. It is noteworthy that participants made errors on 
more than a quarter of the word valence judgments. In addition, more errors (64%) were 
made to incongruent trials (e.g., when genuine happy display preceded negative word) than 
congruent trials.24 The effect of expression prime on error rate was investigated in the 
following analysis. A 7 (Prime: neutral/genuine happy/genuine sad/genuine fear/posed happy, 
posed sad and posed fear) x 2 (Word valence: positive/negative) repeated measures ANOVA 
revealed an Expression by Word valence interaction F (6,48) = 2.93, p < .05, ŋp2 = .268, 
                                                
24 It was not possible to perform this analysis with healthy young and healthy older adults as few errors were 
made by these groups. 
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which is shown in Figure 23. The same planned comparisons were used to assess the effect 
on errors as were used to assess the effect on response times. No significant differences were 
found. 
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Figure 23. Mean Errors as a Function of Expression Prime and Word Valence: Experiment 
4b
General Discussion
The present study investigated whether individuals with AD were sensitive to affective state 
as specified in facial expressions. Contrary to predictions, individuals with AD were sensitive 
to emotion and distinguished between information that did specify emotion (genuine 
expressions) from information that did not (posed and neutral expressions).  Participants 
perceived, however, information that specified (genuine) and information that closely 
approximated (posed) affective state without systematic distinction regardless of the emotion 
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being judged. That is, they did not differentiate between posed and genuine expressions. The 
present study also investigated whether individuals with AD were sensitive to emotion when 
engaged in a task that did not require them to explicitly attend to the facial displays or did not 
draw attention to the nature of the judgment required. There was no evidence that participants 
with AD were sensitive to emotion as neither response times nor error rates were reliably 
different following exposure to the different types of expressions. Finally, the present study 
found that sensitivity to emotion specified in facial expressions was not related to any
specific cognitive function and appears to be a distinct skill.  
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CHAPTER 6
Sensitivity to Emotion Specified in Facial Expressions: Group Comparisons
Chapter 3, Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 have reported findings from two emotion perception 
tasks that were completed by samples of healthy young adults, healthy older adults and 
individuals with AD, respectively. The purpose of the present chapter was to examine 
differences in sensitivity to emotion specified in facial expressions by making comparisons 
between the three groups of participants. The specific focus was to look at whether healthy 
aging effects sensitivity to emotion, and whether, given the effects of aging, AD effects 
sensitivity to emotion. To examine the two key comparisons the sensitivity of healthy older 
adults and healthy younger adults to emotion specified in facial expressions was compared. 
To examine the effects of AD, despite aging, the sensitivity of individuals with AD was 
compared to the sensitivity of healthy older adults. 
In previous chapters, the relationship between sensitivity to emotion and cognitive 
functioning has been examined by looking at the correlations between these two functions. In 
the present chapter, information is provided about the level of cognitive and behavioural 
functioning of the three groups. As can be seen in Table 28 there was a significant difference 
between the healthy groups and the AD group on all measures except for NART estimated 
verbal IQ. Specifically, on all measures individuals with AD performed more poorly than 
healthy adults did. There were also significant differences between the healthy young and 
healthy older groups. Higher IQ scores were found for the older group, but the older group 
performed less well on the digit-ordering test than did the young group. These findings 
demonstrate that the AD group have significant cognitive impairment relative to individuals 
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of similar age without AD. Differences in verbal IQ do not offer any explanation for group 
differences in sensitivity as there was no relationship between IQ and sensitivity to emotion 
in the healthy either young or older adult groups.  
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The categorization tasks reported in previous chapters, yielded sensitivity scores which as 
stated are used in the present chapter to make two key comparisons. The first comparison is 
to establish if there are age-related effects in sensitivity to emotion and the second 
comparison is to establish if AD effects sensitivity, given any age effects. The sensitivity 
scores from the two healthy young groups have been combined to form a single healthy 
young adult group. 25 Results from a group matching analysis are reported first, followed by 
the results from two case-matched analyses. The time taken to make judgments was also 
recorded in the categorization task and will be compared between groups in the present 
chapter. The first case-matched analysis compared healthy young and healthy older adults 
matched for NART estimated verbal IQ to control for intelligence. The second compared 
healthy older adults and individuals with AD matched by age and NART estimated IQ.
Reporting comparisons from two case-matched designs was preferable to matching 
participants from each of the three groups as closer matches could be achieved within pairs 
with regard to verbal IQ. Only Group effects, where relevant, are reported given other effects 
have been reported in the earlier chapters. 
The large difference in response latency and error rate found between groups in the priming 
task, in particular, between the AD and healthy older adult groups, makes it difficult to 
perform meaningful statistical comparisons. Consequently, the final section of the present 
chapter will discuss the different pattern of results found between the groups, rather than state 
statistical comparisons.     
                                                
25 There were no significant differences between the two healthy young groups.
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Group-matched Comparisons
Table 29 presents estimates of sensitivity (A’) from analysis 1 as a function of group, emotion 
and judgment condition. As discussed previously, Analysis 1 included all expressions to look 
at sensitivity to emotion in facial displays; that is being able to detect information in the face 
that specifies affective state from information that does not.
The level of sensitivity ranged from .60 to .80 in the show condition and .67 to .87 in the feel 
condition. As reported in the previous chapters, sensitivity scores were significantly greater 
than chance (0.5) for each group with the exception of fear in the show condition for the AD 
group. Each group was therefore able to detect information in facial expressions that 
specified underlying affective state and distinguish this from facial expressions that did not 
specify emotion. Furthermore each group was able to do so regardless of whether they were 
explicitly asked to judge felt state or not, the only exception being when AD participants 
were making judgments about fear expressions in the show condition. 
Table 29. Comparison between Groups on Estimates of A’ by Judgment Condition and 
Emotion (Experiments 1a – 4a)
HYA HOA AD
Happy Show A’ .79 .80 .76
Feel A’ .86 .86 .78
Sad Show A’ .72 .68 .69
Feel A’ .76 .76 .69
Fear Show A’ .68 .71 .60*
Feel A’ .72 .72 .71
Note. A’ is compared to chance level of 0.5.
Note. * Not significant, p < .05.
To examine the differences more closely a 3 (Group: HYA/HOA/AD) x 3 (Emotion: 
happy/sad/fear) x 2 (Condition: show/feel) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last two 
factors was conducted to investigate whether there were group differences in sensitivity 
scores. A main effect of Group F (2,73) = 3.32, p < .05 ŋp2 = .083, Emotion F (2,146) = 
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27.53, p < .01 ŋp2 = .274 and Condition F (1,73) = 23.78, p < .01 ŋp2 = .246 was found, but 
there were no interactions. Post hoc testing (Tukey, p < .05) on the effect of Group showed 
that the AD group (M = .70) were less sensitive than the healthy young and healthy older 
groups (M = .76 & .75), which did not differ from one another. It appears aging did not effect 
the ability to be sensitive to emotional facial expressions and while individuals with AD were 
able to differentiate information that did from information that did not specify affective state 
at a level above chance, they were less sensitive than healthy individuals.     
A comparison between groups on sensitivity scores from analysis 2, when neutral expressions 
were removed, was also conducted. In this context, sensitivity refers to the ability to 
differentiate between posed and genuine expressions. As can be seen in Table 30 the level of 
sensitivity ranged from .40 to .59 in the show condition and from .49 to .77 in the feel 
condition. Single sample t-tests showed that mean sensitivity scores were no greater than the 
level expected by chance (0.5) in the show condition (p < .05), except for happy judgments 
made by the healthy older adult group. A lack of sensitivity in the show condition is not 
unexpected given the responses made to neutral expressions have been removed. As stated, 
analysis 2 looks specifically at whether participants discriminated between posed and genuine 
expressions. It would be expected that sensitivity to these differences would manifest in the 
feel condition where participants were instructed to consider the felt state of targets. In the 
feel condition the two healthy groups produced sensitivity scores greater than chance when 
making happy and sad judgments whereas the AD group did not. This indicates that healthy 
adults were able to differentiate between posed and genuine expressions of happiness and 
sadness at a level above chance, but individuals with AD were not able to make such 
distinctions. 
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Table 30. Comparison between Groups on Estimates of A’ by Judgment Condition and 
Emotion (Experiments 1a – 4a, neutral data removed)
HYA HOA AD
Happy Show A’ .55 .59* .55
Feel A’ .77* .76* .58 
Sad Show A’ .54 .53 .48
Feel A’ .72* .74* .49 
Fear Show A’  .40 .51 .41
Feel A’ .55 .56 .52
Note. A’ is compared to chance level of 0.5, * p < .05.
To investigate group differences further, a 3 (Group: HYA/HOA/AD) x 3 (Emotion: 
happy/sad/fear) x 2 (Condition: show/feel) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last two 
factors was conducted on sensitivity (2) scores. This revealed main effects of Group F (2,73) 
= 4.83, p < .05 ŋp2 = .117, Emotion F (2,144) = 26.58, p < .01, ŋp2 = .270 and Condition F
(1,72) = 84.75, p < .01, ŋp2 = .541, as well a Condition by Group interaction F (2,73) = 4.11, 
p < .05, ŋp2 = .101, which is shown in Figure 24. Post hoc tests (Tukey, p < .05) on the 
interaction showed there was no difference between groups in the show condition (M = .49 & 
.54 & .48), with no group demonstrating sensitivity to the difference between posed and 
genuine expressions. In the feel condition there were significant differences between the AD 
group and both healthy groups, which did not differ from each other (M = .53 vs .68 & .68). 
In addition, sensitivity was higher in the feel than show condition for the healthy young 
groups, but not the AD group. When explicitly asked to attend to the felt state of targets, 
healthy adults were able to differentiate between posed and genuine expressions but 
individuals with AD were not. 
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Figure 24. Sensitivity to the Difference Between Posed and Genuine Expressions as a 
Function of Group for Each Condition 
Case-matched Comparisons
The Effect of Aging on Sensitivity
The first case-matched comparison included fifteen healthy young adults and fifteen healthy 
older adults. A match based on NART estimated verbal IQ was made for each healthy young 
participant from the second healthy young study to a healthy older participant (+ 6 points). It 
was not possible to match five healthy young participants based on verbal IQ, therefore, their 
data were removed. The mean difference between verbal IQ was 2.4, which ranged from 0-6 
points. The ratio of males to females was the same for each group, although it was not 
possible to match based on sex. A dependent means t-test revealed there was no significant 
difference in years of post primary education between the groups (M = 7.5 vs. 5.8). The 
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demographic characteristics of each group are presented in Table 31. Analysis was 
performed on sensitivity scores calculated in Experiments 2a and 3a, which investigated 
participant’s sensitivity to affective state specified by facial expressions when explicitly 
required to make overt judgments.
Table 31. Demographic Characteristics of Case-Matched Young Adults and Older Adults
HYA (n=15) HOA (n=15)
Mean; % (sd) Range Mean; % (sd) Range
Age 22.9 (5.5) 18-34 73.0 (5.5) 64-87
NART PVIQ 106.5 (7.3) 91-117 108.1 (8.1) 87-117
BDI-II / GDS 5.6 (3.3) 0-13 3.3 (2.9) 0-8
Education 7.5 (2.2) 5-13 5.8 (3.7) 1-13
Sex (% female) 66.7% n/a 66.7% n/a
Handedness (% 
right)
66.7% n/a 80% n/a
Separate 2 (Group: AD/HOA) x 3 (Emotion: happy/sad/fear) x 2 (Condition: show/feel) 
repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted on sensitivity (1&2) scores. There was no 
main effect of Group, nor were there any interactions. This indicates there was no specific 
effect of aging on the ability to detect emotion from facial expressions and distinguish posed 
from genuine expressions.  
The effect of AD on sensitivity
The second case-matched comparison included nine AD participants and nine matched 
healthy elderly participants. Participants were matched on age (+ 3 years) and NART 
estimated verbal IQ (+ 6 points). One AD participant was matched to a healthy participant of 
the same age despite an 18-point difference in verbal IQ, as this was the only match.26 The 
demographic characteristics of each group are presented in Table 32. The mean difference in 
                                                
26 Results did not differ when this pair was removed (N = 8). Consequently, the pair was retained to improve the 
sample size.
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age was 1.4 years, which ranged from 0-3 years and the mean differences between verbal IQ 
was 4.4 points, which ranged from 0-18 points. A dependent means t-test (p < .05) revealed 
that there was no mean difference between the two groups in age (M = 76.8 vs. 76.2), PVIQ 
(M = 108.7 vs. 109.2), years of post primary education (M = 4.1 vs. 4.2) or GDS (M = 6.6 vs. 
4.1). As expected, (S)MMSE scores (M = 22.7 vs. 28.2) and DRS-2 (M = 121.3 vs. 141.2) 
scores were significantly lower in the AD group than the healthy older group. It was not 
possible to match based on sex as three male AD participants were better matched in age and 
IQ to a healthy female participant. Sex matched cases would have been preferable given 
healthy older males were found to be more sensitive to the difference between posed and 
genuine expressions in an earlier study. The ratio of males to females was higher, however, 
in the AD group. 
Table 32. Demographic Characteristics of Case-Matched Older Adults and AD Participants
AD( n=9) HOA (n=9)
Mean; % (sd) Range Mean; % (sd) Range
Age 76.8 (5.7) 69-87 76.2 (6.1) 66-87
(S)MMSE 22.7 (3.7) 17-28 28.2* (1.3) 26-30
DRS-2 121.3 (14.3) 89-140 141.2* (1.8) 138-143
NART PVIQ 108.7 (8.8) 93-121 109.2 (6.6) 95-117
GDS 6.6 (3.3) 4-14 4.1 (3.0) 0-8
Education 4.1 (3.9) 0-13 4.2 (3.5) 0-11
Sex (% female) 33.3% n/a 66.7% n/a
Handedness (% 
right)
88.9% n/a 77.8% n/a
* p < .01.
Analysis was performed on sensitivity scores calculated in Experiments 3a and 4a which 
investigated participant’s sensitivity to affective state specified by facial expressions when 
explicitly required to make overt judgments. Separate 2 (Group: AD/HOA) x 3 (Emotion: 
happy/sad/fear) x 2 (Condition: show/feel) repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted on 
sensitivity (1&2) scores. Main effects of Group F (1,8) = 14.91, p < .01, ŋp2 = .651, Emotion 
F (2,16) = 13.46, p < .01, ŋp2 = .627 and Condition F (1,8) = 5.43, p < .05, ŋp2 = .404 were 
187
found for sensitivity (1) scores with no interactions. Post hoc testing (Tukey, p < .05) on the 
Group effect showed the healthy older group was more sensitive than the AD group (M = .78 
vs. .70). 
Main effects of Group F (1,8) = 25.34, p < .01, ŋp2 = .760 , Emotion F (2,16) = 5.46, p < .05,
ŋp2 = .406 and Condition F (1,8) = 12.16, p < .01, ŋp2 = .603 were found for sensitivity (2) 
scores, as well as a Group by Condition interaction F (1,8) = 17.64, p < .05, ŋp2 = .440, which 
is shown in Figure 25. 
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Figure 24. Sensitivity to the Difference between Posed and Genuine Expressions as a 
Function of Group for Each Condition 
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Post hoc tests (Tukey, p < .05) on the interaction compared sensitivity scores between 
conditions for each group and found no difference between the show and feel condition for 
the AD group (M = .50 & .53) while there was a significant difference for the healthy group 
(M = .54 & .70). In addition, the scores in each condition were compared between groups and 
revealed no difference in the show condition between the AD and healthy groups, however, 
sensitivity in the feel condition was higher for the healthy than the AD group. 
In summary, aging did not effect sensitivity to emotion specified in facial expressions, nor 
did aging effect the ability to specifically distinguish posed from genuine expressions. In 
contrast, AD did effect the ability to detect emotion and in particular, the ability to 
distinguish posed from genuine expressions. 
Judgment Response Time 
Group Comparisons
To examine group differences in time taken to make judgments about facial displays in the 
categorization task a 3 (Group: HYA/HOA/AD) x 3 (Emotion: happy/sad/fear) x 2 
(Condition: show/feel) x 3 (Expression: genuine/posed/neutral) ANOVA with repeated 
measures on the last three factors was conducted on response times. This revealed main 
effects of Group F (2,49) = 23.70, p < .01 ŋp2 = .492, Emotion F (2,98) = 38.39, p < .01, ŋp2 =
.439, Condition F (1,49) = 21.48, p < .01, ŋp2 = .305 and Expression F (2,98) = 14.50, p < 
.01, ŋp2 = .228, as well as Condition by Expression F (2,98) = 8.72, p < .01, ŋp2 = .151, 
Emotion by Expression F (4,196) = 7.01, p < .01, ŋp2 = .125 and Condition by Emotion 
interactions F (2,98) = 5.35, p < .01, ŋp2 = .098 that were qualified by a three-way interaction 
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F (4,198) = 4.11, p < .01, ŋp2 = .077. A Group by Expression F (4,98) = 3.07, p < .01, ŋp2 =
.111 interaction was also found as in shown in Figure 26.  
Post hoc testing (Tukey, p < .05) on the Group by Expression interaction revealed there were 
significant differences between groups for each expression type. Specifically the healthy 
young group were faster than both the healthy older group and AD group when judging 
genuine (M = 1349 vs. 2729 & 2506 msec) posed (M = 1560 vs. 3112 & 3112 msec) and 
neutral expressions (M = 1300 vs. 2553 & 2965 msec). In addition, the differences between 
expressions for each group were compared. For the healthy young and older groups
judgments were slower to posed than neutral expressions with no other differences reaching 
significance. For the AD there were no significant differences.  
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The Priming Task
Group Comparisons
The priming tasks were conducted to investigate whether individuals would demonstrate an 
ability to differentiate between types of expressions (genuine, posed and neutral) without 
being explicitly instructed to attend to facial displays or to make explicit judgments. 
Response times as a function of expression type were analysed and planned comparisons 
were performed to examine the effect of genuine happy compared to posed happy 
expressions on the time to identify positive words. Both posed and genuine expressions were 
also compared to neutral. Only the healthy young group demonstrated sensitivity to the 
difference between posed and genuine expressions by responding faster to positive words 
preceded by genuine primes than posed primes. It is noteworthy, however, that the healthy 
older group also revealed a significant difference. Healthy older adults were slower to 
respond to negative words preceded by genuine primes than posed primes. Genuine 
happiness appears to have facilitated quicker responding to congruent stimuli in healthy 
young adults and inhibited the response to incongruent stimuli in healthy older adults. 
Planned comparisons also examined the effect of genuine sad compared to posed sad 
expressions on time to identify negative words. Both posed and genuine expressions were 
also compared to neutral. No group was sensitive to sadness as the response times did not 
differ as a result of any of the expression primes. The same pattern of results was found for 
fear in each group, that is, no group demonstrated sensitivity to fear emotion when engaged 
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in the priming task.27
The groups differed in overall response latency. The AD group (M = 2049 msec) was slower 
than the healthy older group (M = 799 msec) which was slower than the healthy young group 
(M = 261 msec). Groups also differed in the number of errors that were made. The AD group 
made 25.2% errors compared to only 1.2% and 1.7% for the healthy young and older groups 
respectively. There was no evidence that the type of expression prime effected the error rate, 
thus, there is no evidence that the AD group were sensitive to the affective state of the 
targets.
In summary, each of the groups demonstrated they were sensitive to happiness and sadness 
specified in facial expressions, although individuals with AD were less sensitive than both 
healthy young and healthy older adults. Unlike the healthy participants, individuals with AD 
were not able to differentiate between posed and genuine expressions of happiness and 
sadness. The present research did not find that aging effected sensitivity to emotion as 
specified in facial expressions and healthy older adults were as sensitive as healthy young 
adults were.
                                                
27 The first sample of healthy young adults was sensitive to fear in the priming task but this effect was not 
maintained when both samples of healthy young adults were combined to examine group differences.
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CHAPTER 7
General Discussion and Conclusions
The present research investigated whether healthy young adults, healthy older adults and 
individuals with AD were sensitive to the emotional state of others as specified by their facial 
expressions. Knowing the affective state of an interaction partner is a fundamental aspect of 
successful communication and social interaction. Such knowledge can be used to better 
predict how others may behave and therefore how they should be interacted with. Facial 
expressions provide a highly visible source of affective information; however, facial 
expressions are not always a reliable source of this information, as it is not always 
advantageous for individuals to reveal such dispositional information. 
Two tasks were employed in the present research - a categorization task and a priming task. 
In the categorization task participants had to identify each facial expression as either 
showing, or not and feeling, or not, the target emotion. The task was a modified form of a 
signal detection task and two measures of sensitivity were calculated. The first sensitivity 
measure assessed the extent to which participants were sensitive to the differences between 
faces that did and did not display felt emotion (i.e., differentiating genuine expressions from 
posed and neutral expressions). The second sensitivity measure assessed the extent to which 
participants were sensitive to the difference between posed and genuine expressions of each 
target emotion. In the priming task, participants categorized target words as being either 
positive or negative in valence. The words were preceded by a facial display. The priming 
task is based on emotional congruence. That is, recognition of the valence of the target words 
should be facilitated when preceded by a valence-congruent prime. Only genuine, and not 
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posed expressions, convey emotion and, hence, can be emotionally congruent with the target 
words. Therefore, if participants spontaneously attended to the nature of the facial expression 
primes (which they were told to ignore) they would show facilitated identification of 
emotion-congruent words after genuine expression primes, relative to posed or neutral 
expression primes. In other words, positive words would be identified faster when preceded 
by genuine than posed expressions of happiness and negative words would be identified 
faster following exposure to genuine than posed expressions of sadness and fear. 
The findings for each of the three participant groups have been discussed individually in the 
previous chapters, and some comparisons between groups were reported in Chapter 6. A 
recap of these findings is provided below including a discussion of the implications of these 
findings in terms of the understanding of the recognition of emotional states in others and the 
impact of aging and AD on the recognition of emotional states. Further consideration is given 
to the implications of these findings for the care and management of individuals with AD. 
Directions for future research are also considered.      
The present research found that healthy young and healthy older adults, as well as individuals 
with AD were sensitive to happiness, sadness and fear emotion specified in facial 
expressions. That is, the results from the first sensitivity measure showed that these 
individuals could all reliably detect, at a level higher than expected by chance, whether 
targets were experiencing emotion or not by attending to their facial expressions. 
Specifically, individuals could differentiate expressions of emotional experience (genuine 
expressions) from the other facial expressions (posed and neutral expressions). Furthermore, 
the present research provided evidence that aging does not adversely influence sensitivity to 
emotion. Healthy older adults were not only sensitive to emotion at a level higher than 
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expected by chance; there was no significant difference in the level of sensitivity between 
healthy young and healthy older adults. Although individuals with AD were also sensitive to 
the three target emotions at a level higher than expected by chance, they were significantly 
less sensitive than their healthy age-matched counterparts and the healthy young adults were. 
The finding that young adults can differentiate expressions of emotional experience from 
other expressions is consistent with previous research that has demonstrated healthy young 
adults are sensitive to happiness specified in facial expressions (Miles, 2005; Miles & 
Johnston, 2007). The present research extended these findings and provided evidence that 
healthy young adults are also sensitive to sadness and fear specified in facial expressions and, 
furthermore, that healthy older adults and individuals with AD are sensitive to the three target 
emotions as well. These findings suggest that sensitivity to emotion specified in facial 
expressions is a robust skill unaffected by aging and largely maintained in AD despite the 
difficulties found relative to healthy individuals.
The lower sensitivity scores of individuals with AD were largely driven by an inability to 
reliably differentiate between posed and genuine expressions. That is, the results from the 
second measure of sensitivity showed that individuals with AD were not sensitive to the 
meaningful differences between posed and genuine expressions even when they were asked 
to directly attend to whether the targets were experiencing emotion or not. When making 
judgments they did not differentiate between the two types of facial expressions and 
identified that posed expressions specified the experiencing of emotion as often as genuine 
expressions did. In contrast, the present research found that both healthy young adults and 
healthy older adults were sensitive to the differences between posed and genuine expressions 
of happiness and sadness and therefore, they could reliably detect whether targets were 
experiencing happy and sad emotion or whether they were simulating the expression of such 
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emotion. This suggests that they were sensitive to the meaningful differences between these 
two types of expressions and did not simply regard them as equivalent. It is worth noting that 
the healthy individuals were only sensitive to the differences between posed and genuine 
expressions in the feel condition, that is, they were sensitive when explicitly instructed to 
attend to the emotional state of the targets. It appears, therefore, that individuals need to focus 
on emotional experience before such sensitivity is manifest. None of the groups was sensitive 
to the different affective states underlying posed and genuine fear expressions. As discussed 
in Chapter 3 it may be that fear poses a risk to an individual that essentially outweighs the 
need to establish the veracity of fear expressions. The negative consequences of not detecting 
fear in the environment may see an individual adaptively consider even approximations of the 
emotional display as valid indicators of the underlying affective state. In contrast, the 
opportunity and concomitant consequences of being duped or manipulated by unauthentic 
fear is likely to be rare and trivial in comparison to not detecting authentic fear. Conversely, 
the opportunity and consequence of being duped by unauthentic happiness is likely to be 
relatively common in comparison to fear and can have stern consequences (approaching 
smiling but angry person), whereas not detecting happiness poses no immediate danger to the 
perceiver.
As with the first sensitivity measure, the particular focus of the present research was to 
establish whether aging and AD influenced sensitivity to the differences between posed and 
genuine expressions. The results showed that healthy aging does not influence sensitivity. 
Sensitivity scores on the second measure of sensitivity were not only significantly greater 
than chance level for the healthy older adult participants, but were no different from the 
sensitivity scores for the healthy young adults. In contrast, individuals with AD demonstrated 
impairment. Sensitivity scores for the AD participants did not differ from chance level, and 
they were significantly less sensitive than the healthy age-matched counterparts and healthy 
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young adults were. These findings suggest that AD compromises sensitivity to the different 
emotional states underlying posed and genuine expressions. These difficulties cannot be 
explained by factors relating to aging, per se, as no age-effects were found, rather the 
difficulties are evident as a consequence of the AD illness. 
Taken together the findings from the two measures of sensitivity suggest that there are some 
limitations with the sensitivity to emotion of individuals with AD that are not due to aging. 
When making judgments about genuine, posed and neutral expressions, individuals with AD 
could reliably detect whether emotion was present or absent, that is they could distinguish 
genuine expressions from posed and neutral expressions. However, when responses to neutral 
expressions were removed in the second sensitivity measure, as a means to directly compare 
the judgments made to just posed and genuine expressions, they did not systematically 
differentiate between these expressions. In contrast, the findings from the two measures of 
sensitivity also provides clear evidence that not only are healthy young and older adults 
sensitive to emotion specified in facial expressions and sensitive to the meaningful 
differences between posed and genuine expressions, there is no adverse influence of aging on 
this important aspect of social perception. 
There is an important caveat to the conclusion that aging does not influence sensitivity to 
emotion, however, that was revealed when examining the time taken to make judgments 
about each of the facial expressions. The findings for each of the groups has been discussed 
in previous chapters, however, the key finding to emerge is that healthy older adults and 
individuals with AD were considerably slower than healthy young adults to make their 
judgments. Although it is common to find that older adults perform tasks more slowly than 
young adults do (e.g., Lindeboom & Weinstein, 2004; Myerson et al., 2007), the extra time 
taken to make judgments about the facial expressions in the categorization task indicates 
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older adults have employed additional resources or relied on crucial resources for longer to 
complete the tasks. 
Consideration of the results relating to response times is of particular relevance to the healthy 
older adults. The examination of sensitivity scores revealed no differences between healthy 
young and healthy older adults, however, reports of emotion perception deficits and 
associated social functioning difficulties suggest that differences exist that sensitivity scores 
do not capture. It is important to acknowledge that social interactions are dynamic exchanges 
that are often subject to temporal constraints. Being sensitive to emotion specified by facial 
expressions requires not only accurate judgments but also quick judgments (Bargh & 
Ferguson, 2000). Making judgments too slowly likely compromises the adaptive function of 
accurate social perception (Ambady, LaPlante, & Johnson, 2001; Bar, Neta, & Linz, 2006). 
For example, effective social communication requires that individuals interact in a reciprocal 
fashion; each interaction partner is attending to and adjusting their behavior in light of, 
amongst other factors, information about affective state. If an individual is unable to detect 
and, therefore, tailor their response to accommodate such information then there is an 
increased risk of miscommunication and less successful interactions (Adams, Ambady, 
Macrae, & Kleck, 2006; Boraston et al., 2007). 
The slower response times of older compared to younger adults found in the present research 
might lead to these unsuccessful social interactions. Thus, while older adults can be sensitive 
to emotion via facial expression, the utility of such sensitivity in actual social interactions 
might be limited if they are too slow to detect affective information. Whether the additional 
resources that appear to have been relied upon in the present research would or could 
necessarily be employed outside the context of completing a measured task is unclear. 
Specifically, it is unclear whether older adults would take the extra time needed to make 
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accurate judgments during social interactions in real life settings. The artificial nature of the 
experimental context might have motivated the older adults to spend more time making their 
judgments and this additional allocation of time resources might have improved the accuracy 
of their judgments. Future research is warranted to assess whether response time might 
influence sensitivity to emotion and whether such compensatory measures would be evident 
in situations outside the laboratory.  
It is important to consider how the results of the present research align with the major 
findings of previous research investigating the influence of aging and AD on facial 
expression recognition. With regard to the healthy older adults, the present research is 
consistent with studies that report that the perception of happiness is maintained in older age 
(Calder et al., 2003; MacPherson et al., 2006; Phillips et al., 2002a; Sullivan & Ruffman, 
2004a; Wong et al., 2005). Furthermore, the task employed to assess the perception of 
happiness in the present research involved making more subtle judgments than traditional 
facial expression recognition tasks and therefore avoided many of the constraints associated 
with interpreting results that included ceiling effects. No support was found, however, for the 
many studies that found that the perception of sadness poses difficulties for older adults
(Calder et al., 2003; Keightley et al., 2006; MacPherson et al., 2006; Phillips, MacLean, &  
Allen, 2002b; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004a; Suzuki et al., 2007; Wong et al., 2005). The
healthy older adults showed no deficits regarding the perception of sadness compared to 
healthy young adults in the present research. 
Some of the studies reviewed in Chapter 1 suggested that difficulties with the recognition of 
sadness reflect neurological changes due to aging that effect regions important for the 
identification of sadness (Calder et al., 2003; Sullivan & Ruffman, 2004a; Wong et al., 2005). 
The present research, however, suggests that despite any neurological changes associated 
199
with aging, older adults were in fact able to recognize sadness, and were able to differentiate 
between posed and genuine expressions of sadness. It may be that the previous research, 
which has employed different types of facial expressions and displayed them within very 
different experimental tasks than does the present research, has shown deficits that are a 
function of the task rather than a general deficit with the perception of sadness. For example, 
the additional task complexity inherent in traditional facial expression recognition tasks, 
together with the neurological changes in areas subserving sadness perception, might 
culminate in a specific deficit in the recognition of sad facial expressions; one that is not 
evident with other expressions subserved by more intact regions. Alternatively, it may be that 
the posed expressions employed, together with the neurological changes, might culminate to 
produce the difficulties shown in previous research. Posed facial expressions might require 
that mental processes be invoked to take information that is representational and treat it as if 
it were indicative of emotion. Poor performance in previous research, like that found for sad 
and not disgust, for example, might only manifest when the mental processes required 
involves facial expressions linked to areas compromised by age. In contrast, the simplicity of 
the tasks and the ecological validity of the expressions used in the present research might not 
stretch the regions or networks that subserve the perception of sadness, and which, have been 
compromised by aging.  
The findings relating to AD, specifically the finding that individuals with AD are sensitive to 
emotion, are consistent with several studies showing individuals with AD maintain the ability 
to recognise facial expressions (Bucks & Radford, 2004; Burnham & Hogervorst, 2004; 
Fernandez-Duque & Black, 2005; Lavenu et al., 1999; Ogrocki et al., 2000). Whereas the 
previous research has focused on the recognition of facial expressions, the present research 
has provided evidence that emotion perception via facial expressions is maintained in AD. 
Several previous studies, however, have concluded that impairments exist because 
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individuals with AD performed significantly less well than healthy control participants did 
(Allender & Kaszniak, 1989; Hargrave et al., 2002; Kohler et al., 2005). While the present
research also finds this to be the case, it is argued that sensitivity is maintained, given 
individuals with AD were more sensitive than expected by chance. Rather the present 
research suggests that the sensitivity of individuals with AD is limited by a lack of specific 
sensitivity to the meaningful differences between posed and genuine expressions.
The lack of sensitivity to the specific differences between these expressions may be explained 
by the way in which individuals with AD attend to the face. Individuals with AD have 
previously been shown to scan facial expressions differently than healthy controls (Ogrocki et 
al., 2000). For example, individuals with AD focused less on the face and in particular the 
eye region than did healthy older adults when involved in a facial expression recognition 
task. They were also found to spend more time looking at irrelevant areas of the face than 
healthy older adults did (Ogrocki et al., 2000). A tendency to not fixate sufficiently on the 
eye region would seriously limit any attempt to detect the differences between posed and 
genuine facial expressions, in particular, as the physiognomic differences between these two 
types of expressions are most evident in the muscle movement around the eye region. For 
example, the Duchenne marker specifying felt happiness is evident only with fixation on the 
eye region. 
Findings of a specific deficit in the ability to differentiate between posed and genuine 
expressions might also be explained by fewer opportunities to practice and maintain the skill. 
Individuals with AD have less opportunity for social interactions (Mackenzie, 2006) and 
likely are less motivated to engage fully in social interactions. This is consistent with the 
level of apathy that is often associated with AD (Mizrahi & Starkstein, 2007; Weiner, Hynan, 
Bret, & White, 2005). Without suitable stimulation, the ability to detect the more subtle 
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aspects of facial expressions like the difference between posed and genuine expressions may 
deteriorate and this requires further investigation. Encouragement toward continued social 
interactions would benefit individuals for whom there is likely a lack of self-directed interest.
The present research also aimed to investigate the spontaneity of individuals’ sensitivity to 
emotion. In other words, the present research sought to establish if individuals ‘do’ detect the 
meaningful differences between different types of facial expressions rather than just ‘could’ 
they. The results from the categorization task provided evidence that individuals could be 
sensitive to emotion when explicitly instructed to attend to the target and the experience of 
emotion, but of particular interest was whether individuals do attend to the target and the 
experience of emotion without such explicit instruction. To this end, a priming task was 
employed and the findings suggest that only healthy young adults spontaneously attended to 
the different emotions underlying posed and genuine expressions. Specifically, they 
responded faster to positive words preceded by congruent positive facial expressions 
(genuine happy expressions) than incongruent facial expressions (posed happy expressions). 
Neither healthy older adults nor individuals with AD demonstrated they were sensitive to 
emotion spontaneously when engaged in a task that did not require them to make explicit 
judgments about whether others were experiencing emotion. That is, without the explicit 
instruction to attend to targets and attend to whether they were experiencing emotion, the 
older adults did not appear to differentiate between expressions that specified emotion and 
expressions that did not. 
These findings can be interpreted as indicative of a limitation in sensitivity to emotion 
specified in facial expressions in older age and AD. It may well be that the sensitivity 
demonstrated in the categorization task was achieved only through explicit instruction to first 
attend to the emotional states of the targets. This finding and such a conclusion could have 
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implications for the actual social interactions of older adults and individuals with AD. They 
may, for example, have no difficulties confirming whether someone is feeling sad via their 
facial expression when prompted by other, perhaps verbal cues, to take particular notice, but 
may not be sensitive without such prompts. Such prompts, however, rarely occur during 
social interactions. It is important for successful social interaction that individuals 
spontaneously attend to the affective state of interaction partners. Any factors, such as a lack 
of self-directed focus toward affective information that might lead to less successful social 
interactions, are likely to lead to less frequent social interactions. A variety of research has 
found such a consequence then impacts on quality of life (Arthur, 2006; Cavallero et al., 
2007; Deary et al., 2007; Li & Liang, 2007).
The contribution of social perception deficits to difficulties with social interactions is likely 
to be more acute in the AD population given the concomitant difficulties with cognitive 
functioning and other behavioral disruptions that also adversely effect social interactions. 
That is, social interactions, in general, can be impeded by other cognitive and behavioral 
functions as well as social perception deficits. Those individuals with cognitive as well as 
social/emotion perception deficits are likely to experience more severe disruptions in their 
social interactions. Attempts at communicating how one is feeling should perhaps involve 
multi-modal channels of expression and directed encouragement to attend to this information. 
It is likely that the communication of emotional experience to individuals with specific 
difficulties is enhanced by the effort to integrate information from more than one mode of 
expression (Flom & Bahrick, 2007). 
Another novel finding of the present research was that sensitivity to emotion was found to be 
emotion specific rather than a generalized skill that was applied or demonstrated across the 
three target emotions. Individuals appear to be selectively sensitive to specific emotions, as 
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there were no consistent relationships found across emotions. In other words, when 
considering the emotional state of the targets, those who were more sensitive to one emotion, 
for example happiness, were not likely to be the ones more sensitive to both sadness and fear. 
This suggests that individuals do not develop a general sensitivity to emotion but rather 
develop specific sensitivities to some emotions more than others develop. These findings are 
consistent with many previous findings from behavioral and imaging research that suggests 
the ability to identify facial expressions, as investigated by traditional facial expression 
recognition tasks, is an emotion specific skill (for reviews see Calder & Young, 2005; 
Vuilleumier & Pourtois, 2007). This is underpinned by the findings that disparate neural 
substrates underlie the perception of different emotions. 
The finding that sensitivity to emotion is specific is also consistent with an experiential 
explanation, however, in so far as, individuals become more sensitive to some emotions 
because of their direct experience with some emotions more than others. For example, the 
unique environment of different individuals may not offer as much opportunity to develop 
sensitivity to some emotions compared to others. Individuals who have more experience or
are highly motivated to differentiate between genuine (spontaneous) and posed (deliberate) 
facial expressions of happiness, for instance, do not necessarily also encounter the same 
opportunities or have the same investment in detecting such differences in sad expressions 
and vice-versa.
Another aim of the present research was to investigate the relationship between sensitivity to 
emotion specified in facial expressions and cognitive functions. Specifically, the aim was to 
identify which aspects, if any, of cognitive functioning were associated with this specific 
social perception skill. Several studies examining facial expressions recognition in AD have 
attributed poor performance to the general cognitive decline associated with the disease 
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(Albert et al., 1991; Bucks & Radford, 2004; Koff et al., 1999; Kohler et al., 2005; Roudier et 
al., 1998). However, the nature of the relationship between cognitive functions and 
perception of emotion was unclear. Again, the findings for each group are reported in 
previous chapters but it is noteworthy, given the associations previously found between 
cognitive functions and emotion perception, that when each group of individuals was 
considering the felt state of targets their sensitivity to emotion was not related to their level of 
functioning in any particular cognitive domain. That is, sensitivity to emotion specified in 
facial expressions was not related to working memory, episodic memory, semantic memory, 
attention, executive functions or visuoperception. 
The finding that sensitivity to emotion is not related to cognitive functions is consistent with 
only a few previous studies that have shown that the ability to recognize facial expressions is 
a discrete skill unrelated to cognitive functions (Allender & Kaszniak, 1989; Hargrave et al., 
2002; Maurage, Campanella, Philippot, Martin, & de Timary, 2008). The majority of 
published studies find that deficits in facial expression recognition are either accounted for 
by, or are related to, the general level of cognitive functioning of populations of interest. The 
identification of a relationship between cognitive functioning and facial expression 
recognition, however, may reflect that cognitive resources are more keenly required to 
complete traditional facial expression recognition tasks than are required during the tasks 
employed in the present research. The identification tasks employed in traditional facial 
expression recognition tests, for example, often require the participant to remember the verbal 
options provided, or when a printed list of response options is provided, the participant must 
still consider and be cognizant of the relative merits of each option. The cognitive skills 
required to complete such a task arguably overshadow or even interfere with emotion 
recognition. In contrast, the categorization task employed in the present research requires the 
participant to simply attend to the emotional state of the target and indicate whether 
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emotional experience is present or absent. Reducing the need to recruit cognitive resources 
when completing an emotion perception task might reduce the interdependence of these 
functions and highlight the disparate nature of cognitive functioning and emotion perception. 
One of the major findings of the present research that has been highlighted is that sensitivity 
to emotion is maintained in AD. The maintenance of the ability to detect whether emotion is 
being experienced by attending to facial expressions has important implications for the care 
and management of individuals with AD. Caregivers and people involved in the assessment 
and management of AD patients needs should be aware that although individuals with AD 
may be less responsive to the attempts to communicate with them, they are likely to still 
maintain the robust skill of detecting whether emotion is being experienced. Many studies 
have highlighted the frustrations and stresses associated with providing care for those with 
AD (Connell, Janevic, & Gallant, 2001; Covinsky et al., 2003; Hubbell & Hubbell, 2002) and 
specifically the challenges involved with social interactions (Gallagher-Thompson, Dal 
Canto, Jacob, & Thompson, 2001). These situations can lead to the experience of a variety of 
negative emotions that are likely displayed in facial expressions and therefore are likely to be 
perceived by individuals with AD. Frequently perceiving the negative emotional experiences 
of other people can have a detrimental effect on the mood of AD individuals (Goodman & 
Shippy, 2002; Joiner, 1994), particularly when there is still an awareness of the antecedent 
events and individuals with AD might perhaps feel like the cause of such experiences. 
However, the present research also found that despite sensitivity largely being maintained 
there is a specific limitation, in so far as, individuals with AD have difficulty telling posed 
expressions apart from genuine expressions. This too can have implications, because as well 
as the consequences of inaccurate emotion perception, such as approaching the smiling but 
angry person, individuals with AD are also vulnerable to deception. Individuals with AD 
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might accept all facial expressions at face value, so to speak, and miss the opportunity to 
detect when an interaction partner has decoupled their affective experience from their facial 
expressions. Specifically, for example, an individual with AD might erroneously accept an 
interaction partner as friendly, likeable and trustworthy when they display posed smiles that 
do not actually specify such attributes. 
As mentioned already, individuals with AD should be encouraged to continue participating in 
social interactions, not only to achieve the many benefits that social interaction has on quality 
of life and cognitive functioning, but also as a means to offer remediation to emotion 
perception skills through practice. Several studies have shown the benefit of more formal 
training strategies in the remediation of deficits in emotion perception in a variety of other 
clinical populations such as autism (Solomon, Goodlin-Jones, & Anders, 2004), intellectual 
disability (McAlpine, Singh, Ellis, Kendall, & Hampton, 1992) and schizophrenia (Combs et 
al., 2007; Combs, Tosheva, Wanner, & Basso, 2006). There are obvious differences between 
these groups and AD, particularly regarding the ability to learn new information, however, 
such examples provide insight into the feasibility of remediation and highlight the functional 
gains that can be made. Remediation that involves re-learning to focus more on the eye 
region of the face as well as discrimination training to differentiate examples of posed and 
genuine expressions might result in improved sensitivity to emotion in facial expressions. 
Any improvement in sensitivity to emotion is likely to improve social interactions and social 
functioning as well as reduce the risks associated with misperceptions. A behavioral approach 
to raise the operant level of verbal behaviors and re-establish verbal communication has been 
somewhat successful even with individuals with severe AD (Henry & Horne, 2000).
The findings that sensitivity to the difference between posed and genuine expressions was not 
related to cognitive functioning and that such sensitivity is unaffected by healthy aging 
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suggests that difficulties in this social perception skill might be a specific sequelae of AD and 
one worthy of consideration as a potential early social behavior marker of AD. Delaying the 
onset of AD by five years would result in half the number of cases worldwide (Kawas & 
Corrada, 2006; Plassman et al., 2007). Given there is evidence that degeneration begins years 
before the emergence of clinical signs (e.g., Bondi et al., 2008), the reasonably long 
prodromal period provides the opportunity to detect initial changes that might distinguish pre-
clinical AD from normal aging. Early detection has implications for early treatment and 
allows individuals with AD and their families more quality time to understand and prepare 
for the illness. There is a vast literature of research that has investigated the early cognitive 
changes that are sensitive to AD as a means to better identify preclinical AD patients (for 
reviews see Bondi et al., 2008; Grossman et al., 2006). Recent conclusions suggest the utility 
of cognitive markers is limited given there is a substantial overlap in scores between 
individuals who will and will not be diagnosed with AD (Backman & Small, 2007). 
Consequently, it is suggested that other markers such as social markers should be included in 
profiles as indicators to increase accuracy (Backman & Small, 2007). The utility of a test to 
distinguish posed from genuine facial expressions is worthy of further consideration and 
future research effort, especially given the need to develop measures that have high face 
validity and offer novelty to difficult to engage populations.  
The small sample size of the AD group in the present research limits the confidence one can 
have when generalizing the reported findings. However, the effect sizes found, when 
comparing individuals with AD to matched controls were large and therefore there was 
sufficient power in the present research. Larger sample sizes would be preferable, however, 
and would allow for the identification of subgroups of individuals with AD. AD is a 
relatively heterogeneous disease, in which the clinical presentation and neuropsychological 
profiles can vary considerably. Few studies examining facial expression recognition have 
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identified, for example, predominantly right and left hemisphere impaired AD groups 
(Cadieux & Greve, 1997). Cadieux and Greve (1997) report that different patterns of 
performance were seen as a function of which hemisphere was predominantly impaired. 
Given the hemispheric advantages often reported in relation to emotion perception, future 
research would benefit from any attempt to consider such variance to improve the assignment 
of participants to more homogeneous groups.
Of particular relevance for future research is to examine the differential performance of 
individuals with various types of neurodegenerative diseases and different types of dementia 
in particular. Research looking at the differences in facial expression recognition between AD 
and Fronto-temporal dementia (FTD), for instance, cite comparable levels of cognitive 
decline yet show more impairment in expression recognition by participants with FTD than 
AD. Traditional measures of facial expression recognition might tap into aspects of cognitive 
functioning that are also more keenly effected in FTD than AD. That is, despite similar levels 
of general cognitive function, the cognitive impairments associated with FTD more so than 
AD might be more heavily recruited during the completion of traditional facial expression 
recognition tasks. An investigation of emotion perception employing a methodology similar 
to the present research is warranted to establish if differences between dementia types exist in 
the sensitivity to emotion specified in facial expressions.   
Furthermore, future research is needed to more fully examine the influence sensitivity to 
emotion has on subsequent behavior. Miles (2005) reported that healthy young individuals 
were more likely to cooperate with interaction partners expressing genuine than posed smiles, 
and hence, empirically demonstrated a functional role of sensitivity to smile veracity within 
social interaction. Similar future research is required to empirically demonstrate the 
behavioral outcomes associated with the accurate perception of the emotional state specified 
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by posed and genuine expressions of negative expressions also. It is important to understand 
more about the consequences of accurate social perception so that better predictions can be 
made about the types of behaviors that result from inaccurate social perceptions. 
In conclusion, the present research provided one of few empirical investigations of emotion 
perception that has employed ecologically valid facial expressions. Each of the facial displays 
generated specifically for the present research provided the participant with information 
about whether emotion was being experienced or not by the targets from whom they were 
asked to make affective judgments. By providing individuals with information that did or did 
not specify emotion, the present research was able to offer empirical evidence that individuals 
are sensitive to sadness and fear specified in facial expressions as well as support previous 
findings relating to happiness. Furthermore, the present research has contributed to our 
understanding of the influence of aging on emotion perception by revealing that healthy older 
adults are as sensitive as healthy younger adults are to the underlying affective state of 
interaction partners. The limitation inherent in making slower judgments was identified and 
the present research highlights this as a pertinent area for future research. In addition, the 
present research extended our knowledge about the influence of AD on emotion perception. 
Individuals with AD continue to be sensitive to emotion specified in facial expressions, 
although the AD illness does adversely effect such sensitivity. Their sensitivity is limited by 
an inability to reliably detect the meaningful distinctions between posed and genuine 
expressions. The present research also provided novel evidence that sensitivity to emotion is 
emotion specific and unrelated to cognitive functions. It is argued therefore that the 
methodology employed in the present research offers the opportunity to investigate a specific 
aspect of social functioning that is more indicative of emotion perception than cognitive 
functioning. 
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Appendix A: Normative Ratings for IADS and IAPS Stimuli
IADS Ratings
Pleasure  Arousal  Dominance
No. M SD M  SD M SD
Walking 722 4.15 1.28 5.43 1.90 4.30 1.81
FemScream2 276 1.91 1.49 7.74 1.64 2.60 1.98
PuppyCry 105 4.76 2.72 5.44 2.17 4.86 2.15
BabyCry 261 2.84 1.61 6.49 1.66 3.77 2.16
Victim 286 2.03 1.34 7.35 1.67 2.47 1.72
CarWreck 424 1.95 1.61 7.82 1.56 2.16 1.72
BikeWreck 600 1.94 1.40 7.68 1.52 2.39 1.81
BabyLaugh 110 7.92 1.55 6.04 2.08 6.65 1.90
EroticFem1 201 7.84 1.52 7.36 1.74 6.57 2.15
ClockTick 708 4.38 1.28 4.56 2.07 4.65 1.85
TypeWriter 322 4.42 1.46 4.51 1.80 5.20 1.78
IAPS (female) Ratings
Pleasure  Arousal  Dominance
No. M SD M  SD M SD
Tumor 3261 1.70 1.43 5.92 2.60 3.52 2.35
Baby 2661 4.46 2.72 6.27 2.06 4.13 1.88
SadChild 2800 1.41 0.79 5.87 2.13 2.99 2.18
Infant 3350 1.76 1.72 5.78 2.21 3.28 2.50
DisabledChild 3300 2.35 1.30 4.96 1.98 4.57 1.79
Mug 7009 4.89 0.96 3.26 1.96 6.51 2.10
Checkerboard 7182 5.03 1.38 4.02 2.11 5.35 2.06
AttractiveMan 4572 7.52 1.37 6.30 1.78 6.21 2.32
EroticMale 4561 6.10 2.00 5.90 2.27 5.10 1.78
Women 1340 7.63 1.52 5.25 2.24 5.85 1.75
Monkies 1811 7.95 1.51 5.21 2.57 6.10 1.71
Adult 2020 5.97 2.13 3.41 2.01 5.64 1.77
Attack 6550 2.08 1.90 7.20 1.83 2.55 2.28
Spider 1205 3.22 1.62 5.94 2.22 3.72 2.15
Mutilation 3060 1.66 1.71 7.34 2.10 2.88 2.26
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Appendix C: Information Sheet: Facial Expression Generation
University of Canterbury
Department of Psychology
Information Sheet: Reactions to video clips: a pilot study
You are invited to take part as a participant in a pilot study looking at people’s 
reactions to a variety of film material.
In this study, we are asking people to evaluate some video clips and we would like to record 
people’s reactions to these video clips. It is important for our research that we record people’s 
natural responses to the video clips, so that we can then judge whether this process will be 
used in future research.  
You will be alone in the experimental room while you watch the video clips and you will be 
asked to look into the video camera as much as possible. As this is a pilot study, we will be 
showing you a number of different types of video clips. Some of these clips may appear to be 
bland and will not elicit any obvious reaction – this is fine! The reactions elicited will vary 
from person to person. For example, what somebody finds funny another person might find 
slightly embarrassing. We have no prior expectations about how any of our video clips will 
elicit reactions in viewers, so don’t think about your reactions until we ask you some specific 
questions. Just relax and enjoy watching the videos!
The second time you watch the video clips you will be asked to answer some questions about 
each one, including your own reactions to the clip. Again, remember that different things 
influence people in different ways, so do not worry about how you are responding, just 
answer the questions as you feel is appropriate for you.
Our research is concerned only with reactions to everyday situations. Consequently, there is 
no intention to expose participants in this project to material likely to produce extreme 
reactions. However, you are of course free to discuss your reactions or the video material 
with the experimenter and you are free to stop being involved in the study at any point.  If so, 
please just indicate this to the experimenter by coming out of the experimental room – the 
experimenter will be in the adjacent room. 
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It is estimated that your participation in this project will take approximately 60 minutes. As a 
participant in this project, you have the right to withdraw at any time including the 
withdrawal of any information you provide. 
The results of this research may be published, but you will not at any stage be identified as a 
participant. You will be provided with a further opportunity at the completion of this project 
to consider whether you wish to give permission for your information to be used in future 
research, and therefore, any subsequent publication.
This project is being conducted at the University of Canterbury, under the supervision of Dr 
Lucy Johnston and Dr John Dalrymple-Alford of the University of Canterbury and Dr 
Richard Porter of the University of Otago, Christchurch School of Medicine. If you have any 
questions or concerns about participation in this project please feel free to contact Tracey 
McLellan (03) 3642987, ext. 7704 or alternatively Dr Lucy Johnston ext. 6967 or Dr John 
Dalrymple-Alford ext. 6998.
The project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human 
Ethics Committee 
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Appendix D: Summary of the Procedure used to Generate Facial Expressions
Block 1 Task Relax
IADS Clock tick (708)
Typewriter (322)
IAPS Tumor (3261)
Baby (2661)
Sad child (2800)
Infant (3350)
Disabled child (3300)
Mug (7009)
Checkerboard (7182)
Task Task Passport photo 
ID card
IAPS Attractive man (4572)
Erotic male (4561)
Women (1340)
Monkeys (1811)
Adult (2020)
Attack (6550)
Spider (1205)
Mutilation (3060)
Task Pretend sad
Pretend fearful Reaction sheet
Block 2 Task Sing National Anthem
Stop
Permission to show tape
Stop
Confederate stimuli Fake sad reaction to blank slide
Fake fearful reaction to blank slide
Fake disgust reaction to blank slide
Scenario Display sad face
Display frightened face Reaction check
Sad song Think about sad event  Confirm reaction
Block 3 Scenario Walking alone at night
IADS Walking (722)
Female scream (276)
Puppy cry (105)
Baby cry (261)
Victim(286)
Car wreck (424)
Bike wreck (600)
Baby laugh (110)
Erotic female (201) Reaction sheet
Task Relaxation
IADS Clock tick (708)
Typewriter (322)
Task Pose a sad face
Pose a fearful face
Smile for a licence photo Reaction sheet
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Appendix E: Debriefing Sheet and Consent Form: Facial Expression Generation
University of Canterbury
Department of Psychology
Debriefing sheet: Reactions to video clips: a pilot study
Thank you for being involved in this project. You have been told that you were involved in a 
pilot study designed to evaluate which video clips were good at producing a reaction in 
people. Although this was one purpose of the study, we also wanted to capture genuine facial 
expressions of emotion on videotape for use in future studies. To enable us to do this, we did 
not initially disclose the full aims of the project when you were invited to participate. This 
omission was necessary, as participants are often inhibited in their expression of emotion if 
they experience any pressure to display specific emotions. 
Your ratings of how you felt after watching each of the video clips and participating in the 
tasks will be useful in allowing us to identify the various emotions elicited. The video footage 
produced in this study and the still shots taken from this footage will be used in various 
projects relating to the investigation of emotion processing. Subsequent work will involve 
showing the posed and genuine expressions of emotion to participant groups and looking at 
how sensitive people are to the differences. 
Now that you are aware of the real aim of the project, we would like you to consider whether 
you still wish to be involved and have your facial expressions used in our future studies. If 
you would like to continue in the project, please provide informed consent for the use of any 
video footage and photographs for future research. No identifying information about you will 
be attached to your photos. Of course, you may still choose to withdraw your photos at any 
time.  
If you do not feel comfortable with your image being used in future research, we will 
permanently remove your video footage as soon as possible. In this case, we thank you very 
much for your participation today and ask you to indicate your decision by completing the 
appropriate response on the attached consent form. 
If you have any questions regarding this information or any concerns arising from your 
participation in this project, please feel free to ask the researcher. You may also contact any 
of the following people by telephone (03) 364 2987, Tracey McLellan, ext. 7704, Dr Lucy 
Johnston, ext. 6967 or Dr John Dalrymple-Alford, ext. 6998. 
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Consent form
Generation of stimulus material for use in research examining the differentiation of 
posed and genuine facial expressions of emotion.
Introduced as:
Reactions to video clips: a pilot study
I have read and understood the description of the above-named project. On this basis, I agree 
to continue as a participant in this project and am willing to be included as a model in the 
resulting facial expression series. I understand that the facial expression series will be shown 
to others for the purpose of future research and I consent to publication of the results of this 
project with the understanding that no identifying information will be attached to my image.
I understand that I may at any time withdraw from the project, including withdrawal of any 
information I have provided.
NAME (please print):…………………………………………………….
Signature: 
Date:
_____________________________________________________________________
I have read and understood the description of the above-named project. I do not wish to 
continue as a participant in this project and I do not consent to the use of my photographs for 
future research. I understand that by choosing not to continue in this project, the information I 
have already provided will be destroyed as soon as possible.
NAME (please print):…………………………………………………….
Signature: 
Date:
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Appendix F: Summary of the Affective Responses of Targets used in the Present Research
Participant 3 
Affect/intensity  
Block 1 Task Relax
IADS Clock tick (708)28 neutral
Typewriter (322) neutral
IAPS Tumor (3261) disgust (H)
Baby (2661) neutral
Sad child (2800) sad (M)    
Infant (3350) sad(H)     
Disabled child (3300) sad (H)    
Mug (7009) neutral
Checkerboard (7182) neutral
Task Task Passport photo neutral
ID card happy (L)
IAPS Attractive man (4572) surprise (L)
Erotic male (4561) surprise (H)
Women (1340) happy (H)          
Monkeys (1811) happy (H)
Adult (2020) happy (H)
Attack (6550) neutral
Spider (1205) neutral
Mutilation (3060) disgust (H)
Task Pretend sad happy (L)
Pretend fearful neutral 
Block 2 Task Sing National Anthem surprise
Stop neutral
Permission to show tape surprise
Stop neutral
Confederate stimuli Fake sad reaction-blank slide -
Fake fearful reaction-blank slide -
Fake disgust reaction-blank slide happy (L)
Scenario Display sad face neutral
Display frightened face -
Sad song Think about sad event  sad(M)
Block 3 Scenario Walking alone at night
IADS Walking (722) fear (L)
Female scream (276) fear (H)           
Puppy cry (105) neutral
Baby cry (261) sad (L)
Victim(286) anger (L)
Car wreck (424) fear (L)
Bike wreck (600) fear (L)
Baby laugh (110) happy (H) 
Erotic female (201) happy (M) 
Task Relaxation
IADS Clock tick (708) -
Typewriter (322) neutral
Task Pose a sad face neutral
Pose a fearful face happy
Smile for a licence photo neutral  
                                                
28 The facial expressions elicited to stimuli in bold were selected for use in the present research.
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Participant 4 
Affect/intensity        
Block 1 Task Relax
IADS Clock tick (708) -
Typewriter (322) -
IAPS Tumor (3261) disgust (H)
Baby (2661) sad (M)
Sad child (2800) sad (H)
Infant (3350) sad (M)
Disabled child (3300) neutral
Mug (7009) neutral
Checkerboard (7182) neutral
Task Task Passport photo neutral
ID card neutral
IAPS Attractive man (4572) happy (H)
Erotic male (4561) surprise (M)
Women (1340) happy (H)
Monkeys (1811) happy (L)
Adult (2020) neutral
Attack (6550) fear (M)
Spider (1205) happy (L)
Mutilation (3060) disgust (H)
Task Pretend sad neutral
Pretend fearful neutral 
Block 2 Task Sing National Anthem surprise (M)
Stop neutral
Permission to use tape neutral
Stop neutral
Confederate stimuli Fake sad reaction-blank slide neutral
Fake fearful reaction-blank slide neutral
Fake disgust reaction-blank slide happy
Scenario Display sad face neutral
Display frightened face  neutral
Sad song Think about sad event sad (H) 
Block 3 Scenario Walking alone at night
IADS Walking (722) fear (L)
Female scream (276) fear (M)
Puppy cry (105) neutral
Baby cry (261) neutral
Victim(286) surprise (M)
Car wreck (424) disgust (M)
Bike wreck (600) disgust (M)
Baby laugh (110) happy (H)
Erotic female (201) happy (H) 
Task Relaxation
IADS Clock tick (708) surprise (L)
Typewriter (322) neutral
Task Pose a sad face neutral
Pose a fearful face neutral
Smile for a licence photo neutral 
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Participant 5 
Affect/intensity   
Block 1 Task Relax
IADS Clock tick (708) happy(L)
Typewriter (322) neutral
IAPS Tumor (3261) neutral
Baby (2661) sad (L)
Sad child (2800) sad (L)
Infant (3350) sad (M)
Disabled child (3300) neutral
Mug (7009) neutral
Checkerboard (7182) neutral
Task Task Passport photo neutral
ID card neutral
IAPS Attractive man (4572) happy (H)
Erotic male (4561) happy (H)
Women (1340) happy (H)
Monkeys (1811) happy (H)
Adult (2020) happy (L)
Attack (6550) fear (M)
Spider (1205) neutral
Mutilation (3060) neutral
Task Pretend sad neutral
Pretend fearful neutral
Block 2 Task Sing National Anthem -
Stop neutral
Permission to use tape neutral
Stop neutral
Confederate stimuli Fake sad reaction-blank slide neutral
Fake fearful reaction-blank slide happy
Fake disgust reaction-blank slide neutral
Scenario Display sad face neutral
Display frightened face neutral 
Sad song Think about sad event sad (H) 
Block 3 Scenario Walking alone at night
IADS Walking (722) neutral
Female scream (276) fear (H)
Puppy cry (105) neutral
Baby cry (261) fear (L)
Victim(286) surprise (L)
Car wreck (424) fear/surprise (L)
Bike wreck (600) surprise (M)
Baby laugh (110) happy (H)
Erotic female (201) happy (M)
Task Relaxation
IADS Clock tick (708) neutral
Typewriter (322) neutral
Task Pose a sad face sad (L)
Pose a fearful face neutral
Smile for a licence photo neutral  
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Participant 6 
Affect/intensity   
Block 1 Task Relax
IADS Clock tick (708) neutral
Typewriter (322) neutral
IAPS Tumor (3261) disgust (H)
Baby (2661) neutral
Sad child (2800) sad (M)
Infant (3350) sad (M)
Disabled child (3300) surprise (L)
Mug (7009) neutral
Checkerboard (7182) neutral
Task Task Passport photo neutral
ID card happy (L)
IAPS Attractive man (4572) neutral
Erotic male (4561) happy (M)
Women (1340) happy (M)
Monkeys (1811) happy (L)
Adult (2020) neutral
Attack (6550) anger (M)
Spider (1205) fear (M)
Mutilation (3060) surprise (M)
Task Pretend sad neutral
Pretend fearful neutral
Block 2 Task Sing National Anthem surprise (L)
Stop happy (M)
Permission to use tape neutral
Stop neutral
Confederate stimuli Fake sad reaction-blank slide neutral
Fake fearful reaction-blank slide neutral
Fake disgust reaction-blank slide neutral
Scenario Display sad face neutral
Display frightened face neutral 
Sad song Think about sad event sad (M)  
Block 3 Scenario Walking alone at night
IADS Walking (722) neutral
Female scream (276) fear (H)
Puppy cry (105) sad (L)
Baby cry (261) anger (L)
Victim(286) sad (L)
Car wreck (424) fear (L)
Bike wreck (600) surprise (L)
Baby laugh (110) neutral
Erotic female (201) neutral 
Task Relaxation
IADS Clock tick (708) neutral
Typewriter (322) neutral
Task Pose a sad face neutral
Pose a fearful face neutral
Smile for a licence photo neutral      
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Participant 7 
Affect/intensity   
Block 1 Task Relax
IADS Clock tick (708) surprise (L)
Typewriter (322) neutral
IAPS Tumor (3261) disgust (H)
Baby (2661) neutral
Sad child (2800) sad (L)
Infant (3350) sad (M)
Disabled child (3300) neutral
Mug (7009) neutral
Checkerboard (7182) neutral
Task Passport photo 
neutral 
ID card neutral
IAPS Attractive man (4572) neutral
Erotic male (4561) surprise (L)
Women (1340) happy (M)
Monkeys (1811) happy (M)
Adult (2020) surprise (L)
Attack (6550) disgust (L)
Spider (1205) neutral
Mutilation (3060) disgust (M)
Task Pretend sad neutral
Pretend fearful happy (L) 
Block 2 Task Sing National Anthem fear (M)
Stop happy (H)
Permission to use tape neutral
Stop neutral
Confederate stimuli Fake sad reaction-blank slide neutral
Fake fearful reaction-blank slide neutral
Fake disgust reaction-blank slide -
Scenario Display sad face neutral
Display frightened face  neutral
Sad song Think about sad event sad (H) 
Block 3 Scenario Walking alone at night
IADS Walking (722) neutral
Female scream (276) fear (H)
Puppy cry (105) neutral
Baby cry (261) neutral
Victim(286) surprise (M)
Car wreck (424) anger (M)
Bike wreck (600) anger (L)
Baby laugh (110) happy (H)
Erotic female (201) surprise (M) 
Task Relaxation
IADS Clock tick (708) neutral
Typewriter (322) neutral
Task Pose a sad face neutral
Pose a fearful face neutral
Smile for a licence photo happy (L)
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Participant 8 
Affect/intensity   
Block 1 Task Relax
IADS Clock tick (708) neutral
Typewriter (322) neutral
IAPS Tumor (3261) disgust (H)
Baby (2661) neutral
Sad child (2800) sad (M)
Infant (3350) sad (L)
Disabled child (3300) sad (L)
Mug (7009) neutral
Checkerboard (7182) neutral
Task Task Passport photo neutral
ID card neutral
IAPS Attractive man (4572) happy (M)
Erotic male (4561) happy (M)
Women (1340) happy (H)
Monkeys (1811) happy (H)
Adult (2020) happy (L)
Attack (6550) fear (H)
Spider (1205) neutral
Mutilation (3060) disgust (H)
Task Pretend sad neutral
Pretend fearful neutral 
Block 2 Task Sing National Anthem surprise (M)
Stop neutral
Permission to use tape neutral
Stop neutral
Confederate stimuli Fake sad reaction-blank slide neutral
Fake fearful reaction-blank slide neutral
Fake disgust reaction-blank slide happy (L)
Scenario Display sad face neutral
Display frightened face neutral 
Sad song Think about sad event sad (H)
Block 3 Scenario Walking alone at night
IADS Walking (722) neutral
Female scream (276) fear (H)
Puppy cry (105) neutral
Baby cry (261) sad (L)
Victim(286) fear (M)
Car wreck (424) sad (L)
Bike wreck (600) sad (L)
Baby laugh (110) happy (M)
Erotic female (201) happy (M) 
Task Relaxation
IADS Clock tick (708) neutral
Typewriter (322) neutral
Task Pose a sad face neutral
Pose a fearful face neutral
Smile for a licence photo neutral 
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Participant 12 
Affect/intensity 
Block 1 Task Relax
IADS Clock tick (708) surprise (L)
Typewriter (322) neutral
IAPS Tumor (3261) disgust (H)
Baby (2661) neutral
Sad child (2800) neutral
Infant (3350) sad (M)
Disabled child (3300) neutral
Mug (7009) neutral
Checkerboard (7182) neutral
Task Task Passport photo neutral
ID card happy (L)
IAPS Attractive man (4572) neutral
Erotic male (4561) happy (L)
Women (1340) neutral
Monkeys (1811) neutral
Adult (2020) neutral
Attack (6550) neutral
Spider (1205) neutral
Mutilation (3060) disgust (M)
Task Pretend sad neutral
Pretend fearful happy (L)
Block 2 Task Sing National Anthem neutral
Stop happy (L)
Permission to show tape neutral
Stop neutral
Confederate stimuli Fake sad reaction-blank slide neutral
Fake fearful reaction-blank slide neutral
Fake disgust reaction-blank slide happy (L)
Scenario Display sad face happy (L)
Display frightened face neutral
Sad song Think about sad event  sad (H)
Block 3 Scenario Walking alone at night
IADS Walking (722)
Female scream (276) fear (L)
Puppy cry (105) neutral
Baby cry (261) neutral
Victim(286) surprise (M)
Car wreck (424) sad (L)
Bike wreck (600) surprise (L)
Baby laugh (110) happy (M)
Erotic female (201) surprise (L) 
Task Relaxation
IADS Clock tick (708) anger (L)
Typewriter (322) neutral
Task Pose a sad face neutral 
Pose a fearful face neutral
          Smile for a licence photo                  neutral
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Appendix G: Instruction Sheet: Categorization Task
The recognition of emotion: perceiving the experience behind facial expressions of emotion.
In this experiment, you will see photographs of people appear on the computer screen. Your 
job is to decide whether or not they are showing each emotion and whether or not they are 
feeling each emotion. For instance, sometimes when people smile it does not necessarily 
mean that they are actually feeling happy.
Each question will appear on screen for you to read and the experimenter will also read out 
each question. 
The photographs will appear one at a time. 
Your job is to answer the question for each photograph by pressing YES or NO. For example, 
the first question might ask, 
 “Are the following people showing happiness?” 
You will press the YES button if you think they are showing happiness, or
You will press the NO button if you think they are not showing happiness
The next question might ask, 
 “Are the following people feeling happiness?” 
You will press the YES button if you think they are feeling happiness, or
You will press the NO button if you think that they are not feeling happiness.  
Each photograph will stay on screen until you have answered YES or NO
There are six questions and each will begin with 3 practice photographs. 
Before we start – Feel free to ask any questions
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Appendix H: General Health Interview
General Health Interview                                                                     M / F
Today’s Date:                                       ID code:
Full Name:
Date of birth:                          Age:        GP & clinic:
                                                                   GP contact no.
Satisfactory / corrected vision:  Yes / No  and hearing: Yes / No
Check inclusion criteria: (tick if met)
□ English as a first language       
□ Normal or corrected to normal vision    
□ No history of alcoholism                       
No serious history of
□ neurological                        
□ thyroid                                  
□ cardiovascular                     
(not related to diagnosis of dementia)
□ No poorly controlled diabetes                 
□ No involvement in current trial of psychoactive drugs    
□ No sig. psychiatric illness requiring hospitalization        
□ No major depression in last 6 months                           
Previous main occupation:__________________________________
Years of education (post primary)____________________________
Current medications, including dose:
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Appendix I: Information sheet: Healthy Young Adults
Information Sheet
Recognition of Facial Expressions of Emotion
This study will examine if aging and dementia influences a person’s ability to detect posed 
and genuine facial expressions of emotion. Participants will include Alzheimer’s Dementia 
patients; patients with Lewy Bodies Dementia and/or Parkinson’s disease with Dementia; 
Fronto-Temporal Dementia patients and healthy non-dementia control participants of various 
ages. Our aim is to establish if dementia impairs or does not impair the ability to recognize 
facial emotion. We also will be able to tell if a test of emotion recognition can help 
differentiate different types of dementia.
Your involvement in the study will take approximately 60 minutes. We will give you some 
standardised tasks that are frequently used in this kind of research and for the actual facial 
expression test; we will show you several photographs of people on a computer screen and 
ask you some questions about the people you see. 
Please note we will seek your permission to advise your GP on your behalf should your score 
on the mood scale be of concern.
Your participation in this study is voluntary (your choice). You do not have to take part in 
this study, and you may choose to withdraw from the study at any time, without having to 
give any reason. The information you provide to this study will be coded for confidentiality 
and available only to the researchers. We will keep all coded information securely stored 
during the study and are required to safely archive this information once the study is 
completed. 
The results of this study may be published but you will not be identified as a participant. You 
can request a summary of the results of this study by circling YES on the consent form, 
although it may take some time for us to collect and analyse all of the data. We appreciate the 
time and effort required to participate in research and although we are unable to provide cash 
to participants, we can compensate you with a $10 voucher.
Please ask the researcher if you have any further questions
Contact details
Tracey McLellan Ph: 364 2987 extn. 7704 (daytime), Email: tlm36@student.canterbury.ac.nz.
Assoc Prof Lucy Johnston, University of Canterbury, Phone (03) 3642987 extn. 6967
Assoc Prof John Dalrymple-Alford, University of Canterbury, Phone (03) 3642987 extn. 6998 
Assoc Prof Richard Porter, Christchurch School of Medicine and Health Sciences, 
richard.porter@chmeds.ac.nz
The project has been reviewed and approved by both the University of Canterbury Human 
Ethics Committee.
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Appendix J: Consent Form: Healthy Young Adults
CONSENT FORM
The Recognition of Facial Expressions of Emotion 
I have read and understood the inclusion criteria required for this study and I meet these 
criteria.
I have read and understood the information sheet for people taking part in the study. 
I have had the opportunity to ask questions and I am satisfied with the answers I have been 
given. 
On this basis, I agree to participate in this study.
I consent to publication of the results of this study with the understanding that I will not be 
identified as a participant.
I understand that my participation in this study is voluntary (my choice).
I understand that I may at any time withdraw from the project, including withdrawal of any 
information I have provided.
I would like a copy of the results of the study                                          YES / NO
NAME (please print): ______________________________________________
Signature: ______________________________________________
Date: ______________________________________________
Address for results:
  
___________________________________________________________________________
I agree / disagree to the researcher informing my GP should my score on the depression 
rating scale indicate reason for concern. 
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Appendix K: Formulae for calculation of non-parametric indices of sensitivity (A’) and 
response bias (B”). 
Sensitivity (A’): 
• For H ≥ FA: A’ = 0.5 + [(H – FA)(1 + H – FA)] / [4H(1-FA)] 
• For FA > H: A’ = 0.5 - [(FA – H)(1 + FA – H)] / [4FA(1-H)] 
Response bias (B”): 
• For H ≥ FA: B” = [H (1 - H) – FA(1 - FA)] / [(H (1 - H) + FA(1 - FA)] 
• For FA > H: B” = [FA(1 - FA) – H(1 - H)] / [(FA (1 - FA) + H(1 - H)] 
H = hit rate, and FA = false alarm rate. 
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Appendix L: Information Sheet: Older Adults
Information Sheet
Recognition of Facial Expressions of Emotion
This study will examine if aging and dementia influences a person’s ability to detect posed 
and genuine facial expressions of emotion. Participants will include Alzheimer’s Dementia 
patients; patients with Lewy Bodies Dementia and/or Parkinson’s disease with Dementia; 
Fronto-Temporal Dementia patients and healthy non-dementia control participants of similar 
age. Our aim is to establish if dementia impairs or does not impair the ability to recognize 
facial emotion. We also will be able to tell if a test of emotion recognition can help 
differentiate different types of dementia.
Your participation is entirely voluntary (your choice) and you may take as much time as you 
need to make your decision. The research staff is available to answer any questions you may 
have before making a decision and we suggest that you discuss this decision with a friend, 
family member/ whanau support person. You are also welcome to bring a support person 
along to the testing. Participants and /or whanau may also request to say Karakia (blessings) 
before each session of cognitive testing.
About the study
This study is a thesis project and part of a Doctoral degree in Psychology by Tracey 
McLellan. The testing will be conducted at either the Van der Veer Institute for Parkinson’s 
and Brain Research, 16 St Asaphs St, Christchurch, the University of Canterbury, Ilam Rd, 
Christchurch or The Princess Margaret Hosiptal, Cashmere Rd, Christchurch. We will 
confirm the venue if you choose to make an appointment. 
What to expect as a participant
In total approximately 48 patients and 48 control participants will take part in the study. Your 
involvement in the study will require you attend 2 separate sessions that will take 
approximately 2 hours each. First, we will give you some standardised tasks that are 
frequently used in this kind of research. These tasks have been de designed to provide 
information regarding abilities such as memory, attention and problem solving. Most of the 
tests require short verbal answers, some require pen and paper answers. 
For the actual facial expression part, we will show you several photographs of people on a 
computer screen and ask you some questions about the people you see. 
You and your support person/caregiver will also be asked to complete some questionnaires 
about daily living activities at home that will take about half an hour. Because we need to 
match patients with control participants, we will also ask you some brief questions about 
‘who you are’, for instance, what is/was your occupation and how many years did you spend 
at school. Certain types of medication can interfere with the process we are investigating; 
accordingly, we will ask you to advise us of any medications that you currently take. 
Please note we will seek your permission to advise your GP on your behalf should your score 
on the mood scale be of concern or should your score on other measures indicate that further 
assessment is warranted. Your GP may discuss a possible referral. 
Benefits, Risks and Safety
We have arranged the sequence of tests to maintain interest and to minimise fatigue. In the 
unlikely event that a participant may experience tiredness while completing tasks, we will 
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add further breaks or, in the case of distress, terminate the testing. We have arranged several 
breaks and you of course are welcome to request a break or discontinue the tasks at any stage. 
No direct benefit for the participant is expected from taking part in this study; however, we 
hope to provide an interesting experience for those who kindly donate their time.
Participation and Your Rights
Your participation in this study is voluntary (your choice). You do not have to take part in 
this study, and if you choose not to take part, this will not affect any future or continuing 
health care. Even if you do agree to take part, you may choose to withdraw from the study at 
any time, without having to give any reason. The information you provide to this study will 
be coded for confidentiality and available only to the researchers. We will keep all coded 
information securely stored during the study and are required to safely archive this 
information once the study is completed. 
The results of this study may be published but you will not be identified as a participant. You 
can request a summary of the results of this study by circling YES on the consent form, 
although it may take some time for us to collect and analyse all of the data. We appreciate the 
time and effort required to participate in research and although we are unable to provide cash 
to participants, we can compensate your travel costs by providing you with $15 vouchers for 
each session. If you have any concerns about your rights as a participant in this study you 
may wish to contact a Health and Disability Advocate (telephone 03 3777501 or (outside 
Christchurch) 0800 377 77 66.
This project has received ethical approval from the Upper South A Regional Ethics 
Committee. The investigator agrees to an approved auditor appointed by either the Ethics 
committee, or the regulatory authority or their approved representative, and approved by the 
Upper South A Regional Ethics Committee reviewing the relevant medical records for the 
sole purpose of checking the accuracy of the information recorded for the study.
In the unlikely event of a physical injury as a result of your participation in this study, you 
may be covered by ACC under the injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation 
Act. ACC cover is not automatic and your case will need to be assessed by ACC according 
to the provision of the 2001 Injury Prevention Rehabilitation and Compensation Act. If 
your claim is accepted by ACC, you still might not get any compensation. This depends on 
a number of factors such as whether you are an earner or non-earner. ACC usually provides 
only partial reimbursement of costs and expenses and there may be no lump sum 
compensation payable. There is no cover for mental injury unless it is a result of physical 
injury. If you have ACC cover, generally this will affect your right to sue the investigators.  
Thank you for considering this study. If you have any further questions or you wish to make 
an appointment, please contact:
Tracey McLellan, Department of Psychology, Ph: 364 2987 extn. 7704 (daytime), Ph: 021 022 
53755 (mobile), Email: tlm36@student.canterbury.ac.nz.
Contact details for supervisors
Assoc Prof John Dalrymple-Alford, University of Canterbury, Phone (03) 3642987 extn. 6998 
Assoc Prof Lucy Johnston, University of Canterbury, Phone (03) 3642987 extn. 6967
Assoc Prof Richard Porter, Christchurch School of Medicine and Health Sciences, 
richard.porter@chmeds.ac.nz
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Appendix M: Consent Form: Older Adults
CONSENT FORM
             Recognition of Facial Expressions of Emotion
I have read and I understand the information sheet for volunteers taking part in the study that 
examines the recognition of facial expressions of emotion. I have had the opportunity to 
discuss this study and I am satisfied with the answers I have been given.
I have had the opportunity to use whanau support or a friend to help me ask questions and 
understand the study.
I understand that taking part in this study is voluntary (my choice) and that I may withdraw 
from the study at any time and that this will not affect my continuing health care.
I understand that my participation in this study is confidential and that no material that could 
identify me will be used in any reports.
I consent to publication of the results of this study with the understanding that I will not be 
identified as a participant. 
I understand the compensation provisions for this study as covered by accident compensation 
legislation within its limits.  
I understand that my Geriatrician/GP will be informed if my test scores, including my score 
on the mood scale, is cause for concern.   
This study has been given ethical approval by the Upper South A Regional Ethics 
Committee.  This means that the Committee may check at any time that the study is 
following appropriate ethical procedures.
I agree to an auditor appointed by the Ethics committee, or the regulatory authority or their 
approved representative approved by the Upper South A Ethics Committee reviewing my 
relevant medical records for the sole purpose of checking the accuracy of the information 
recorded for the study.  
I would like a copy of the results of the study. YES  /  NO
Address for results: ___________________________________________________________
I ________________________________________(full name) hereby consent to take part in 
the study: Recognition of Facial Expressions of Emotion.
And I consent to my GP being informed if any of my scores on tests indicate a cause for 
concern.
Signed: _____________________________ Date:_____________________
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Appendix N: Match words with Definitions task
Match these words with the best definition by drawing a line to connect 
them. 
LIAR Unkind or unpleasant
MEAN Causing pain or grief intentionally
HONEST Someone who tells lies
KIND Free from fraud or deception
CRUEL Only concerned with oneself without regard for 
others
LOYAL Of a sympathetic or helpful nature
SELFISH Marked by genuineness
SINCERE Faithful to a person or cause
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Appendix O: Consent Statement by Relative: Individuals with AD
STATEMENT BY RELATIVE/FRIEND/WHANAU
The Recognition of Facial Expressions
Principal Investigator Tracey McLellan
Participant’s Name ____________________________________________________________
I have read and I understand the information sheet for people taking part in the study examining the 
recognition of facial expressions. I have had the opportunity to discuss this study. I am satisfied with 
the answers I have been given.
I believe that relative/friend would have chosen and consented to participate in this study if he/she had 
been able to understand the information that I have received and understood.
I understand that taking part in this study is voluntary and that my relative/friend may withdraw from 
the study at any time if he/she wishes. This will not affect his/her continuing health care.
I understand that his/her participation in this study is confidential and that no material which could 
identify him/her will be used in any reports on this study.
I understand the compensation provisions for this study.   
I know who to contact if my relative/friend has any side effects to the study or if anything occurs 
which I think he/she would consider a reason to withdraw from the study.
This study has been given ethical approval by the Upper South A Regional Ethics Committee.  This 
means that the Committee may check at any time that the study is following appropriate ethical 
procedures.
I believe my relative/friend would agree to an auditor appointed by the Ethics committee, or the 
regulatory authority or their approved representative approved by the Upper South A Ethics 
Committee reviewing my relative’s/friend’s relevant medical records for the sole purpose of checking 
the accuracy of the information recorded for the study.  
I/my relative/friend would like a copy of the results of the study. YES/NO
I believe my relative/friend would agree to his/her GP being informed of
his/her participation in this study YES/NO
Name:__________________________Signed:__________________________Date ____________
Relationship to Participant:_________________ Address for results:___________________________
Statement by Principle Investigator
I Tracey McLellan declare that this study is in the potential health interest of the group of 
patients of which ________________________ is a member and that participation in this 
study is not adverse to his/her interests.
Signed: _____________________________ Date __________________________
